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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation is an analysis of criminal enforcement of digital copyrights.  I 
argue that an international prohibition regime to govern intellectual property rights (IPR) 
has emerged through systems of international trade and law enforcement.  The regime, 
or international system of norms and decision­making procedures, is supported primarily 
by the United States, the European Union, and multinational intellectual property 
industries, and these stakeholders are consistently creating measures to strengthen 
intellectual property (IP) enforcement to include criminal sanctions.  The question 
guiding the research is how the governance of IP enforcement through the international 
prohibition regime affects the legitimacy of intellectual property law enforcement.  I 
engage the research question through case study analysis that adopts a critical legal 
methodology and relevant stakeholder analysis.   
The case studies occur in the European Union, where the standardization of 
copyright among member states takes place to strengthen the European Union’s common 
market.  I conduct the case research through a critical legal analysis of policy 
documents, court cases, diplomatic cables, secondary sources and previous research on 
the cases.  The two cases include the international police raid of the file sharing website 
OiNK’s Pink Palace and the formation of and protest against Spain’s Ley Sinde, a law 
created under U.S. pressures to strengthen Spanish copyrights.  Two major findings are 
revealed:  First, despite the difficulty of establishing digital copyright laws that 
legitimize criminal enforcement, police agencies are increasingly involved in the 
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governance of intellectual property; second, the legitimacy of IP policy is contested by 
political actors when governance occurs through the mechanisms of a global prohibition 
regime.  As a result of these conclusions, I recommend that Access to Knowledge (A2K) 
advocates and policy proposals confront the expansion of police enforcement of digital 
copyrights, and recommend further study into the phenomenon of criminal enforcement 
of copyright. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
Intellectual property is a form of information policy that underpins the 
commodification of informational, communicative, and cultural goods.  The extent to 
which the law should commodify culture and information is the basis of political 
lobbying and activism from all sides of the debate.  This dissertation is a critical 
examination of intellectual property (IP) policymaking and the enforcement of 
international IP policies.  I focus in particular on the European Union’s enforcement of 
digital copyrights, as the European Union’s common market and information society 
initiatives create contested standards of emergent intellectual property law.  The IP 
debate is rooted in the struggle between the importance of communicating and sharing 
ideas and the economic value of creativity and innovation.  The debate takes heightened 
precedence in networked, informational societies that are constantly interacting with 
knowledge and creation online.  In a networked setting, IP laws that were initially 
designed for disputes between authors and firms spread their reach to everyday people 
interacting online (Braman, 2007, p. 62).  The problems surrounding the everyday 
practice of engaging with culture and information online have led to “range wars of the 
Internet” (Boyle, 2009, p. 31) over the prohibitions on access to knowledge online.  This 
dissertation is both a scrutiny of those range wars and an analysis of how new laws 
surrounding IP affect communication throughout culture and society.  I argue that 
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instead of reconfiguring policy and law to strike new balances between shared network 
culture and online commodification, international IP policy is moving to expand IP law 
and introduce greater criminal enforcement.  Once law enforcement agencies become 
more integrated into the governance of digital IP, the question of striking a balance 
between culture, information, and capital is transformed by policymakers into questions 
of crime and punishment.  The criminal enforcement of intellectual property policy also 
leads to the emergence of the IP prohibition regime that is the primary point of analysis 
in this study.  The methods used to operate prohibition regimes include criminal 
enforcement and international policing procedures involving extraditions and raids.  
Task forces and “copyright police” physically enforce IP law just as police agencies 
regulate drugs and other prohibitions.  Examples of prohibition enforcement abound 
across Europe and globally.  Peter Sunde, a co­founder of the file sharing website The 
Pirate Bay (TPB), was arrested by Swedish police after a two­year hunt by Interpol 
involving criminal charges in the operation of the website (Kreps, 2014).  Gottfrid 
Svartholm Warg, another TPB co­founder, was hunted down by police and extradited to 
Sweden for the same reason.  Extradition was also used as a tool against Richard 
O’Dwyer, a British student that ran TVShack.net, a hub for sharing television shows 
online (Halliday, 2012).  Kim Dotcom, the founder of the cyber locker site MegaUpload, 
was also threatened with extradition by the United States after being arrested in New 
Zealand (Johnston, 2012).  The Dotcom case is a vivid illustration of the criminalization 
and police enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR).  Seventy­six New Zealand 
police officers and two helicopters were dispatched to arrest the MegaUpload founder in 
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his mansion after he was indicted in the United States on criminal charges including 
conspiring to commit copyright infringement (Graeber, 2012).  The dramatic raid 
included police in paramilitary gear descending on the property from helicopters and 
attacking and arresting Dotcom (Graeber, 2012).  The New Zealand raid occurred after 
extensive cooperation between the FBI, U.S. Department of Justice, and New Zealand 
and Hong Kong police (Graeber, 2012).  The MegaUpload raid is stark evidence of the 
operations of an IP criminal enforcement regime.  The case studies given in Chapter III 
of this dissertation describe other instances of international police coordination toward 
IPR within the European Union.  I describe the escalation of IP enforcement by 
presenting a critical history of global IP enforcement and through case studies that 
document the emergence of an international prohibition regime to enforce digital 
copyrights.  The cases build on existing literature to describe the political economic, 
social, and cultural consequences of allowing international governance, law enforcement 
agencies, and multinationals to dictate the course of information policy, or policy that 
controls information creation, flows and processing (Braman, 2004, p. 1).  Democratic 
deficits, activist politics, and ineffective policy are all potential consequences of the 
prohibition regime increasingly surrounding digital copyrights.  Chapter I is an 
introduction to this project and includes a literature review that sketches the current 
debate surrounding the core concepts of the dissertation.  The literature review maps the 
discussion of the history and political economy of prohibition regimes, information 
policy and policymaking, cybercrime enforcement, and the social movement and activist 
politics that resist the global escalation of intellectual property rights.  I use the literature 
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to situate this study within a larger, ongoing discourse of critical legal studies and IP 
enforcement.  Critical legal studies is an approach that views the law as a political 
construct that reflects the interests of the most powerful stakeholders in a given society 
(Hutchinson, 1989, p. 4).   
The IP and information policy critique utilized here is informed by works from 
Braman (2004; 2007), Benkler (2006), Boyle (2008), Cohen (2012), and Drahos (2002).  
These authors’ research on IP and access to knowledge communicates the weaknesses of 
past and emerging IP laws and regulatory practices and details calls for policies granting 
greater digital freedoms for the public.  I review this critique with a focus on how, why, 
and by whom IP laws are enforced internationally.  The literature and case studies I 
provide examine the policy­making relationships between international governance 
organizations (IGOs), non­governmental organizations (NGOs), states, corporations, 
social movements, and activists.  Another contribution that I provide to the literature is 
the application of criminological research and theory to the existing IP discussion in 
political economic and communication texts. I use criminological studies to diagram 
how police organizations, including the FBI, Interpol, EuroPol, and others, influence 
policy and policing of international IPR.  I argue that international crime control 
complicates the reform of international IP by enabling violent police raids, property 
seizures, extraditions, and surveillance to enforce policies that are out of proportion with 
social norms.   
Chapter I evaluates the landscape of international IP law by first drawing from 
literature on modern international regimes (Krasner, 1981, 2009).  Regime theory is an 
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effective framing mechanism for international information policy because it provides a 
way to operationalize the impact that IGOs, states, markets, culture, technology, and 
informal normative structures have on international law and regulation (Braman, 2004, 
pp. 1, 12­13).  The international regime that I focus on throughout the study to analyze 
international IP law and policy is a global prohibition regime (GPR) as described by 
Nadelmann (1990), Andreas and Nadelmann (2006), and observed by Getz (2006) and 
Wrage and Wrage (2005).  Andreas and Nadelmann offer research in criminology and 
international relations to explain how and why social norms are prohibited by the state 
and international actors, and what qualities of norms make them more or less appropriate 
for criminalization on a global scale.  If an activity can be efficiently limited through 
criminal sanctions and law enforcement, the GPRs will be effective (Andreas & 
Nadelmann, 2006, p. 22).  If a GPR is not effective, the results can be damaging to the 
state and IGOs and result in democratic deficits, criminal enterprises, or other socially 
detrimental phenomena (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, pp. 22­24).  This dissertation’s 
analysis of the prohibition regime surrounding IP is concerned with the effectiveness of 
prohibitions to regulate digital copyrights, and I evaluate the processes of the prohibition 
regime through scrutiny of relevant literature and case research.  The original GPR 
research maintains that efforts to “police the globe” (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, p. 
23) should be carefully considered and selectively chosen, and I analyze how policing is 
affecting the international governance of IP as a feature of specific free trade treaties and 
harmonization initiatives.  Chapter II frames information policy and IP standards within 
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the European Union and discusses how the European Union’s history, institutions, and 
social norms limit and enable IP enforcement.   
I use Nadelmann’s (1990) model for prohibition regime formation as the basis for the 
model of an IPR GPR that I formulate in this dissertation.  Nadelmann’s international 
prohibition regime model has been utilized for studies of prohibition regimes 
surrounding drug trafficking (Levine, 2003), arms proliferation (Kelle, 2007), pollutants 
(Getz, 1995), business corruption (Wrage & Wrage, 2005), human trafficking 
(Papanicolaou, 2008), and tobacco (Campbell & Sato, 2009).  All of these GPR studies 
focus on the existence and emergence of prohibition regimes and note the effects of their 
success or failure.  I also utilize the GPR model to better understand the enforcement 
model of the current international intellectual property regime.  Andreas and Nadelmann 
(2006) briefly discuss the emergence of an international IP prohibition regime, and IP 
policy research from Sell (2010) extrapolates on the increased role of police 
organizations and criminal enforcement in the governance of intellectual property.  I 
build on both the regime and policy studies by exploring the arrangement of IP 
prohibitions in the international arena.   
I argue that the IPR GPR is largely coordinated by the most powerful states, IGOs, 
multinational corporations (MNCs), and international police cooperation.  The 
intellectual property prohibition regime is potentially problematic because criminal 
enforcement disregards the underlying cultural and social value of cultural and 
information goods in favor of solely combating theft and digital piracy.  If IP policy 
cannot be effectively enforced and socially legitimated, the prohibition regime enforcing 
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the policy could inflict a loss of legitimacy and democratic deficits against law and 
policymaking institutions.  I explore the concept of legitimacy through international 
relations research from Hurd (1999) and Machida (2009) in Chapter I and the literature 
on democratic deficits in the European Union in Chapter II. Legitimacy and democratic 
deficits, or a lack of democratic accountability and representation in governance, are 
highlighted to demonstrate how international prohibitions on communication 
technologies can alter the inherited ties between international institutions, states, and 
society. 
The legitimacy loss potentially inflicted by the IPR GPR is reflective of power 
relations within international governance.  I explain the operation of these power 
relations with an overview of literature discussing the international political economy.  I 
use analysis of the political economy of communication from Mosco (2009), Fuchs 
(2008, 2011), and Schiller (1999) to differentiate information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) from other prohibited activities—such as the drug or arms trades—
that are regulated by GPRs.  Communication technologies affect the way that people 
communicate, create, and access knowledge.  The results of the struggles for control 
over knowledge are a determinant of political economic and social power.  The political 
economic analysis clarifies what rights are at stake in the struggle for access to 
knowledge via ICTs and to analyze power distribution in the struggle for influence over 
the path of IP policy formation.  
The construction of rights to informational and cultural goods is crafted through 
information policy.  I use Braman’s (2007) research to dissect how information policy is 
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constructed, how it regulates the use and innovation of ICTs, whom information policy 
is crafted to benefit, and the types of oppositional actors that emerge to contest these 
policies.  I also use criminology research to underscore the difficulty of information 
policy regulating ICTs.  Cybercrime studies posit that digital copyrights are extremely 
difficult to enforce (Towers, 2011; Kigerl, 2012) and that police organizations are by 
design incapable of dealing with the social and cultural points of contention surrounding 
digital IP (Lemieux, 2010; Leman­Langlois, 2012).  I discuss the social movement actors 
who do engage with digital IP issues by reviewing literature emphasizing the human 
right of A2K and the development of a democratic agenda for policy surrounding 
creative works.  The A2K movement’s efforts at IP reform emphasize how the 
prohibition model for IPR is misguided in its aims to enhance the restrictions of 
intellectual property.  I observe examples of the A2K movement utilizing legitimate 
democratic processes for policy change and examples of more radical hacktivist 
collectives using extra­political tactics. 
I seek to improve the literature on IPR by emphasizing the connections between 
international regime theory, criminology, information policy theory, and political 
economic and liberal legal critiques of power and justice as pertaining to IP and 
information societies.  An advantage of engaging in cross­disciplinary discussion is that 
it enables this research to consider several critiques and analyze a broad range of cases in 
order to improve the overall scholarly discussion of IPR.  A disadvantage to this cross­
disciplinary approach is that it invites the critique that the study is unable to apply a 
singular, established theoretical model and that certain categorical inconsistencies exist 
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between approaches; nevertheless, the benefit of improving the understanding of IPR 
and dispelling misconceptions that exist between approaches outweighs this risk.  The 
unique contribution of this study is an analysis of international police influence on IPR 
policy within the European Union.  The dissertation, including the framing of theory, 
creation of models, analysis of policies, and the cases themselves, also refines critiques 
of and approaches to IPR research by applying theory and argument to case research. 
The remainder of Chapter I is as follows.  First, I propose the research question 
guiding the study.  The second section is the literature review, which includes a 
theoretical background and history of the international IP prohibition regime and an 
evaluation of political economy and A2K critique of the regime.  I then describe the 
research design that will guide the case studies, and conclude by emphasizing the 
significance of the dissertation to the fields of IP and media studies.   
Research Question 
The research question guiding the study is, “How is legitimacy negotiated in political 
conflicts over intellectual property when the governance of IP occurs through a global 
prohibition regime?” This question stems from literature—described below in the 
literature review—that legitimacy problems may be embedded in the current IP 
prohibition regime.  The literature review provided in the next section outlines the 
potential problems that an IP regime can face when trying to attain legitimacy.  The case 
research, however, leaves open the possibility that IPR prohibition regime does not have 
a negative impact on social perceptions of institutions, and that criminal enforcement of 
IP policy is part of a legitimate regulatory system.  The possible quandaries faced by the 
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regime are explored through an analysis of regime literature, information and IP policy, 
and cyber policing in the literature review section of this chapter.  The problems 
discussed in the literature are all potential pitfalls of the IPR GPR and are points of 
analysis in the Chapter III case studies.  Before discussing the literature, though, clear 
definitions of “governance,” “regime,” and “legitimacy” are in order.   
The concept of governance that I use in this research is based on Sarikakis’ (2012) 
approach to governance in information and media policy.  Sarikakis (2012) understands 
governance as “a political process, through which decisions are made about the media 
and which is ‘located’ in procedures, formal and informal structures, spatio­temporal 
dispersions and beyond the clearly defined spaces of ‘government’” (p. 143).  
Governance, then, goes beyond the authority of individual governments and 
encompasses the creation and regulation of international institutions and policy regimes 
(Sarikakis, 2012, p. 144).  Within media governance, policy mechanisms and institutions 
within states and state­like entities such as the European Union work to guide and 
transform their regulatory interests into policy regimes (Sarikakis, 2012, p. 144). 
The most common definition of “regime” in the field of global policy studies comes 
from Krasner (1983):  
Regimes can be identified as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules 
and decision­making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a 
given area of international relations.  Principles are beliefs of fact, causation and 
rectitude.  Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and 
obligations.  Rules are specific prescriptions for actions.  Decision­making 
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procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective 
choice. (p. 2) 
Regime theory was chosen for this study because of its value to studying the 
international relations of information policy (Braman, 2004, p. 1).  As “specific 
prescriptions for actions” (Krasner, 1983, p. 2), regime theory offers an opportunity to 
analyze how international relations converge to govern a particular phenomenon, and 
this research, the phenomenon being studied is the enforcement of IPR.  The theory 
offers a framework for demonstrating how technology and culture are as important as 
law and regulation to matters of state, (Braman, 2004, p. 1).  Regime theory offers an 
opportunity to analyze how norms and procedures govern policy­making procedures 
and, as such, provide an examination of what social stakeholders those norms and 
procedures benefit most in society.  Additionally, the state is prioritized as an important 
actor within regime theory, with the most powerful states contributing the most to 
regime formation (Braman, 2004, p. 8).  In the study of information policy, where the 
United States and European Union are at the forefront of policy formation and 
exportation, regime theory is especially important for analyzing how political, social, 
economic and legal structures are arranged to manage relations (Braman, 2004, p. 8).  
The importance of the state to this study makes regime theory a more appropriate model 
of analysis than other theories of international systems such as modern systems theory, 
which does not emphasize the continued social importance of the state in arranging 
international relations and instead emphasizes a notion of world society divided into 
subsystems of law and politics (Albert, 1999, p. 260).   Despite its fit for this study, 
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though, regime theory in Krasner’s (1983) ideation does require some corrective 
measures from other theorists.   
Fellow international relations theorist Strange has identified Krasner’s definition as 
over­broad and imprecise, but also noted that the definition is useful in practice as a 
mechanism to study the policy objectives of government and international organizations 
(Strange, 1988, p. 203). Regime theory is also useful in that it looks to institutions and 
norms and not only to states and markets as agents of behavioral governance in 
international systems.  Krasner’s (1983) definition holds that regimes are reciprocal 
relationships between states that are based on general obligations and long­term 
commitments (pp. 2­3).  For regime change or collapse to occur, the norms and 
principles of international institutions, not just rules or procedures, must change 
(Krasner, 1983, pp. 3­4).  A critique of a regime is an appraisal of an entire system of 
governance, as opposed to a critique of specific regulations or a particular state.   
Regimes consist of states, MNCs, intergovernmental organizations, and other elite 
institutional actors (Getz, 2006, p. 255).  For these institutions to be effective, they 
should be perceived as democratically legitimate (Machida, 2009, p. 374). A definition 
of legitimacy from international studies is the “normative belief by an actor that a rule or 
institution ought to be obeyed” (Hurd, 1999, p. 387).  In liberal democracies and 
institutions, legitimacy is dependent upon representation (Mather, 1999, p. 277).  
Democratic representation strengthens legitimacy by creating popular mandates for 
government activity requiring a government to be chosen under and subject to a system 
that has acquired popular sanction (Mather, 1999, p. 277).  Problems of legitimacy due 
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to a lack of representation from citizens are a common critique of international 
governance (Machida, 2006, p. 372).  A lack of legitimacy leads to democratic deficits 
that undermine the authority of and trust in states and IGOs (Machida, 2006, p. 373).  
Democratic deficits are understood to occur in situations in which citizens lack 
institutions that represent their interests and are unable to influence the governance of 
IGOs (Machida, 2006, p. 372).  There are a variety of reasons that international 
organizations foster legitimacy problems.  These include a lack of democratic input into 
governing mechanisms and attempts to encourage norms that are inconsistent with 
societies (Machida, 2006, pp. 375­376).  This dissertation explores literature and case 
look for evidence of whether or not democratic deficits and social norms undermine 
legitimacy within the IPR GPR.  I also analyze the political economic and social 
consequences of IP laws and regulations and the legal, political, and economic systems 
that produce them in order to produce a focused critique of international IP law.  The 
following literature review scrutinizes some of the core arguments used to make claims 
about the legitimacy of international regimes.  The review begins with a description of 
GPRs as discussed by Nadelmann (1990) and Andreas and Nadelmann (2006).  Regime 
critique within the GPR model founds the arguments about the IPR GPRs legitimacy 
that are woven throughout this dissertation.  The rest of the literature review 
incorporates theory on the political economy of communication, criminology, 
information policy, and the A2K movement to reinforce the critical history of the IPR 
GPR and sketch the landscape for the case studies.   
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Literature Review 
The literature review is divided into two major sections.  The first section discusses 
and links theoretical frameworks and mechanisms from international relations, 
criminology, and communication research to describe international regimes, 
international police cooperation, and information policy.  I expand on Krasner’s (1983) 
definition of an international regime, and discuss the relationship between international 
regimes and multinational regulation as described by Getz (1995).  I then focus on global 
prohibition regimes as both a historical and ongoing phenomenon that drives 
international enforcement, and I give examples of GPRs from Getz (2006) and Wrage 
and Wrage (2005).  I describe Andreas and Nadelmann’s (2006) model for how GPRs 
evolve and explain how the model applies to IPR.  A central mechanism of GPRs are 
international police cooperation, and so an analysis of criminological research on 
international police cooperation regarding IP and information and communication 
technology­based crimes from Lemieux (2012) and Leman­Langloix (2012) is covered 
as well.  I also analyze criminological theories of file sharing and digital piracy.  Legal 
and historical work on IP and trade regimes from Drahos (2002) and Johns (2009) is 
discussed in order to clarify the history of IP prohibitions and their ascent into the policy 
arena of international institutions.  I then provide an overview of information policy 
theory and the emergent information policy regime from Braman (2004, 2007) in order 
to emphasize how information is qualified through policy. This section describes several 
approaches—international relations’ regime models, criminological approaches to digital 
crime and international police cooperation, communication research on information 
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policy, IP and ICTs—in order to build a common theoretical framework of the 
international governance of intellectual property.  The literature review also evaluates 
potential obstacles to an IP prohibition regime from studies in international relations, the 
critical legal tradition, information policy, and criminology.   
The second section offers critiques of and alternatives to the systems, norms, and 
policies that make up the IPR GPR by introducing political economic and A2K 
descriptions of international law and policy and alternatives to them.  The second section 
ties the discussion on international regimes and policies to the political economy of 
communication.  This section emphasizes the traits of the political economy surrounding 
ICTs, intellectual property, and modes of regulation.  I examine critiques of the 
international political economy and the political economy of communication as offered 
by Strange (1988), Mosco (2009), Fuchs (2008, 2011), and Schiller (1999).  In 
particular, I look at how states and markets operate to commodify information and 
internationally implement intellectual property law through processes of spatialization.  
The second section of the literature review also provides an analysis of the role of ICTs 
in information­based economies, and ties the GPR model into the narrative of 
commodification and spatialization.  In the final portion of the second section, I hone in 
on critiques of and alternatives to the current IPR regime through a discussion of the role 
of intellectual property in an international system.  This final portion discusses the work 
of A2K scholars and activists including Kapczynski and Krikorian (2010), Benkler 
(2010), Cohen (2012), and Boyle (2008).  I analyze A2K literature on IP and copyright 
in particular to provide a framework for the legitimate social functions of intellectual 
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property policy.  The arguments provided by A2K scholarship supports access to 
knowledge, information, and culture, and points to A2K discourse and mobilization as 
necessary for creating a just international system norms and principles.  I conclude the 
literature review by stressing connections and a broader narrative that relates information 
policy and IP to a political economic critique of the IGOs, states, and power relations 
that exist within international regimes.   
Overview of Theories 
International regimes and the IP prohibitions. As mentioned above, regimes are 
“sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision­making procedures 
around which actors’ expectation converge in a given area of international relations” 
(Krasner, 2009, p. 113), wherein “actors” generally refer to states, multinationals, and 
other institutional actors (Getz, 2006, p. 255).  Regimes are socially constructed arenas 
and involve negotiation within a set boundary of expectations.  The most significant 
international regime since the 1940s is a liberal trade regime that exists to generate and 
protect the market interests of the most powerful, industrialized nations (Krasner, 2009, 
pp. 114­115).  Krasner (2009) contends that the norms and principles of this regime 
guide the rules and procedures that govern international trade and law enforcement (p. 
115).  The liberal regime was born of a need to reconstruct the world economy after 
World War II (Cohen, 1983, p. 320).  Chase­Dunn (2005), in a discussion of the rise and 
decline of core powers, states that U.S. power allowed it to be the world’s hegemonic 
political actor in the world system until the early 1970s (p. 185).  During this hegemonic 
period, the United States heavily influenced the creation of the international liberal 
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order.  The regime was launched with the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, which 
tied currency to the value of gold (Cohen, 1983, p. 325), and with the 1947 General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Cohen, 1983, p. 323).  Bretton Woods 
established the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to reconstruct 
the international monetary system and help rebuild Europe (Cohen, 1983, p. 325).  In an 
exposition of regime history, Cohen (1983) notes that the United States was the primary 
beneficiary of the Bretton Woods system and was able to use its leverage as the premiere 
post­War power to export a liberal ideology that supported free trade and privatization 
(p. 65).  The United States used its military, economic, and ideological might to back the 
emerging liberal regime (Cohen, 1985, p. 65).  The Bretton Woods system was largely 
dependent on U.S. finances and a system of conditionality that ensured that states 
receiving loans adopted policies that supported deregulation and reductions in 
government spending (Cohen, 1983, p. 327).  Conditionality primarily affected smaller 
European nations and the Third World, as wealthier and more powerful states were 
given opportunities to opt out of conditional loans (Cohen, 1983, p. 324).  GATT also 
favored established industrial powers through discriminatory arrangements in its 
framework for an international free trade regime (Lipson, 1983).  GATT’s tariff and 
trade barriers are most beneficial for the United States, the European Community, and 
Japan (Lipson, 1983, p. 267). 
The Bretton Woods system weakened considerably in the 1970s with the decline of 
U.S. economic influence and the strengthening of other world powers in Europe and 
Asia (Krasner, 2009, pp. 64­65).  The collapse weakened the liberal regime, with private 
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banks taking over many of the duties of the IMF, and the Third World’s influence was 
bolstered in the world scene (Krasner, 2009, pp. 64­65).  Krasner (2009) points to the 
leverage of the Third World in particular as a moment of erosion for the liberal regime 
(p. 114).  For a regime to weaken or collapse, the norms and principles that govern the 
regime must change (Krasner, 2009, p. 114).  Krasner (2009) argued that revisions to 
GATT in the 1970s signaled the weakening of the liberal regime because it 
acknowledged “special and differential treatment” for less developed countries (LDCs) 
(pp. 115­116).  A core norm of the liberal regime—that access to the world’s largest 
markets was dependent on all parties adopting similar market­oriented rules—was 
weakened through the creation of the LDCs (Krasner, 2009, p. 115).  The norms and 
principles that governed the regime shifted.  Regime change is not simply a matter of 
introducing new laws or policies, but of altering standards of governance.  The 
weakening of international liberalism and the decline of U.S. hegemony hardly spelled 
the end for the liberal regime, though.  GATT remained a crucial tool for international 
trade (Drahos, 2002, pp. 110) and the IMF found renewed purpose in the 1980s through 
exploiting the debt of developing nations (Strange, 1988, p. 113).  The United States also 
remained the most powerful actor in the international trade system and led the way for 
the globalization of the liberal regime (Krasner, 2009, p. 64).   
The liberal regime is an embodiment of the overarching international order, and is 
based in a strong set of norms and principles by elite actors that prioritize global 
liberalization.  The concept of a regime, though, is not without criticism.  Strange (1983) 
offers a structural objection to the regime concept in international relations (pp. 346­
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351), arguing that regime theory underrates the dynamism of the international system 
and overrates the stranglehold that standards of governance have on international society 
(pp. 346­351).  Regimes, where they exist, are epiphenomenal to the political and 
economic arrangements and bargains that make up international relations (Krasner, 
1983, pp. 5­7; Strange, 1983, pp. 351­353).  The structural constraints of states and 
markets make static regimes too difficult to maintain through systems of norms and 
principles.  The alternative that Strange (1983) proposes to regime research is a world 
system analysis that centralizes the structural relationship between states and markets (p. 
351).  Strange’s analytical method evaluates how the market affects basic structures of 
the international political economy such as security, trade, transport, and credit (1983, p. 
352).  The approach offered by Strange (1994) also places greater focus on corporations, 
banks, civil society, social movements, and the individual power of states than does 
Krasner’s approach to regime studies (p. 21).  In particular, Strange notes the inordinate 
power of the United States in the world system and stresses that its global reach make its 
interests central to the agendas of IGOs and international regimes that do not explicitly 
include the United States (1994, pp. 21­22).  An approach to regime analysis that also 
emphasizes the importance of the most powerful states in the international political 
economy stems from Chase­Dunn’s (1989) work on world­systems theory.  He takes a 
structural approach to history and social change that prioritizes class, markets, state 
interaction, and a core/periphery hierarchy (pp. 2­3).  The core/periphery hierarchy 
includes core states that control the flow of capital and semi­peripheral and peripheral 
states that have a weaker standing in the world economy and are exploited for labor and 
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other resources (Chase­Dunn, 1989, pp. 202­203).  In Chase­Dunn’s formulation, North 
America, Europe, and Japan are the current core actors, with other regions rapidly 
developing and chipping away at the current hegemons.  The world system is dynamic 
and the core and periphery are always developing and changing; regimes have the 
potential to rapidly change or collapse.  Chase­Dunn’s and Strange’s work proposes 
analyses that avoid taking structures of the international political economy for granted as 
static institutions.  I incorporate this awareness of dynamism and the stress on states, 
market actors and social movements into the regime analysis conducted in this 
dissertation.  I also acknowledge the potential of the core/periphery by emphasizing the 
roles of the United States and European Union in the maintenance of international 
governance.  The importance that Strange (1983, 1994) assigns to markets and social 
movements in altering international systems is also central to this study.  
The specific regime analyzed in this dissertation, the international IP prohibition 
regime, is a functional regime.  Functional regimes are smaller regimes that regulate 
specific industries, activities, or problems (Getz, 2006, p. 256).  Activities such as 
telecommunications, trade, and currency exchange are often governed by functional 
regimes (Getz, 2006, p. 266).  Research on functional regimes particularly takes into 
account the dynamism of the international system and the idea that regimes can be 
secondary to weak policies and arrangements (Getz, 2006, p. 256). Smaller international 
regimes operate under the logic of the larger liberal regime and form when actors 
recognize shared problems and opportunities (Getz, 2006, p. 266).  The IP regime, for 
instance, is shaped through the market interests of core states to regulate intellectual 
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property in the world economy.  Getz (2006), in a discussion of the global bribery 
prohibition regime, stresses that functional regimes are designed to promote the interests 
of the actors that put them in place (p. 266).  For the intellectual property GPR, the 
interested actors are enumerated in the stakeholder analysis I provide in Chapter IV and 
include trade associations from the IP industries.   
GPRs are legal, economic, social, and political regimes that regulate prohibited 
norms (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, p. 17).  GPRs encompass a diverse range of 
activities, including but not limited to counterfeiting, high seas piracy, money 
laundering, terrorism, poaching, and the trades of prostitution, ivory, and weapons 
(Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006).  Nadelmann first discussed GPRs and the evolution of 
social norms in international society in 1990.  In a 2006 work with Andreas, the authors 
move away from the broader “global” in favor of the phrase “international prohibition 
regime.”  The change was almost purely cosmetic and the core concepts and definitions 
from Nadelmann’s early GPR writings remain the same.  I maintain the original term 
“global prohibition regime” for two reasons.  First, the emerging prohibition regime on 
IP is truly global and includes trade agreements, law enforcement, and judiciary 
procedures worldwide.  The prohibition regime functions differently in the United 
States, European Union, China, Russia, South Korea, New Zealand and so forth because 
of structural constraints, but the goals and mission of the regime are the same globally.  
This dissertation’s case studies focus on events in the European Union, but as I 
demonstrate in the reviews of political economy and A2K literature, disputes over IP 
governance are linked through the same patterns of international policymaking and the 
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same networks of states, IGOs, multinationals, and activists.  Braman (2004), for 
instance, identifies the emergent information policy regime as a global phenomenon with 
implications throughout the world system.  The IP prohibition regime also has a global 
outreach, even as its use varies considerably across regions.  The second reason that I 
use “global prohibition regime” is for the more mundane goal of avoiding acronym 
confusion with “intellectual property rights.”  
The arguments that Andreas and Nadelmann offer for the ascendance of GPRs 
emphasize the influence of power in regimes.  The rules of prohibition regimes usually 
stem from social norms that are developed by historically elite states such as the U.S. 
and Western European nations, economic actors and civil society, or “moral 
entrepreneurs” that lobby for the enforcement of particular norms (Nadelmann, 1990, p. 
480).  For a prohibition regime to expand to the international arena, the regulations that 
underpin the regime must be supported by hegemonic actors that are typically made up 
of the most powerful states and institutions (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, p. 21).  In 
general, GPRs may take shape due to the need of states to protect the well­being of 
people, the need to protect markets, through the moral outcry of nonstate actors such as 
religious groups, or through any combination of those three factors (Nadelmann, 1990, 
p. 480).  GPRs, like other regimes, are dynamic and subject to change or weakening due 
to alteration in the international power structure or changes in social norms and 
principles due to political and moral activism (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, pp. 11­13).  
Andreas and Nadelmann (2006) point to War on Drugs, for instance, as gradually 
weakening due to changing international norms toward drug prohibitions and the need to 
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re­direct law enforcement resources toward the War on Terror (pp. 194­195).  Other 
prohibitions, such as those against anarchist political movements, dissolved over time 
due to declining perceptions of threats from the actors involved in the prohibited 
activities (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, p. 84­85). 
International prohibitions are also complex and encompass a wide range of activities.  
Many of these activities are effectively managed through prohibition regimes, and GPR 
literature is not a wholesale condemnation of international prohibition regimes.  Kelle 
(2007), for instance, insists on the necessity of a GPR to control arms proliferation, and 
Campbell and Sato (2009) hail the potential of a prohibition regime to regulate tobacco 
in Japan. The literature does, however, point to concerns that the increased 
harmonization of criminal justice systems, stronger criminal justice relationships across 
borders, and the influence of multinationals over international governance leads to over­
criminalization of activities (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, pp. 8­9, 250­251).  The most 
commonly criticized prohibition regime is drug enforcement (Levine, 2003).  The drug 
war is broadly criticized for relying too strongly on criminal measures to curtail drug 
trafficking and failing to approach the political, economic, and social reforms that are 
necessary for alleviating the illicit distribution of drugs (Levine, 2003, pp. 148­149).  
Certainly, A2K critics of intellectual property policy echo the sentiments of drug war 
criticism by pointing to fundamental injustices within the institutional administration of 
IPR.  The appropriateness and efficacy of the IPR GPR is evaluated throughout this 
dissertation.   
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Andreas and Nadelmann (2006) describe most GPRs as developing through a five 
stage model.  The first two stages are largely historical and not a point of analysis 
throughout this dissertation, but the later stages describe the international growth and 
influence of prohibition regimes.  Stages one and two involve the development of 
prohibitions.  The activity is considered legitimate under certain conditions in the first 
stage, but scholars, civil society, and social movements begin proscribing the activity as 
a problem or an “evil” in the second stage (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, p. 22).  The 
actors clamoring for prohibitions frequently take the form of “moral entrepreneurs” 
(Nadelmann, 1990, p. 484) or stakeholders such as religious or humanitarian groups 
investing resources into creating rules and norms to prevent activities perceived as 
unethical.   
The drug GPR, for example, reached its second stage in the early 20th century when 
a reform movement emerged in the United States (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, p. 22).  
The U.S. drug reform movement manipulated fears of drug use by immigrants and 
minorities to foster prejudice to psychoactive substances that were not tobacco or 
alcohol (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, pp. 42­44).  In the third stage, prohibition 
proponents begin to “agitate actively for the suppression and criminalization of the 
activity by all states and the formation of international conventions” (Andreas & 
Nadelmann, 2006, p. 21).  Transnational moral entrepreneurs and core states began the 
call for international prohibitions through methods ranging from the formation of 
international institutions, diplomatic pressures, economic inducements, military 
interventions, and propaganda campaigns (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, p. 21).  
 25 
 
 
Andreas and Nadelmann’s account of drug prohibitions is flawed in that it fails to 
differentiate categories of moral entrepreneurs based on a hierarchy of political 
economic relations within the international system (Papanicolaou, 2008, p. 403).  
Research of human trafficking in Greece conducted by Papanicolaou (2008) stresses the 
importance of acknowledging power in the international system and criticizes Andreas 
and Nadelmann for lacking political economic analysis (pp. 404­405).  Papanicolaou 
offers a “corrective approach” to GPR research that takes political economic factors into 
account, especially when criticizing regional implementation for a GPR.  For 
Papanicolaou (2008), Greece’s implementation of the Greek human trafficking GPR is 
flawed because the regime stems from U.S. policies, U.S. advocacy groups, and IGOs 
that operate under U.S. influence, and the U.S. approach is unfit for Greek domestic 
conditions (p. 382).  I use a similar corrective approach in applying the GPR model to IP 
policy.  The IP prohibition regime stems from the policy interests of core states and 
actors, and the political economic difficulty of exporting the regime’s institutional 
factors and norms into individual states causes tensions and dysfunction.   
The later stages of Andreas and Nadelmann’s model are not as reliant on moral 
entrepreneurship and are more accommodating toward theories of international regimes 
heavily influenced by hegemonic states and institutions.  If the third stage is successful, 
the regime moves into a fourth stage where international institutions and IGOs launch 
criminal sanctions and police action toward the activity throughout large sectors of the 
globe.  Pressures on all states to adopt the legal regimes that enforce prohibition are 
intense, and states that do not adopt the framework for the GPR are seen as illegitimate 
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actors in global society.  Dissident states, states that implement but do not enforce 
prohibitions, noncompliant individuals, and criminal organizations are all perceived as 
threats in the fourth stage (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, p. 21).  The core/peripheral 
hierarchy of the world­systems analysis (Chase­Dunn, 1989) is particularly useful in 
discussing stage four because it is at this stage that the core states of the regime pressure 
weaker states to institute enforcement.  The U.S. and E.U.­dominated efforts to spread IP 
enforcement are a central area of analysis in this dissertation.  Outside of IP, the 
influence of core states on drug policy is evident with international drug prohibitions.  
The U.S. export of prohibitions on the cocaine, opiates, and cannabis in regions where 
the drugs are historically prevalent demonstrates the ability of hegemonic states to 
enforce their norms globally (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, pp. 44­45).  The failure of 
the drug GPR, though, demonstrates the difficulty of international prohibition regimes to 
reach a fifth stage.  In stage five, the prohibited activity is nearly eliminated and only 
persists in isolated areas (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, p. 21).  The fifth stage is 
exceptionally rare, and only applies to prohibitions that can be successfully tackled 
through criminal sanctions and law enforcement (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, p. 22).  
Slavery and high seas piracy from the late 19th to early 20th century are examples of 
GPRs eliminating a practice, although piracy did resurge in the later 20th century 
(Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, pp. 26­32).  Piracy was effectively eliminated by states 
withdrawing support and enforcing criminal measures, in addition to pirates having 
difficulty accessing steam technology (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, pp. 26).  Slavery 
was eliminated due to the waning political influence of slaveholders, international 
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conventions, and transnational moral leadership leading to a powerful GPR against the 
practice (Andreas & Nadelmann, pp. 30­32).   
GPRs for which resources are readily available, for which little expertise is required, 
that are not seen as legitimate and are thus unlikely to be reported to authorities, and for 
which demand is consistent and resilient are unlikely to ever reach the fifth stage 
(Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, p. 22).  The success or failure of GPRs depends on the 
complexity of the problem that the GPR is attempting to solve, the degree of behavioral 
change required, the resources spent on combating the activity, and the clarity of 
objectives articulated by the regime (Getz, 2006, pp. 259­263).  International 
prohibitions on drug trafficking are a clear example of a GPR failing to reach the fifth 
stage due to the limited ability of criminal enforcement measures to stop drug use and 
trade.  The resources to grow and manufacture illicit drugs are plentiful, distribution and 
sale requires little expertise, drug trafficking does not produce many victims that want to 
notify police authorities, and the demand for drugs is substantial and irreplaceable 
(Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, p. 45).  Prohibitions on IP, particularly digital copyrights, 
may be similarly difficult.  Benkler (2006), analyzing networked communication 
technology in an information economy, outlined the problem of controlling information 
by noting how reproducing and creating information, knowledge, and content through 
ICTs is simple and socially legitimated (pp. 4­5).   
Andreas and Nadelmann (2006, pp. 54­55) briefly describe the IP prohibition regime 
as between the third and fourth stages of development.  Research on IP policy supports 
Andreas and Nadelmann’s claims on the current state of IP prohibitions, and the 
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advancement of prohibitive intellectual property policy detailed in IP scholarship aligns 
with the claim that the IPR GPR is between a third and fourth stage.  Literature on IP 
policy from Sell (2010), Burkart (2014), and Andersson (2014) all describe international 
IP policy as increasingly reliant on lateral pressures and criminal enforcement measures.  
Sell’s (2010) work is concerned with an upward ratchet—that is the incremental, 
unidirectional movement—of IP law stemming from the United States and including the 
U.S. government, trade organizations, IGOs, and international police organizations (p. 
10).  Burkart (2014) and Andersson (2014) focus on broad European laws and directives 
and international trade agreements that criminalize file sharing in efforts to stem piracy.  
The movement into a fourth stage consists of greater clamoring by U.S. and E.U. 
interests for more robust and aggressively enforced IPR.  The literature presented in the 
next section of this chapter and the case studies provided in Chapter III detail the 
systems and structures used to propel the IPR GPR into the fourth stage and beyond.  I 
also argue that international prohibitions on IP, especially digital copyrights, face many 
of the same implementation and execution problems as the drug war in terms of high 
demand, weak social prohibitions, and the ease of distribution.  Yet the inability to 
completely halt an activity does not make the pursuit of prohibitions inherently flawed.  
As an example, while the failure of the drug war is one important example of an 
unsuccessful GPR, it is not indicative of all prohibition regimes that are unable to reach 
a fifth and final stage.  Other GPRs, such as human trafficking, face many of the same 
obstacles but are not widely viewed as misguided or unnecessary (Papanicolaou, 2008, 
pp. 403­404).  Policymakers usually understand that harmonization does not guarantee 
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full implementation, and the success of international regulatory regimes may be 
measured incrementally (Drezner, 2008, pp. 11­13).  If international regulations on a 
chemical pollutant are designed to eliminate that pollutant but only succeed in 
significantly reducing the pollutant, the regulation may still be considered a partial 
success and superior to alternative measures (Drezner, 2008, p. 13).  For example, 
international regulations to curb certain ozone pollutants were a success because of 
effective communication and cooperation among the multiple sets of actors involved 
(Getz, 1995).  IGOs sponsored policy was developed to curtail the use of the pollutants 
(Getz, 2006, pp. 307­308).  International regulation does not guarantee implementation, 
however, so the true test of efficacy for the anti­pollutant regime was approval from 
NGOs and cooperation from multinational corporations (Getz, 2006, p. 308).  
Multinationals embraced the new regulations and the targeted pollutants were largely 
eliminated from production.  Importantly, the pollutants were still allowed on a limited 
basis in developing nations that did not export goods containing the pollutants (Getz, 
2006, p. 308).  The targeted ozone pollutants were significantly curbed but not 
eliminated, and the GPR was considered a success by policymakers (Getz, 2006, p. 309). 
The lesson from the ozone pollutant example in regard to prohibition regimes is that 
a regime can still be considered effective if it only partially stops a prohibited activity.  
Perfect prohibition may not be, and likely is not, an intended policy outcome of the 
global regulation of intellectual property.  In the case of intellectual property, policy 
analysis should question whether or not the legal regimes put in place will be efficient in 
managing intellectual property infringement, or if the regimes will be over­reaching, 
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dangerous, and ineffectual.  GPRs require resources and dedication to international 
governance and cooperation, legal regimes, and investment in law enforcement 
coalitions such as task forces (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006).  The case research in this 
dissertation analyzes the resources used to combat digital copyright infringement within 
the context of communicative and cultural relations in the European Union in order to 
evaluate the efficacy and necessity of prohibitions and criminal enforcement.  If the 
benefits of prohibition do not outweigh the political, social, and economic costs of 
enforcement—especially if prohibition is implemented at the expense of more 
constitutive approaches to solving problems—then the case for sustaining the GPR 
becomes problematic.   
A critical history of the IPR GPR.  This section overviews how advances in ICTs 
and telecommunications historically shaped the IPR GPR.  I also trace how the 
expansion and liberalization of the international telecommunication and information 
infrastructure and the globalization of the United States’ drug war were pivotal to the 
development of the IP prohibition regime.  The section maps how advancements in 
technology and policing continue to shape the way that multinational regulation is 
created, implemented, and enforced.  The beginnings of IPR prohibitions are derived 
from European conceptualizations of intellectual property (Johns, 2009, pp. 8­11), the 
Berne Convention as an agreement to unify IP rights across Europe (Johns, 2009, pp. 
284­286), and European pressure on the United States to conform to European IPR 
standards (Drahos, 2002, pp. 32­33).  This dissertation, however, is not concerned with 
the early stages of the IPR GPR so much as the methods and mechanisms involved in the 
 31 
 
 
historic transformation to the third and fourth stages of implementation.  How European 
IP policy fits into the framework of a prohibition regime informs this study by 
contextualizing the influence and breadth of the GPR.  I conceptualize the IPR GPR as a 
functional regime within the post­War liberal regime described by Krasner (1983, 2009), 
Lipson (1983), and Cohen (1985).  I also recognize international IP prohibitions as a 
function of what Braman (2004) identifies as an information policy regime; Braman 
(2004) traces the emergence of the information policy regime with advances in ICTs and 
emerging international policies to govern communication technology (pp. 30­31).  The 
development of both the IP prohibition regime and the information policy regime is 
rooted in the history of telecommunication and media policy. 
Histories of telecommunication reveal that the United States began to dominate the 
spread of telegraph cables after WWI, which laid the groundwork for U.S. dominance in 
telecommunications after the Second World War after decades of British preeminence in 
the telecommunication field (Thussu, 2006, p. 8).  The United States’ position over the 
cable infrastructure gave it an early lead in the global networking of the 
telecommunication system over a weakening Europe and an isolated Eastern bloc.  
During the 1950s, the United Kingdom and continental Europe operated telecom 
systems primarily through public monopolies, while the United States operated through 
a state capitalism model fueled by private monopolies, notably AT&T (Hudson, 1997, 
pp. 66­68).  By the 1960s, the United States was at the zenith of its status as an 
informational superpower. U.S.­influenced post­War IGOs accelerated the spread of 
telecommunication systems developed under U.S. terms (Schiller, 1992).  The United 
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States began to introduce competition to its private monopolies and eroded its state 
capitalism model in favor of models of liberalization (Hudson, 1997, pp. 69­71).  The 
United States then used a model for expanding telecommunication systems based on 
deregulatory policies that encouraged the liberalization of state enterprises and the 
opening of structural and cultural markets for competition across the globe (Schiller, 
1999).  
Telecommunication firms lobbied to encourage the United States to expand its 
liberal­minded economic policies around the globe in the form of trade agreements and 
lateral pressures (Schiller, 1999, pp. 47­49).  The World Trade Organization (WTO), for 
instance, demands that states embraced market­friendly development of telephone, 
cable, satellite, and Internet infrastructure in trade negotiations (Schiller, 1999, pp. 47­
49).  The globalization of financial capitalism was enhanced through the expansion of 
telecommunication systems, and the international liberal regime became the engine 
driving the economies of states that controlled the means of regulation (Schiller, 1999).  
By the time the United States’ informational power began to decline and disperse 
internationally in the 1970s, its model for governing telecommunication systems and 
financial capitalism was firmly in place (Schiller, 1992, pp. 4­6).  The digitization of 
communication systems and the growing importance of information­based sectors led to 
new policies and organizations to manage information policy.   
The acceleration of globalization led to an increase in the consensus among states, 
IGOs, NGOs, and international policing agencies for the need of greater transnational 
law enforcement (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, pp. 51­53).  The growth of international 
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capital exchange created a sharp increase in crimes related to “transnational securities 
transactions, banking exchanges, commercial ventures, and credit card” fraud (Andreas 
& Nadelmann, 2006, p. 125).  ICT innovations enabled transnational crime and allowed 
law enforcement agents to coordinate investigations internationally (Andreas & 
Nadelmann, 2006, p. 126).  Advancements in telecommunications and ICTs allowed 
police to keep track of criminals, exchange intelligence with foreign counterparts, and 
create databases of criminal activity (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, p. 126).  
Technologies of information exchange and surveillance expanded both police and 
criminal activity by giving both a means to operate more efficiently internationally. 
Advances in telecommunications and surveillance technology enhanced the presence 
of GPRs that were primarily guided by the United States’ drug war model.  
Transnational capitalism made global the need to protect property and capital (Andreas 
& Nadelmann, 2006, p. 126).  The IP prohibition regime is one in a line of many regimes 
that emulated the drug war.  Post­War regulations on exports and, by 1970, money 
laundering were examples of how new crimes related to transnational capitalism 
spawned new regulatory regimes, IGOs, and international police cooperation (Andreas 
& Nadelmann, 2006, p. 126).  In the wake of the Agreement on Trade­Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1996, IPR enforcement spread to the Internet, 
where multiple police and law enforcement institutions cooperate internationally in 
efforts to arrest the operators of peer­to­peer (p2p) and streaming websites (Andreas & 
Nadelmann, 2006, p. 55).   
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TRIPS represents the culmination of years of the U.S.­led post­War push to 
strengthen control of IP (Drahos, 2002), marks the solidification of the IPR GPR.  U.S. 
enforcement of intellectual property rights rapidly accelerated after World War II 
(Drahos, 2002, p. 39).  The U.S. drive to strengthen IPR came about when emerging 
economic realities made evident the fact that the control of intellectual property would 
be a driver for the global economy (Drahos, 2002, p. 39).  Multinationals are the 
dominant force in persuading policymakers how to regulate intellectual property.  These 
corporations insist that successful trade agreements must enhance a legal regime that 
creates complete market control over knowledge­based goods (Drahos, 2002, p. 39).  
Multinational corporate cartels and business associations representing the software, 
entertainment, pharmaceutical, and publishing industries act as the primary outlets for 
the IPR industries to create and promote policy preferences (Drahos, 2002, p. 40).  The 
largest regulatory success for the multinationals to date was the inclusion of TRIPS into 
the WTO (Drahos, 2002, p. 5).  The WTO, established in 1994, replaced the 
international trade regime established by GATT with a global trade regime that included 
stronger regulations for information services and intellectual property (Braman, 2007, p. 
237).  The WTO was the culmination of years of effort from the United States to expand 
the liberalization of international trade to information policy (Braman, 2007, p. 237).  
Supporters of the WTO, particularly the U.S. and trade associations, argued that it was 
essential for economic growth to dismantle the barriers to the free flow of information 
through international organizations (Thussu, 2006, p. 68). TRIPS became enforceable in 
1996 and holds all signatories to minimum standards for enacting and enforcing IP law 
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(Thussu, 2006, p. 224).  The International Intellectual Property Association (IIPA), a 
trade association made up of U.S. IPR holding companies, was instrumental in the 
inclusion of TRIPS into the WTO (Thussu, 2006, p. 225).  The IIPA argued that billions 
were lost due to IP infringement and that advancements in Internet technology would 
make the problem worse in the coming years (Thussu, 2006, pp. 224­225).   
Other than the U.S., the primary powers invested in TRIPS negotiations were the 
European Community and Japan (Drahos, 2002).  Concessions were made throughout 
TRIPS negotiations to assuage the European Union’s concerns toward overly broad 
patent laws that protected U.S.­based pharmaceuticals, and Japan was allowed to protect 
its laws regarding CD rentals (Drahos, 2002, p. 146).  However, Europe did not get its 
desired implementation of moral rights, or the ability of an author to control the 
modification of a work even when a work is licensed to a third party, into TRIPS 
(Drahos, 2002, p. 146).  The agreement was protested by developing countries, 
particularly Brazil and India (Thussu, 2006, p. 225), as many industrializing nations 
were fearful of the fact that the global north held 90% of all patents and the vast majority 
of copyrights (Thussu, 2006, p. 225).  The taxes on knowledge and innovation were a 
threat to developing nations, but the threat of trade sanctions from WTO members 
outweighed these concerns and most nations signed on (Thussu, 2006, p. 225).  As 
Drahos (2002) explains, developing nations did not have the leverage to stop TRIPS, and 
instead worked for provisions that would give them time to implement TRIPS’ standards 
(pp. 144­145).   
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TRIPS marked the globalization of the IPR prohibition regime because of the extent 
of its international framework, but the extent of prohibition enforcement varies by 
region.  For instance, China is a member of the WTO as of 2001 and a signatory of 
TRIPS, but its compliance is unstable.  Chinese policy openly supports an “indigenous 
innovation” (Raustiela & Sprigman, 2013, para. 1) model that is criticized by the United 
States as legitimating piracy. The U.S. International Trade Commission estimated in 
2011 that Chinese IP infringement cost $2 billion (Raustiela & Sprigman, 2013, para. 2).  
The United States took China to the WTO court over the piracy issue from 2007­2009 
and largely failed to get the WTO to force China to ramp up enforcement measures 
(Broude, 2010, pp. 668­669).  The Office of the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR) claims that nearly all digital content in China is pirated and that the nation does 
not fare much better with its protection of physical trademarked goods and 
pharmaceuticals (USTR, 2014, pp. 34­35).  Enforcement in China is being slowly and 
steadily ratcheted upward, however, as evidenced by China materially committing to its 
WTO accession and expanding its civil remedies for IP disputes in 2013 (USTR, 2014, 
p. 31).  The USTR also showed cautious optimism regarding China’s 2013 copyright and 
patent reform (USTR, 2014, p. 31).  The ineffectiveness of the IPR GPR in China leads 
to condemnation from the United States and IPR industries, but global prohibitions on 
copyright infringement are beyond the scope of this dissertation, which is limited to the 
development of European IP prohibitions and the difficulties in harmonizing 
enforcement across the European Union.   
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TRIPS affected all levels of IPR, from biotechnology to counterfeit DVDs, and 
pressured the developing world to import the intellectual property norms of the United 
States and Europe (Drahos, 2002, p. 5).  In addition to TRIPS, the United States and 
European Union engaged in bi­ and multilateral agreements with other states that 
favored the economic interests of the two dominant economic powers (Drahos, 2002, p. 
73).  States that refused diplomatic relations regarding IPR and those that did not meet 
the obligations of the treaties were attacked as “pirates” and accused of supporting 
counterfeiting and theft by IP groups (Drahos, pp. 73­74).  For states that signed in to 
TRIPS, violations could mean a court hearing in front of the WTO (Drahos, 2002, p. 
107).  All states in violation of U.S. IPR norms are pressured by the United States to 
adopt a stronger IPR regime or face trade sanctions (Drahos, 2002, p. 73).  A notable 
tool that the United States uses to enforce IPR standards is the United States Trade 
Representative’s (USTR’s) Special 301 list (Drahos, 2002, p. 96).  The list is based 
almost entirely on suggestions from the IIPA and pharmaceutical companies (Drahos, 
2002, p. 96).  The IIPA’s complaints include levels of piracy in countries and often 
dubious and inflated claims of monetary losses (Drahos, 2002, p. 95).  The claims of 
monetary harms from the IP industry and U.S. regulatory agencies are consistently large 
and difficult to confirm.  For example, the FBI and International Trade Commission 
publicly claimed in 2008 that $200 to $250 billion is lost every year due to copyright 
infringement (Sanchez, 2008, p. 1).  The numbers were based on a 20 year­old report of 
calculations of the entire global market in counterfeit goods that additionally claimed 
that copyright infringement cost the U.S. economy $60 billion annually (Sanchez, 2008, 
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p. 2).   The report noted, however, that the calculations were from “biased and self­
serving” rights holders and included activities covered under fair use, such as academic 
photocopying (Sanchez, 2008, p. 3).  Another study by the Motion Picture Association 
of America (MPAA) claimed that the U.S. movie industry loses $6.1 billion per year due 
to Internet piracy.  The numbers were admittedly rough estimates by the movie industry, 
and counted each individual download of a movie as a loss (Balik, 2013, para. 1).   
Additionally, a 2010 report from the United States Government Accountability Office 
that no current major study on the harms inflicted by IP infringement could be 
substantiated due to a lack of underlying studies and the difficulty in garnering financial 
estimates for illicit activities (United States Government Accountability Office, 2010, p. 
1).  Despite the difficulty in gaining accurate numbers for losses, the expansive Special 
301’s Watch List of countries with poor IP standards includes dozens of nations each 
year (Drahos, 2002, p. 96).  Suggestions for fixing piracy in nations usually include IP 
restrictions that include new laws, task forces, and education initiatives that promote the 
interests of U.S.­based multinationals. The 301 list is often criticized for its lack of 
interest in the well­being of the nations it blacklists and for leading to cultural and 
economic damage in developing nations (Drahos, 2002, pp. 95, 127).   
The regulatory mechanisms for enforcing IPR are encouraged by intellectual 
property coalitions acting to define and redefine social norms and principles surrounding 
the use of creative and information works.  For instance, the entertainment industry 
asserts that it is defending the integrity of artists and ensuring the future of the arts by 
lobbying for strict copyright laws (Drahos, 2002, p. 177).  The recording industry has a 
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particularly long history of attempting to justify more stringent copyright law as a 
defense of the arts that goes back to the Music Copyright Association’s condemnation of 
sheet music “pirates” near the beginning of the 20th  century (Johns, 2009, pp. 332­333). 
In the United Kingdom, the Association went so far as to band together paid­for­hire 
thugs to break into people’s houses and destroy allegedly infringing sheet music before 
managing to successfully lobby for new copyright laws (Johns, 2009, pp. 335­336).  By 
the late 20th century, the figure of the intellectual property pirate expanded from 
organizations to individuals when communication technologies began to make home 
taping, recording, remixing, and copying easily accessible to individuals (Drahos, 2002, 
p. 181).  Constructing the “home taper” as a pirate and a thief was a process that required 
the entertainment and software industries to engage in propaganda campaigns informing 
consumers that they were contributing to the collapse of culture and damaging the 
livelihood of programmers and artists (Johns, 2009, p. 433).  Not only was the 
counterfeiter or the file sharing website creator a pirate, but users of the technology now 
were, too (Johns, 2009, pp. 433­434). In the wake of TRIPS, the boundaries and 
definitions of piracy shifted even further outward at the behest of private interests.  
Digital rights management (DRM) laws as constructed under the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA), for example, make circumventing digital locks that prevent 
copying on media like DVDs and .MP3s illegal (May, 2003, sect. 2, para. 1).  The U.S. 
and E.U., which instituted DRM respectively in 1998 and 2001, promoted anti­
circumvention policy across the globe through trade agreements and the aggressive 
condemnation of states that do not recognize the act as piracy (Drahos, 2002, p. 184).  
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The figure of the pirate under the United States’ DMCA and the European Union’s 
Information Society Directive included the person who broke the lock on her compact 
disc even if she was not reselling or even copying the CD.  The expanded sphere of 
piracy under DRM is widely criticized by IP law and policy scholars.  Lessig (2004) 
criticizes the potential for DRM to inhibit fair use by granting content holders full 
control over cultural goods (pp. 159­160).  Litman (2001) argues that the DMCA’s DRM 
provisions go well beyond any previous standards of copyright and grant content owners 
greater monopolies over copyrighted materials (p. 114).  Vaidhyanathan (2001) goes 
further in the argument against DRM and claimed that the DMCA was part of a 
“surrender of culture to technology” (p. 160); the “surrender” eliminated the public 
bargain between producers and users over copyrighted material in favor of legally 
legitimizing anti­circumvention technology (p. 160).  May and Sell (2006) describe the 
public bargain of copyright as a gray area wherein producers and consumers agreed upon 
certain forms of socially acceptable copying, access, and use of copyrighted goods (p. 
184).  May (2003) concludes that the restrictions caused by DRM erode the legitimacy 
of copyright law by violating the social norms that regulate access to knowledge (sect. 1, 
para. 3).  The backlash against the private enclosure of technology, information, and 
culture by anti­circumvention policies and other forms of IP overreach has led to both a 
global political movement to reassert rights of access to knowledge and a public 
disregard for digital copyright laws (May, 2003, sect. 5, para. 7); in May’s formulation, 
digital copyright laws that expand private interests at the expense of public goods are 
harmful to the democratic legitimacy of IPR.  Digital copyright laws then create a 
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potential crisis for an IP prohibition regime.  Compounding the problem of social 
legitimization of digital copyright laws, Drahos (2002) warns that failed prohibitions 
lead the IP industries to lobby for ever more draconian copyright laws and protections 
(p. 184).  The new protections are often packaged as “TRIPS­Plus” agreements that 
exceed the minimum standards of TRIPS. TRIPS­Plus legislation that seeks to normalize 
far­reaching digital copyright standards includes the example of “reeducation 
campaigns” in which states are obliged by treaties and trade law to use resources to 
educate law enforcement officials and public classrooms of the importance of protecting 
copyrights (Drahos, 2002, p. 27).  Intellectual property education campaigns are present 
in French copyright legislation that introduced copyright education as a mandatory part 
of the class room curricula in many grade schools and colleges (Giannopoulou, 2012, 
sect. 4).  If the expansion of digital copyright laws causes the illegitimization of 
copyright as May (2003) and Drahos (2002) argue, then TRIPS­Plus policy could 
worsen the problem of enforcing an IP prohibition regime. In the case studies in Chapter 
III, I observe how individuals respond politically and socially to prohibitions on digital 
copyright infringement to better understand if and how legitimacy problems surround IP 
law.   
Labeling a social activity as deviant and that deviant behavior as criminal is an 
important condition to be met before setting up a prohibition regime.  An activity’s 
identification as socially dubious influences the policy­making process and the reaction 
that legal regimes have to prohibited activities.  In the case of enforcement of digital 
copyrights, which can include tactics from seizing Internet domain names (Sellars, 2011) 
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to cross­border commando raids to arrest website owners (Kerr, 2012), the willingness 
of policymakers to support and create maximalist intellectual property policy that 
regards digital IP  infringement as a serious threat to economic security is crucial.  The 
private sector is also at the forefront of efforts to ratchet up IP law.  Multinationals use 
moral entrepreneurship to promote and establish sets of norms regarding global activities 
related to their business (Wrage & Wrage, 2005.)  The case of bribery prohibitions 
among corporations in the 1980s described by Wrage and Wrage (2005) illustrates the 
moral entrepreneurial role of corporations. Corporations coordinated prohibitions 
because they were worried that the process of globalization created too much 
competition from foreign businesses susceptible to bribery (Wrage & Wrage, 2005).  In 
the case of the IPR GPR and information policy, multinationals are concerned about the 
potential use of digital technology to disrupt business models. Benkler’s (2006) study of 
ICTs stresses the ability that digital communication technology gives to individuals, 
industries, and innovators to easily reproduce content.  Intellectual property industries 
lobby for and create policies that expand IPR in order to halt the potentially disruptive 
use of ICTs.  The underlying factors that define the type of information policy that 
expands intellectual property rights is detailed in the next sub­section, where I describe 
and apply the information policy regime introduced by Braman (2004, 2007). 
The information policy regime and IP prohibitions. The international IPR 
prohibition regime is interdependent with what Braman (2004) identifies as an emergent 
information policy regime.  The information policy regime is emerging to govern 
international issues of E­commerce, data retention and privacy, intellectual property, and 
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other forms of information management in the digital environment (Braman, 2004, p. 1).  
Within information policy formation, there are struggles as to how to identify and define 
information; those that are most relevant to the IP research in this dissertation are the 
struggle over information as a commodity or as a constitutive cultural force, information 
as property or as part of a commons, and information as private or public (Braman, 
2004, pp. 35, 37).  The private/public struggle is especially important to the E.U. policy 
landscape surveyed in Chapter II and the cases discussed in Chapter III.  In those two 
chapters, I identify tensions between the European Union’s privacy framework and its 
surveillance­heavy anti­piracy agenda, which complicate the implementation of IP 
policy in European member states.  The struggles between information as a commodity 
as opposed to a cultural resource and as property versus a commons are particularly 
salient in the arena of digital copyright policy.  With IP regulation, information policy is 
used by the state to stem the reproduction of goods and to enforce the notion of creative 
content as a commodity (Braman, 2007).  Policymakers have a tendency when 
regulating intellectual property to “ratchet up” IPR through systems of international 
governance; the upward ratchet of intellectual property leads to an energetic focus by 
policymakers on combating both counterfeiting and piracy (Sell, 2010, p. 3).  The 
policies that stem from anti­piracy efforts combined with the ease of digital production 
leads to the problem of “deprofessionalization of policy issues” (Braman, 2007, p. 162).  
“Deprofessionalization” refers to laws initially created for disputes between firms and 
authors expanding to prohibitions regarding individual behavior (Braman, 2007, p. 162).  
Digital copyright infringement in particular can lead to industrial­scale punishments for 
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small scale file sharing, and famously did so in the United States through dozens of 
lawsuits from the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) against 
individuals in the 2000s (Miller, 2005, p. 313).  The lawsuits, such as the one against 
single mother Jammie Thomas, were viewed by many as disproportionate to the 
copyright infringements (Miller, 2005, p. 314).  Thomas was originally fined $222,000 
for sharing two dozen songs on a file sharing network in 2008 (Henslee, 2009, p. 3).  
Deprofessionalization and other inefficiencies in the information policy models of the IP 
prohibition regime are symptomatic of the difficulties that the IPR GPR faces in exerting 
control over information flows. 
Braman’s (2007) research on information policy as a mode of power maintains that 
states in an information economy use information policy as a mechanism for structural 
power in society.  Information policy is used to identify which communication 
technologies and what cultural content are commodities, which are public goods, which 
are restricted for use by governments, and which are inaccessible to individuals 
(Braman, 2007).  Information policy guides the flow of communication and social 
interaction in global society.  IPR are governed by information policies that are 
structured to regulate knowledge­based goods as strict commodities instead of public 
goods (Braman, 2007, pp. 177­179).  The policies are also resistant to creating spaces for 
information as a commons instead of property.  The emerging information policy regime 
is especially restrictive of open access to intellectual property because IPR underpin a 
significant portion of the information economy (Braman, 2007, p. 177).  Additionally, 
communication technologies also make it easy for individuals to create, disseminate, and 
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manipulate information­based goods, so there is a push by policymakers to be especially 
restrictive of how individuals are allowed to interact with informational and cultural 
resources (Braman, 2007, p. 177).  Copying and sharing knowledge­based goods is 
easier than ever before in an era of digitization, and collective authorship, wherein many 
individuals build on and distribute texts, is commonplace online.  IPR holders are forced 
to cope with these challenges of individual distribution of copyrighted goods (Braman, 
2007, p. 162).  The ability of criminal sanctions and law enforcement to tackle complex 
rules and norms governing the exchange of information is made more difficult as the 
practice of individual information production is normalized and made increasingly 
simple (Braman, 2007).   
Information policy research as articulated by Braman (2007) and liberal legal 
approaches to governing IP in a networked society typified by Benkler (2006) differ in 
many respects, but there is an overlap in the description of how communication 
technologies can disrupt the business models of IPR industries.  The networked ICT 
approach views the Internet as the “communications environment built on cheap 
processors with high computation capabilities, interconnected in a pervasive network” 
that allows individuals to engage in the information production sector (Benkler, 2006, p. 
3).  Individual reproduction of content operates outside of the corporate control of 
information production.  The inability to control individual reproduction leads to 
corporate pressure on policymakers to lock down intellectual property through policy 
that tightly controls the distribution and reproduction of creative goods (Benkler, 2006; 
Braman, 2007).  The policymakers, in turn, designate forms of content reproduction as 
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cybercrimes.  The next section details the interdependence of IP prohibitions and 
cybercrime law. 
Cybercrime theory, international policing, and the IPR GPR. Enforcement 
measures are essential to the operation of information regulation.  I focus primarily on 
digital copyrights here, so it is important to relate how digital copyright enforcement 
operates in a prohibition regime.  Policymakers generally consider online IP 
infringement to be digital piracy, which is considered a type of cybercrime (Leman­
Langlois, 2012, pp. 3­4).  A widely accepted criminological definition of cybercrime is 
“computer­mediated activities which are either illegal or considered illicit by certain 
parties and which can be conducted through global electronic networks” (Yar, 2005, p. 
409).  Yar (2005) summarizes definitions and conceptions of cybercrime from across the 
criminological field, differentiating computer-assisted crimes like theft, money 
laundering, and fraud from computer-focused crimes such as hacking and defacing 
websites (p. 409).  Digital piracy is further narrowed into the category of cyber-theft 
(Yar, 2005).  The criminological category of cybercrime is differentiated from terrestrial 
crimes because of the technology underlying the Internet.  The near­instantaneous 
communication between spatially distant individuals makes people vulnerable to “an 
array of potentially predatory others who have us within instantaneous reach, 
unconstrained by the normal barriers of physical distance (Yar, 2005, p. 410).  
Cybercriminals are also capable of reaching vast numbers of people through the 
network, and can maintain anonymity online (Yar, 2005, p. 411).  For Yar and others 
that the author references in the criminological tradition, managing cybercrime is 
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difficult because of the structural properties of the network.  The Internet allows easy 
reproduction and transmission of information, so it is difficult to control the flow of 
specific information—including copyrighted material—without altering the network in a 
way that infringes on socially legitimated normative behaviors (Leman­Langlois, 2012, 
p. 3).  Critical criminological scholars also acknowledge that another major problem of 
managing cybercrime is that the criminal classification of many online activities is 
misleading and difficult to harmonize through international law (Leman­Langlois, 2012, 
p. 3).  A challenge for criminal classifications of digital copyright infringement comes 
from the fact that information policy may overstate the commodified qualities of cultural 
goods and criminalize online activity that is not commonly perceived as illicit behavior 
(Leman­Langlois, 2012; Lemieux, 2010). 
Critical criminological studies of crimes that occur through digital networks are 
circumspect of the definitions and discourses surrounding the criminalized online 
activities.  The critical criminological research, typified by Leman­Langlois (2012) and 
Lemieux (2010), is skeptical toward the categorization of so­called cyber crimes.  The 
overreach of IGOs and transnational police organizations in influencing information 
policy are also discussed in critical criminological research.  Enforcement against digital 
crimes operate in an often extra­legal atmosphere wherein police use tactics such as 
surveillance, property seizures and arrests beyond their legal authority after the state, 
through its own initiative or the persuasion of others, determines that a practice—such as 
“cybercrime, cyberwar, cyberwar, cyberharrassment, cyberpiracy, cyberloitering”—is 
worthy of criminal status (Leman­Langlois, 2012, pp. 3­4).  Unlike physical crimes, such 
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as breaking into someone’s car, digital crimes rarely have tangible, immediately 
observable effects (Leman­Langlois, 2012, p. 3).  The underlying assumption of digital 
crime is that people are criminally abusing the power of technology, but this assumption 
is often not shared by users of communication technology (Leman­Langlois, 2012, p. 5).  
Criminology research also flags the problem of legitimating laws that are not 
representative of social norms.  For example, members of the underground “warez 
scene,” who are often responsible for hacking into and redistributing copyrighted 
material, are geographically dispersed around the globe and rarely have an 
understanding of what laws they are breaking and what the legitimacy of those laws are 
(Leman­Langlois, 2012, pp. 5­6).  Even when such users are in the same international 
jurisdictions—states linked through lateral agreements or regional harmonization—the 
criteria for what constitutes intellectual property infringement are increasingly broad and 
the objectives of the law are increasingly hazy.  Towers (2011), in a study of how 
individual content reproduction becomes routine, notes that activities like digital file 
sharing and streaming content become habitual activities for many Internet users (p. 23).  
Even with the acknowledgement that these activities are criminal, there is a sense that 
the crime is of little magnitude: People engaged in file sharing and streaming often 
identify as ordinary Internet users participating in socially legitimated activities (Towers, 
2011, p. 26).   
Police organizations that enforce digital IPR are given their agenda from legislatures, 
executive bodies and IGOs intent on ratcheting up IP laws to protect multinationals and 
trade groups (Leman­Langlois, 2012, p. 6).  Police agencies perpetuate the dominant 
 49 
 
 
discourse about the threat of digital piracy and cybercrime and react accordingly 
(Leman­Langlois, 2012, p. 6).  For example, Leman­Langlois (2012), using 
criminological theory to critique digital crime enforcement, evaluated a report from 
Symantec, a large security software association, which claimed $388 billion annually in 
harms due to cybercrime (p. 4).  Toward the end of the report, Symantec noted that it 
was  counting “mere irritants” such as using someone’s unsecured WiFi network or 
receiving spam e­mails as cybercrimes (Leman­Langlois, 2012, p. 4).  Symantec’s 
numbers are suspect, but reports such as theirs support the notion that cyber­theft is a 
social detriment.  Beliefs about the nature of cybercrime are then engrained in the culture 
of law enforcement.  Information is construed as a type of economic output no different 
than goods and services, and law enforcement adapts new forms of security and 
surveillance to restrict this theft (Leman­Langlois, 2012, pp. 5­6).  The tools used to 
combat digital crimes are both online and physical, leading to a hybrid form of law 
enforcement that works diligently to enforce constantly evolving laws based around 
broad prohibitions that have little backing from greater society (Leman­Langlois, 2012, 
p. 6).  International policing is based around the harmonization of enforcement measures 
(Lemieux, 2010, p. 5), meaning that digital surveillance and seizures, as well as physical 
efforts such as violent raids and extradition, are pushed by agencies such as Interpol, 
EuroPol, and the FBI as the global standard for digital copyright enforcement.  Police 
organizations, then, become stakeholders in the governance of IP because the 
international harmonization of enforcement procedures is partially dependent on their 
standardization of enforcement. 
 50 
 
 
International policing works most effectively by locating the commonalities in 
different criminal regimes, which is why various cybercrimes are often clustered 
together as one social, cultural, and economic threat (Leman­Langlois, 2008, pp. 4­5).  
The clustering of criminal categories is apparent in international trade agreements and 
U.S. and E.U. regulatory mechanisms that associate file sharing with terrorism, 
organized crime, and money laundering (Johns, 2012, p. 6).  Police agencies also drive 
policy and encourage the international standardization of criminalization and policing: 
These agencies train national police officers to work with a set of standardized 
procedures such as surveillance, and then the national officers go home and persuade 
their governments to codify into law the procedures that were taught by the international 
police agencies (Lemieux, 2010, p. 5).  Interpol, the international policing organization 
that facilitates other policing agencies (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, pp. 90­91), is often 
involved in these training programs.  Interpol ran 83 cybercrime training programs to 
police from 169 countries in 2009 (Lemieux, 2010, p. 8).  Officers in these programs 
learned to streamline their procedures with Interpol and how to approach certain crimes, 
including those related to intellectual property (Lemieux, 2010, p. 8).  Interpol is also a 
prominent participant in anti­piracy and counterfeiting conventions around the globe and 
works with numerous stakeholders to develop IP crime databases (Sell, 2010, p. 14).  
Sell (2010), in the analysis of the upward ratchet of IP, notes that international police 
agencies are used as instruments of enforcement to advance U.S. and E.U. intellectual 
property norms around the globe (pp. 13­14). The police agencies also act as vocal moral 
entrepreneurs of maximalist IP policy and frame the threats of piracy and counterfeiting 
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as grave hazards to both the global economy and international security (Sell, 2010, p. 
15).  
International police agencies consist of vast bureaucracies that wield significant 
influence on trade agreements, treaties, and the global police force by coordinating with 
policymakers and setting international standards for crime control (Lemieux, 2010, p. 6).  
The agencies are designed to transcend national laws and governmental authority and 
strengthen the global enforcement of prohibitions regimes.  Police play a central role in 
GPRs, and any call for IP regime reform or change must take into account the influence 
of international police enforcement on the structure of policy and law.  The norms and 
principles of the IPR GPR empower international police organizations to enforce an 
agenda built around the commoditization of information.  Intellectual property is a 
difficult policy area to effectively govern through a GPR, though, as the simplicity of 
sharing and copying through ICTs and the norms surrounding these technologies make 
criminal enforcement difficult.  IP enforcement is critical to the international 
prohibitions, and political economic factors also contribute to the development of a fully 
realized prohibition regime for intellectual property.  A criticism of the GPR model 
(Papanicolaou, 2008) and broader criticisms of regime theory in general (Strange, 1983, 
1994) focus on the need for implementing political economic factors into regime 
analysis.  The next section corrects for regime criticism utilizing political economic 
theory for critique and analysis of IP prohibitions.  I also discuss A2K research as a tool 
for scrutinizing the institutions and structures that create and contest the future of 
intellectual property policy and enforcement.  
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Critiquing an IP Regime: Political Economy and A2K  
This second section of the literature review evaluates two perspectives that are 
critical of global information policy and IP regimes.  The two approaches—political 
economy and Access to Knowledge (A2K)—are used throughout the dissertation as 
means of evaluating resistance to the IPR GPR.  Political economic and A2K criticisms 
are rooted in different traditions, but both are useful tools for criticizing information 
policy and prohibition regimes.  The political economic critique is valuable because it 
illustrates how processes of commodification, the process of transforming things valued 
for use into things valued for their economic function, and spatialization, the way that 
capitalism transforms and improves the means of transportation and communication to 
reduce the time it takes to move goods and services (Mosco, 2009, pp. 127, 157),  
contribute to information policy that gives control of information to the elite at the 
expense of a broader public.  The A2K critique is consistent with the framework of 
political economy, but focuses on access to knowledge, cultural goods, and 
communication as human rights.  Both the political economy and A2K research focus on 
the loss of a digital commons to capitalist interests and both outline categories of 
stakeholders that conflict in the emergent information policy and IP prohibition regimes.  
However, the A2K approach has been criticized by Cohen (2012) as relying too strongly 
on the liberal legal paradigm that stresses law and the judicial system as mechanisms to 
protect the rights of individuals.  In the discussion of A2K, I evaluate Cohen’s (2012) 
corrective approach to creating A2K policies, but first, I explain tenets of liberal legal 
theory and compare it to a critical legal approach. 
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Comparing liberal legal and critical legal theory.  Liberal legal theory prioritizes 
individual rights and considers the promotion of individual liberty and equality before 
the law to be essential functions of the state (Brown & Halley, 2002, p. 6).  Within 
liberalism, the state and legal institutions are considered to be neutral entities that can be 
leveraged by liberal reformers to enhance personal and economic freedoms (Brown & 
Halley, 2002, p. 6).  There are many liberal legal critiques of how the state and the law 
have oppressed individuals on the basis of race, class, gender and sexuality, but the 
solution to social oppression is found through corrective legal approaches that enhance 
equality before the law (Brown & Halley, 2002, p. 6).  For liberal legal thought, equality 
in society comes from laws that are uniform, public and capable of being enforced 
(Unger, 1989, p. 20).  The approach also presumes the existence of a legitimate 
democratic state that is capable of applying legal equality (Brown & Halley, 2002, p. 5).  
Legal equality will, as Cohen (2012) explains, create a balance of rights between 
rational, individual interests (p. 11).  For digital copyrights, the balance means finding 
measures that can promote creativity and innovation without hindering freedom of 
expression and maintaining a degree of access to creative and scientific works (Cohen, 
2012, p. 11).  According to Cohen, the liberal legal objective is to balance the protection 
of private property—copyrights—with minimal interference into individual rights to 
expression or privacy (Cohen, 2012, p. 45).  Cohen (2012) argues, however, that the 
state is ineffective at balancing rights and that liberal governance tends to protect private 
property above individual freedom of expression.  Additionally, Cohen (2012) argues, 
states are subject to trade agendas and regulatory capture— instances where regulatory 
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agencies act on the concerns of the industries they are supposed to be regulating—
inhibits their capability to enact equal application of the law (p. 45).  I have identified 
through the work of Drahos (2002) and Thussu (2006) how the IIPA has large influence 
on the USTR and how TRIPS is international policy heavily informed by IP interest 
groups.  The case analysis I conduct also relates the impact of stakeholder interests on 
international law, and a liberal legal critique of the stakeholder analysis would not be 
adequate to describe how power relations influence law within the international IP 
prohibition regime. 
The critical legal analysis that I use to evaluate international IPR prohibitions is a 
critique, though not a complete rejection, of liberal legal thought.   Critical legal thought 
views the law as a form of politics as opposed to a mechanism capable of the neutral 
arbitration of freedoms (Hunt, 1999, p. 355).  The critique is founded on an 
understanding that liberal legalism underestimates the influence that social power 
structures, especially markets, have on the formation and enforcement of the law 
(Hutchinson, 1989).  As Brown and Halley (2002) argue in a comparison of liberal and 
critical legal the notion of an egalitarian system of rights built through legal mechanisms 
is naïve because there is no substantial separation between the law and social power (p. 
7).  Brown and Halley (2002) note that critical legal thought does not always contain a 
wholesale rejection of the idea of rights to individual freedoms and equality, but rather 
recognizes that the notion of rights to liberty and freedom are often used by institutions 
to extend the power of the advantaged (p. 7).  Critical legal studies is useful here because 
it recognizes that institutions and norms are, as Brown and Halley (2002) describe, at the 
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foundation of regulation (p. 7).  Since regimes are comprised of norms and decision­
making procedures in the form of institutions in which international interests converge 
(Krasner, 1983), critical legal analysis is useful for identifying and evaluating the 
stakeholder interests prioritized by the law in an IP prohibition regime.   
Critical legal arguments also support dismantling institutions that privilege the rights 
of the most powerful state and market stakeholders at the expense of weaker groups 
within society (Duncan & Halley, 2002, p. 7).  For instance, Freeman (1989) discusses 
how institutional racism in the United States is based on legal processes and systems of 
employment and contract rights that disenfranchise minorities.  The solution to 
institutional racism, then, is not a neutral application of the law, but a disintegration of 
racist law altogether (Freeman, 1989; Hutchinson, 1989, p.7).  A key difference between 
liberal and critical legalism, then, is based on critical legal scholars’ tendency to view 
the law as part of the problem instead of the solution.  In the next section, I expand on 
the critiques of social power found in critical legal thought through a discussion of the 
international political economy of communication. 
Commodification and spatialization in the IP prohibition regime. This section 
begins with a explanations from the international political economy of communication in 
order to situate the roles of commodification and spatialization in the IP prohibition 
regime.  The political economic discussion in this dissertation are sourced from Strange 
(1994) and Mosco (2009).  Strange (1994) discussed the international political economy 
as concerning “the social, political and economic arrangements affecting the global 
systems of production, exchange and distribution, and the mix of values therein” (p. 18).  
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Strange’s approach to the international political economy, which is based within an 
institutional approach to international relations, is centered on the human decisions and 
man­made institutions that affect global systems.  The focus on values, norms, and rules 
is valuable to the GPR concept because it puts into perspective why social, political, and 
economic arrangements support prohibitions on particular activities.  Prohibition 
regimes, following Strange, are a product of arrangements and values in global systems 
by institutions to enforce IP law.  Narrowing from Strange’s definition into the particular 
context of communication studies, Mosco’s (2009) explains the political economy of 
communication as the “study of social power relations that mutually constitute the 
production, distribution and consumption of communication, or the social process of 
exchange of social relationships” (pp. 67­68).  Mosco’s definition is valuable here 
because it focuses on means of communication, which allows for a focused discussion of 
the political economic impact of ICTs and intellectual property.  The role of ICTs and 
information policy in international society is a subject of much political economic 
literature (e.g., Mosco, 2009; Fuchs, 2008, 2011; Schiller, 1999).  The post­industrial, 
information­driven form of capitalism that makes up the global economy is partially 
reliant on the manipulation of communication technologies by multinational 
corporations; communication technologies allow multinationals to accumulate capital by 
outsourcing labor and management functions worldwide (Mosco, 2009, pp. 67, 69­71).  
Once multinationals have a large enough presence within the global economy, they are 
able to overcome regulatory obstacles and integrate with regulatory systems that would 
otherwise inhibit their economic interests (Mosco, 2009, pp. 178­179).  Mosco (2009) 
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argues that multilateral organizations such as the European Union and WTO—and by 
extension, TRIPS—are a reflection of the push for the global, liberalized trade agenda of 
the current international political economy (p. 177).  Commodification, the process of 
transforming things valued for use into things valued for their economic function 
(Mosco, 2009, p. 127), is central to expanding the international trade agenda.  May and 
Sell (2006), in a history of IPR, note how TRIPS expanded the commodification to 
eliminate access to information, knowledge and culture to public and potential 
innovators (p. 158).  TRIPS, then, was part of an economic arrangement to expand the 
resources and influence of the IP industries within the international political economy.  
Political economic analysis from May (2003) and May and Sell (2006) assesses the 
expansion of IPR through TRIPS as a major development in the history of using 
intellectual property to enclose science, technology, culture, and information.   
The concept of enclosure as a means for commodification is discussed by May 
(2000) in a political economic analysis of international IPR.  In May’s (2000) enclosure 
argument, information societies create new spaces for the commodification of 
knowledge (p. 43).  The economic and social organizations of information societies 
work to expand and maintain the legitimacy of intellectual property through policy that 
characterizes knowledge as private (May, 2000, p. 43).  May (2000) argued that IPR has 
long been a tool for the commodification of knowledge, but that the signing of TRIPS 
was a touchstone moment in the enclosure of information within digital networks (p. 49).  
Boyle (2008), while writing from a liberal legal rather than political economic 
perspective, also argues that the freedom of people to access knowledge and information 
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is curtailed by a new enclosure movement designed to capture resources (pp. 80­82).  
Enclosure is used in the international political economy to control the production, 
consumption and distribution of information in order to increase the economic returns of 
the IP industries.  Enclosed information is part of a commodified space, and the new 
information commodities are protected by the state.  The defense of informational 
commodities involves institutions that use moral and legal power to deprive individuals 
of information access (Andrejevic, 2013, pp. 154­155).  The IP prohibition regime, as an 
enforcement mechanism for information policy, is one such agent for controlling and 
preventing access to information.  Intellectual property prohibitions exist to guard 
enclosed spaces and protect commodified information and knowledge.  The political 
economic critique of the IPR GPR, then, is dependent on the critique of the 
commodification of information.  The discussion of E.U. IP policy in Chapter II 
describes how the European Union commodifies information and encloses access to 
knowledge through policy initiatives and directives.  The case studies in Chapter III also 
reflect on the political economic consequences of enforcement and prohibitions arising 
in E.U. member states because of institutional, state, and corporate pressures.  The 
analysis in the later chapters also relate to spatialization, the process that allows the IP 
prohibition regime to internationalize in the European Union. 
Spatialization refers to the way that capitalism transforms and improves the means of 
transportation and communication, reducing the time it takes to move goods and services 
(Mosco, 2009, p. 157).  International prohibitions are set into place to prevent 
illegitimate goods and services from utilizing the benefits of spatialization. Therefore, 
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the actors that can achieve the most power from spatialization are those that can define 
the legitimate use of goods and services.  Since advances in the communication industry 
are central to spatialization, the multinationals that influence telecom and media 
industries are a central source of power in the political economy of communication 
(Mosco, 2009, pp. 158­159).  Corporate concentration in the media industry allows 
companies to control production, distribution, and exchange of communication, as well 
as limit competition (Mosco, 2009, pp. 158­159).  The concentration of corporate power 
also gives the private sector resources to affect policy (Mosco, 2009, p. 160).  Corporate 
influence on regulation is not one­sided, however, and the state actively encourages the 
growth and self­regulation of the communication industry (Mosco, 2009, p. 175). 
Mosco’s (2009) discussion of regulation critiques the concept of “deregulation” by 
arguing that when the state eliminates government regulation, it is actually expanding 
market regulation (p. 176).  The expansion of market regulation can be construed as a 
form of commercialization, where the state replaces regulation designed to benefit the 
public good with market standards that emphasize private profits (Mosco, 2009, p. 176).  
The DRM protections of the DMCA and Information Society Directive described earlier 
in this chapter are a clear form of commercialization.  The public good of being able to 
copy or share was invalidated by the market’s right to lock down media through anti­
circumvention technology.  DRM puts the regulation of media under the supervision of 
content holders, and the market also regulates sectors of the telecommunication system.  
The commercialization of the Internet—that is, the market regulation of the Internet that 
prioritizes the profitability of digital networks—is part of the emerging information 
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policy regime described by Braman (2004) and enumerated in the previous section.  
Where state regulation of the Internet does exist, it is heavily influenced by market 
demands and recommendations.  The IIPA’s influence on TRIPS and the USTR’s 301 
report, described earlier in this chapter, is an example of the state regulating IP with the 
close assistance of industry.  The IPR prohibition regime is a product of the constitutive 
regulatory agendas of the state and the market, and the regime is largely regulated 
through internationalization in the form of IGOs, supranational institutions, and trade 
alliances.  Internationalization is a form of spatialization that includes the creation of 
regional and global organizations (Mosco, 2009, p. 177); GATT, the WTO, the World 
Bank, the United Nations and other international organizations discussed throughout this 
chapter are all products of internationalization.  Regimes are also products of 
internationalization insofar as they are made up of international organizations and 
institutions working together to maintain common interests.  The political economic 
perspective addresses Strange’s (1983) critique of early regime theory as ignoring the 
role of the market in international relations (p. 352).  The state and industry are primary 
forces in the development of information policy (Mosco, 2009, p. 178), and both state 
and industry are responsible for regime formation.  Mosco (2009) also notes that the 
world’s richest and most powerful regions exert the most control over global information 
policy, and work with corporate decision makers to create communication regulation (p. 
178).  The IPR prohibition regime was certainly launched by the United States, and the 
European Union’s development of IP policy both internally and externally is an example 
of state and industry constitutively constructing regulation.   
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Spatialization is at the core of the European Union’s common market initiatives 
toward intellectual property.  The purpose of the common market is to eliminate barriers 
to trade and harmonize markets across the European Union (Dinan, 2010, p. 29).  The 
various E.U. directives and policy initiatives discussed at length in Chapter II are 
designed to contribute to the growth of the common market.  The European Union’s 
information policy agenda is crafted to harmonize digital IP policy across member states 
and create a single framework for Internet regulation across the European Union 
(Burkart, 2014, p. 73).  E.U. intellectual property policy discussed throughout the 
dissertation is often created through joint deliberation with E.U. leaders and the private 
sector with little to no input from public interest groups or NGOs (Burkart, 2014, pp. 40­
41).  The efforts to harmonize E.U. IPR through constitutive state and market action 
create policies that prioritize information policy as a tool for commodification.  Fuchs 
(2011), in a critique of the political economy of media, described the type of information 
policy that occurs through constitutive state/market relations as prioritizing the  need to 
exploit cultural goods and creative works in order to profit (Fuchs, 2011, p. 5).  The 
prioritization of market interests creates a “field of conflict” that pits governments and 
media industries against A2K groups, activists and many individual Internet users 
(Fuchs, 2011, p. 5).  The European Union’s E­commerce initiatives illustrate potential 
areas of conflict in IPR.  The European Union’s revenue of online goods and services 
was €311.6 billion in 2012, and the European Commission outlined plans to double sales 
by 2015 (European Commission [EC], 2012a).  Part of the European Union’s plan to 
increase E­commerce revenues is to make it easier for police and copyright holders to 
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take down websites by imposing greater liability on Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
and websites to police users and filter content (EC, 2012a).  ISPs and websites are then 
forced to police the Internet by boosting surveillance and potentially violating the 
privacy of users. Larsson (2011a), in research critical of the European Union’s IP 
agenda, describes the prevalence of mass surveillance in emerging IP policy to be part of 
a trend in increasing control over the flow of information online (pp. 28­29).   
Fuchs (2008, 2011) is critical of state and market regulation that controls digital 
information flows and commodifies online spaces.  Fuchs (2008) argues that ICTs, peer­
to­peer technology, and social networks are capable of threatening the dominant 
economic order (p. 129).  There is no need for the market distribution of information and 
knowledge when those two resources can be shared and copied openly online (Fuchs, 
2008, pp. 132­133).  States and industries act cooperatively to create information policy 
that gives the market control over the access and distribution of knowledge resources 
and communication technologies (Fuchs, 2011, p. 38).  Information policy commodifies 
information, and enforcement mechanisms are put into place to protect the private 
property of corporations (Fuchs, 2011, p. 226).  The European Union institutes 
heightened surveillance and DRM protections to enforce IP protection as police agencies 
broaden IP crime databases and bolster IPR enforcement.  All of the increase in control 
and enforcement of information flows is driven by policy to grow markets and increase 
the profits of multinationals (Fuchs, 2011, pp. 225­226).  Fuchs (2011) is concerned with 
the corporate influence on global information policy and maps trajectories of resistance.  
Fuchs (2011) argues that resistance to global capitalism comes from leftist alternative 
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media and politicized civil society organizations (pp. 318­322).  An example of 
resistance would be Wikipedia’s stand against the United States’ Stop Online Piracy Act 
(SOPA).  SOPA was a U.S. policy proposal that was designed to enhance copyright 
enforcement through increased surveillance and website blacklisting (Carrier, 2013, pp. 
21­22).  The legislation was criticized for being broad and vague in its proposals and a 
potential source of copyright overreach (Carrier, 2013, p. 30).  In protest of the law, 
several websites staged a blackout (Netburn, 2012).  Wikipedia, described by Fuchs 
(2008) as a non­commodified open content project (p. 133), was taking political action 
against the United States government.  The anti­SOPA blackout was part of a larger, 
successful protest against the legislation, and it marked the emergence of Wikipedia as a 
political actor (Netburn, 2012).  Fuchs (2013) labels both Wikipedia and WikiLeaks 
“shining beacons of a commons­based Internet and a political, networked public sphere” 
that exist in outside the realm of corporate media (p. 221).  The two wikis are still 
heavily reliant on and limited by existing structures, though, and WikiLeaks in particular 
is reliant on traditional mass media outlets to distribute its journalism (Fuchs, 2013, p. 
221).  Both sites are part of a communicative commons that Fuchs (2013) argues is made 
up of noncommercial Internet projects, watchdog groups, public search engines, and 
digital rights organizations (p. 222).  These noncommercial actors could—and, for Fuchs 
(2013), should—create coalition politics to reverse the capitalist takeover of the digital 
commons (p. 222).  The case studies in Chapter III, which incorporate European policies 
similar to SOPA, detail the individual and coalition politics of the institutions that resist 
the European Union’s common markets agendas of spatialization and commodification.  
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Political economy and the critical media and information approach are used as tools for 
analyzing and critiquing the systems that create international regimes and prohibitions.  
Political economy is one of two approaches that I use to evaluate resistance to the IP 
prohibition regime.  The other approach is the policy­based approach to IP reform, 
which I describe in the next sub­section through the context of the A2K movement. 
A2K as a framework for IP policy. The literature describing the international 
regimes system and the political economy illustrate a trajectory of intellectual property 
wherein information is treated as a global commodity and is ever more tightly controlled 
through international organizations, trade agreements, and police groups.  In information 
economies, IP is an underlying right that allows multinationals to maximize profits, and 
the social and cultural needs for access to knowledge are secondary to commodification.  
Supporters of Access to Knowledge view the current and emerging IP regime as 
“intellectual property absolutism” (Kapczynski & Krikorian, 2010a, p. 12; Drahos, 2012, 
p. 212), “information­as­control” (Cohen, 2012, p. 7), copyright “maximalism” 
(Samuelson, 1996), and similar descriptions that denote an abuse of IPR.  By contrast, 
the A2K movement prioritizes the use of information outside the domain of intellectual 
property for the betterment of society (Cohen, 2012, p. 216; Kapczynski & Krikorian, 
2010a, pp. 9­14).  A core principle of A2K is that the expansion of absolutist IP policy is 
anti­democratic, restrictive (Kapczynski & Krikorian, 2010a, pp. 28­51), and an outright 
threat to cultural participation and creative practice (Cohen, 2012, pp. 69­70).   
The normative critiques of IPR governance are abundant and diverse, and often 
conflict with one another over the nature of knowledge, information, property, and rights 
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(Correa, 2010, pp. 238­239). However, concepts such as the public domain, the 
commons, sharing, openness, and access are all part of a common language that makes 
up the political discourse of A2K (Kapczynski, 2010, p. 30).  The conception of the 
public domain and the commons online is often based on an environmental metaphor 
(Kapczynski, 2010, p. 30; Boyle, 2008).  Boyle’s (2008) contribution to A2K stresses 
the importance of an ecology that encompasses the entire landscape of information, 
creative works, and knowledge (pp. xi­xv).  The environmentalist metaphor—
associating the informational, cultural environment with the physical environment—
provides a framework for critiquing the abuse of IP as the abuse of the information 
ecology (Cohen, 2012, p. 4).  The commons and the public domain are part of this 
ecology, and they should exist in equilibrium with IPR (Boyle, 2008, pp. 238­239). The 
public domain consists of creative works and ideas that operate outside of the realm of 
property, and is endangered by IPR’s enclosure of creative works (Boyle, 2008, pp. 45­
50).  Proponents of A2K stress the value of the public domain as an asset to the public 
(Kapczynski, 2010, pp. 31­32).  The free works provided by the public domain are at 
once important for creativity—as individuals are allowed to build on, perform, or alter 
works—and a public asset, as they are exempt from financial exchange. 
The commons function alongside the public domain in the information ecology, and 
the environmental metaphor is expanded through a reference to communally shared and 
managed land (Kapczynski, 2010, pp. 32­33).  The cultural commons consists of 
collectively governed and shared information, such as free, open source software 
(Kapczynski, 2010, p. 33).  Unlike physical commons, the cultural commons cannot be 
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degraded via overuse, as the use of intellectual works by one person does not interfere 
with the use of the same works by another (Boyle, 2008, p. 68).  Additionally, the belief 
exists that collective ownership regimes may be equal or superior to the individual rights 
guaranteed with intellectual property (Kapczynski, 2010, pp. 33­34).  Benkler (2012), in 
a critique of legal approaches to the commons, argues that the enclosure of creative 
works through IP regimes leads to the “underutilization of information” (p. 228).  
Benkler’s underutilization of information thesis, when applied to the ecology metaphor, 
implies that overly protective rights regimes damage the cultural environment.   
Cohen (2012) is critical of the environment/ecology metaphor and warns of the 
dangers of comparing culture with the physical environment, claiming that while 
scientists can make empirical statements as to what will be beneficial or damaging to the 
physical environment with certainty, evaluation of a cultural ecology is more relative (p. 
8).  Cohen’s approach prioritizes the cultivation of individual and cultural creativity over 
legal liberal notions of just distribution of knowledge. This cultivation approach to A2K 
supposes that the environmental metaphors offered by reformers and activists may be as 
misplaced or even as dangerous as the market metaphors applied to creative culture by 
IP absolutists (Cohen, 2012, pp. 8­9). The political economic binary of “freedom” and 
“control” in the debate between IPR critics and absolutists may be buried too deeply in 
liberal democratic thought and out of touch with the cultural, social, political, and 
technological systems that actually foster creativity (Cohen, 2012, pp. 28­29).  Cohen 
(2012) argues that cultural play is an important part of a life well lived (p. 145); policy 
regimes should work to preserve the interplay of cultural practices and shape the social 
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geography in a manner that allows creativity to flourish (pp. 58­62). From a perspective 
that prioritizes the development of creativity and human culture, information policy in a 
digital environment should express the understanding that creativity is fostered through 
the self.  Creativity does not occur in a vacuum of property or speech rights, but is, 
rather, dependent on the broader social and cultural landscape surrounding authors 
(Cohen, 2012, pp. 21­22).  To create a just policy regime, information policy needs to 
create room for privacy and access to knowledge (Balkin, 2012, p. 103).  Information 
policy also needs to focus on the privacy and access rights of individuals to the detriment 
of the same rights by corporations (Cohen, 2012, pp. 9­10).   
While Cohen’s cultivation approach is critical of the legal liberalism that surrounds 
A2K theory and activism, it still acknowledges a recognition of the need for people to 
access cultural works and artifacts in order to encourage practices that “allow human 
beings to flourish” (Cohen, 2012, pp. 42­43).  Cohen’s work is skeptical of policy 
models based around fostering a specific notion of a public domain or the commons 
because Cohen’s theory of information policy focuses on preserving culture and human 
happiness more so than liberal legal and democratic processes. The narrative of sharing 
and openness that is common throughout the A2K movement is largely—though not 
completely—compatible with proposals to model information policy toward fostering 
human creativity and the development of the self.   
The discourse of sharing and openness in A2K supports an argument that “the whole 
is greater than the sum of its parts” (Kapczynski, 2010, p. 35).  IP regimes that focus 
solely on the relationship between an individual and a creative work lose sight of the 
 68 
 
 
social, cultural, and technological norms and practices that inform creativity 
(Kapczynski, 2012, p. 35).  For example, the open software movement demonstrates 
how sharing and collaboration can improve technologies and spur innovation through 
upgrading, modifying, improving, and developing software (Kapczynski, 2010, p. 36).  
Arguments from proponents of sharing and openness view the software as collaboration 
of shared knowledge, not as a commodity.  As Kapczynski (2010) explains:  
The demand for sharing and openness is thus also a demand that the ability to 
access and manipulate knowledge and information be democratized.  What is 
being shared and opened is not just a set of commodities, but also the processes 
by which we communicate with one another and create together and the processes 
by which we act as citizens of our increasingly informational societies. (p. 36) 
A2K researchers and activists hold that creative works should be viewed as processes 
of communication, as opposed to strict commodities.  Additionally, access to knowledge 
is crucial in forming a democratic system that allows people to contribute to and benefit 
from culture fairly (Kapczynski, 2010, p. 38).  People cannot contribute to the 
development of society and culture without access to the networks, resources, and tools 
necessary for cultural and social participation (Cohen, 2012, pp. 179­180).  Beyond the 
realm of creativity, access is also important as a mechanism for distributive justice in 
society by ensuring that people are able to access scientific information and medicine 
(Kapczynski, 2010, pp. 39­40).  In terms of copyright policy, A2K advocates argue that 
there is a moral imperative to improve the post­TRIPS IP landscape in order to better 
protect and cultivate open systems of knowledge and information sharing (Krikorian, 
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2010, pp. 86­87).  Sell (2010) describes the A2K movement as important in limiting the 
influence of “IP maximalists” in intergovernmental forums that work continuously to 
ratchet up IP enforcement (pp. 2­3).  IGOs, the United States, European Union, and 
police agencies like Interpol consistently promote TRIPS­Plus policies that heighten the 
global expansion of IP (Sell, 2010, pp. 2­3, 14).  Policies such as TRIPS and TRIPS­Plus 
violate the social contract of copyright as a means to spur creativity and innovation by 
limiting activities such as library access to digitization projects or Internet users’ abilities 
to “remix” creative works (Franz, 2010, pp. 521­522).   
Access to knowledge encompasses a legitimate set of norms and principles that its 
advocates claim should be pursued in human rights discourse (Kapczynski, 2010, p. 38).  
In terms of policy discourse, A2K’s major contributions come within the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).  WIPO is a UN agency founded in 1967 to 
protect, advance, and harmonize IPR (Netanel, 2009, p. 143).  The agency oversees 
international copyright agreements and in 2002 extended digital copyright protection and 
DRM standards through the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty (Tellez & Musungu, 2010, p. 186).  After the ratification of the two 
treaties, WIPO continued to engage in efforts to create new rights for IPR holders in the 
digital environment (Tellez & Musungu, 2010, p. 187).  However, aggressive outreach 
by pro­A2K civil society groups toward developing nation governments and WIPO 
began in 2004 to refocus WIPO’s agenda from “new intellectual property protection 
standards toward economic development and non­proprietary approaches to promoting 
human innovation and creativity” (Helfer, 2007, p. 1010).  The move to an A2K­
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supportive WIPO began when pressure from A2K­supportive institutions and developing 
nations prevented the ratification of a copyright maximalist broadcast treaty in WIPO 
that was backed by the European Union and Japan (Tellez & Musungu, 2010, p. 189).  
The highlight of the A2K agenda at WIPO came when Brazil and Argentina proposed the 
Development Agenda (Helfer, 2010, p. 1011).  The crafting of the proposal began with a 
coalition of nations with similar concerns regarding the protection of public access to 
medicines being threatened by patent law, including Brazil, Egypt, India, and South 
Africa and grassroots organizations in those countries (Latiff, 2010, p. 101).  The 
national coalitions were joined by A2K­supportive civil society and NGO groups such as 
Medicins San Frontieres, Knowledge Ecology International, and the Third World 
Network (Latiff, 2010, pp. 101, 109).  The Development Agenda abandoned WIPO’s IP­
centric mission in favor of an approach to information and knowledge resources that 
recognized that, while IPRs can fuel innovation, creativity, and development, they often 
fail to do so (Netanel, 2009, p. 2).  The supportive coalitions explicitly acknowledged the 
importance of A2K in both a developmental sense in support of access to medicine and 
technology as well as in the sense of developing creativity and innovation through 
reforming copyright standards (Latiff, 2010, p. 117). 
The Development Agenda’s proposal included the “Geneva Declaration on the 
Future of WIPO” written by civil society groups that urged WIPO to pay greater 
attention to the social and economic costs of IP protection, scaling back IPR through 
reform, and greater support of free and open software projects, distance education tools, 
and medical research tools (Helfer, 2007, pp. 1011­1012).  The Geneva Declaration used 
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the language of human rights discourse and stemmed from the premise that “[h]umanity 
faces a global crisis in the governance of knowledge, technology and culture” (Geneva 
Declaration on the Future of the World Intellectual Property Organization, 2004, p. 1).  
Due to the size and influence of the coalitions supporting the Development Agenda, 
WIPO repositioned itself in support of a strong public domain and a rejection of 
absolutist IP policy (Netanel, 2009, pp. 2­3).  The Development Agenda was ratified in 
2007 after three years of deliberation.  The finalized Agenda’s primary function is to 
apply empirical research and analysis to better understand appropriate approaches to IPR 
around the world and facilitate norms and policies that encourage those approaches 
(Netanel, 2009, p. 6).   
Netanel (2009) describes the Development Agenda as part of a broader international 
rejection of the “Washington Consensus” that prescribes free trade and liberalization to 
development policy (p. 3).  The World Bank and other economic forums began moving 
away from the Consensus in the early 21st century in favor of nuanced policy that 
considers local conditions, human rights, and social justice as part of generating 
economic growth (Netanel, 2009, p. 3).  A2K advocates seized on the change in 
development policy to articulate to governments and IGOs the need for a robust public 
domain and national flexibility in defining and delimiting IP rights (Netanel, 2009, p. 3).  
The Development Agenda is widely regarded as a major victory of the A2K movement 
and an important counter­balance to TRIPS and TRIPS­Plus agreements (Latiff, 2010, 
pp. 99­101.)  Parts of the initial proposal for the Agenda never made it through 
deliberations, though.  The A2K Treaty is one aspect of the Agenda that was not ratified 
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(Helfer, 2007, p. 1012).  The A2K Treaty offers specific policy proposals across the IP 
spectrum and was meant to be a counter­balance to TRIPS (Helfer, 2007, p. 1013).  
TRIPS’ minimum standards for IPR were met by the A2K Treaty with maximum 
standards that would limit the ability of signatories to institute TRIPS­Plus proposals 
(Helfer, 2007, p. 1014).  In relation to digital copyright law, the Treaty calls for limits to 
DRM protections, broad provisions for public access to information, and a ban on 
copyrighting databases (Treaty on Access to Knowledge, 2005, pp. 7­8).  Though not 
ratified, the Treaty maintains support from A2K proponents and provides a clear outline 
of A2K policy discourse (Helfer, 2007, pp. 1013­1014).   
The Development Agenda is an example of A2K success in the international arena 
and an example of how some governments and IGOs are beginning to reject the IP 
aspects of the Washington Consensus.  At the regional level, a coalition of NGOs, civil 
society and trade groups, scientists, and businesses including Sun Microsystems and a 
political coalition organized by the Green Party defeated a proposal for new standards for 
software patents in the European Union in 2005 (Aigan, 2010, pp. 168­170).  On a 
national and later regional level, the Pirate Party first emerged in Sweden as a reaction to 
the police raid of the file sharing website The Pirate Bay (Krikorian, 2010, p. 90).  The 
Pirate Party has since won parliamentary seats in Sweden, the European Parliament, and 
across the European Union, establishing itself as a political party in support of access to 
knowledge, information, and privacy (Kapczynski & Krikorian, 2010b, pp. 377, 383­
384).  The Pirate Party, along with the coalitions that defended open software in the 
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European Union and changed WIPO’s IP agenda, are part of the A2K collective that has 
emerged in opposition the absolutist IP policy agenda.   
The A2K sector is primarily composed of political parties, social movement 
organizations, activists, and interest groups that support reforming IP to reduce 
restrictions on public access to information and knowledge.  On the fringes of and 
intertwined with the A2K movement are radical actors that are willing to ignore or flout 
the law to further their goals.  The fringe groups include file sharing sites like The Pirate 
Bay, stateless whistleblowing organizations like WikiLeaks, and countercultural 
hacktivist collectives like Anonymous.  The Pirate Bay was the largest BitTorrent tracker 
in the world and was famous for its prankster ethos and crass rebuttals of legal threats 
from the entertainment and software industries (Andersson, 2013, p. 133).  The 
international police raid that took its servers, the show trial of its founders, and the 
defiant persistence of The Pirate Bay’s services sparked the emergence of many imitators 
and strengthened a file sharing ecosystem that is dismissive of digital copyrights 
(Andersson, 2013, pp. 133­134).  Another provocateur of the digital commons is the 
whistleblowing organization WikiLeaks that achieved global fame after leaking footage 
of U.S. soldiers firing on innocents in Iraq.  WikiLeaks is perhaps best known for its 
controversial founder and its leaks of the U.S. military and surveillance agencies, but the 
organization has played a crucial role in the success of A2K politics.  Benkler (2013) 
describes WikiLeaks as being at the forefront of an interactive, collaborative “networked 
fourth estate” that bypasses traditional information gatekeepers (pp. 30­31). Leaked 
information can be especially useful to the A2K movement because IP law and policy is 
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often created opaquely between private and government actors with little or no input 
from public interest groups. WikiLeaks leak of the initial text of the Anti­Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA) revealed to the world the U.S. and European Union’s push for 
graduated response policies that would ban users from the Internet for alleged digital 
copyright violations (Geist, 2010, December 22).  WikiLeaks released diplomatic cables 
that revealed the extent of behind­the­scenes pressure by the United States on Spain to 
adopt new copyright policy.  The Spanish case also details the protest politics of 
Anonymous, the leaderless hacktivist collective and another radical actor intertwined 
with the A2K movement.  Hacktivist groups demonstrate political activity through 
collective action, but lack the focused political agency of traditional social movement 
groups (Burkart, 2014, pp. 32­33).  Anonymous, which originated in 2003 as a collection 
of hackers engaging in light­hearted pranks around the web (Gerbaudo, 2012, p. 107), 
first became associated with copyright activism in 2010 when it took down the Motion 
Picture Association of America’s and others’ websites with distributed denial­of­service 
(DDoS) attacks in retaliation for legal action against The Pirate Bay (Zetter, 2014, sect. 
2, para. 4).  A similar, larger attack was launched later that year against credit card 
companies denying donations to WikiLeaks (Zetter, 2014, sect. 2, para. 4).  Anonymous­
oriented calls for engagement in street protests against the United State’s Stop Online 
Piracy Act, ACTA, (Norton, 2012) and Spain’s copyright reform laws (Postill, 2014, p. 
5) also illustrate the collective’s participation in A2K politics.  Anonymous, like 
WikiLeaks, is far from solely focused on digital rights issues.  These and similar entities, 
however, do play a role in the backdrop of the A2K movement.  
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A2K is best understood as a broad theoretical, political, and activist landscape of 
individuals and institutions that oppose the current IP regime as unjust and anti­
democratic.  There is no one solution or set of policies or ethics that are understood to fix 
the problem of the current global IP regime, and harmonization of the A2K agenda 
would likely prove as difficult as international harmonization efforts in general.  There is, 
however, a general set of norms and values, including support for the public domain, the 
commons, sharing, openness, and access that permeates through A2K and aims to reform 
the norms and principles of the current international system of IPR .  
Concluding the Literature Review  
The purpose of the present literature review is to illustrate how IP prohibitions are 
incorporated into an international regime and to identify conflicts and disputes between 
stakeholders within the prohibition regime.   The first section provided a background for 
the IPR GPR by tracing the history of the liberal regime in the world system.  I then 
discussed a framework for information policy from Braman (2004; 2007) that describes 
how international policy is used to control the flow of information, knowledge and 
culture through digital networks.  I also selected approaches from cybercrime theory 
from Lemieux (2010) and Leman­Langlois (2012) that describe the role of police 
organizations in enforcing and standardizing the enforcement of IP law.   
The second section of the literature review applies two frameworks of critique for 
international IP prohibitions.  The first, the critique of the international political 
economy, addresses questions of power within regimes.  The need to apply political 
economy to regime theory was articulated by Strange (2003) as a means of critically 
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evaluating the influence of the state and especially the market on regime formation.  I 
apply Mosco’s (2009) definition of the political economy of communication to analyze 
the prevalence of the commodification and enclosure of information by states and media 
industries.  The constitutive relationship between the state and the market support 
international systems that harmonize IP law.  The harmonization of IP law is a point of 
focus throughout this dissertation, and Chapter II describes how the European Union 
operates to spatialize IP standards throughout Europe.  The European Union utilizes the 
GPR model within confines of its political, economic, and legal system to enforce the 
harmonization of intellectual property.  The political economic critique that the 
international system favors powerful state and industrial actors and is damaging the 
digital commons is examined in Chapter III’s case studies.   
Both the potential enclosure of a digital commons and political dissent to IP regimes 
are addressed in A2K politics, activism, and theory.  As described in the latter part of the 
literature review’s second section, the A2K literature defends the qualities of a digital 
commons, a public domain, sharing, openness, and access to information (Kapczynski 
2010, p. 30).  A2K is similar to the political economic critique of IP regimes in that it is 
concerned with enclosures of information and the power of multinationals to shape 
policy, but A2K activists and supporters have approached IP reform within the legal 
paradigms of the international system.  The WIPO Development Agenda and A2K 
treaties are clear examples of access to knowledge policy discourse that offer alternatives 
to the international upward ratchet of IP law.  The application of the A2K agenda outside 
of WIPO is detailed in Chapter III’s study of Spain’s Ley Sinde.  In that case, I analyze 
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stakeholders and evaluate the impact they have on policy at the Spanish and E.U. levels.  
A2K and political economy are applied throughout the dissertation to qualify 
stakeholders, analyze outcomes, and to observe social perceptions of the European IP 
prohibition regime.   
Research Design 
The research in this dissertation includes the literature review in Chapter I, the 
enumeration and critique of E.U. IP policy and procedure in Chapter II, and a series of 
case studies in Chapter III.  The case studies apply the research from the first two 
chapters to cases in the European Union that deal directly with IP prohibitions and 
international information policy.  The cases are concurrent with similar events occurring 
across the European Union in regard to the harmonization and enforcement of European 
IP law.  The value of case study research is that it allows the researcher to obtain vivid 
descriptions of events as they occur both temporally and spatially, and to find causality 
through deductive reasoning and contextual evidence (Gerring, 2007, p. 184).  Despite 
the importance of other areas of IP policy, I have chosen to focus on regimes guiding 
digital copyright for two reasons.  First, to maintain an appropriate scope of research.  
This study is better served focusing on one aspect of IP—digital copyright 
enforcement—and not evaluating patents, trademarks, and physical copyright 
infringement.  Additionally, as a contribution to the field of information policy, the study 
of physical infringement is outside the boundaries of this dissertation.  Related to the 
issue of scope, I am aware that digital copyright is a feature of IPR.  Enforcement and 
policy related across the spectrum of intellectual property and cultural goods will carry 
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over to particular aspects of this study, even if these outlying facts are not a point of 
emphasis.  Secondly, digital copyright infringement involves both the problems of 
intellectual property and cybercrime, both of which are guided by policy related to 
information and communication technologies.  As such, I am able to stay narrow in 
scope but broad in implication, as many GPRs in the 21st century rely on ICT policy.   
I clarify and verify the arguments that I make about the nature and direction of 
enforcement regimes by observing, analyzing, and mapping the cases.  I am using the 
case study method to gain insight into how GPRs guide information policy and to better 
understand what challenges the norms and principles of prohibition regimes offer to IP 
policy formation and reform.  The case studies will demonstrate political, legal, and 
social relations within the prohibition regime and focus in particular on areas of 
contention within the regime.  The literature in Chapter I discussing cybercrime, 
information policy, international political economy, and A2K and the research on 
democratic deficits and Europeanization in Chapter II indicate that social perceptions of 
IP prohibition regime legitimacy may be weak.  Chapter III’s case studies analyze critical 
claims of international IP systems to determine what effects prohibitions and 
enforcement have on the legitimacy of IP governance.  Chapter IV discusses the effects 
of prohibitions and offers policy recommendations based on the observations of the 
European Union’s utilization of the IP prohibition regime.  The specific cases that guide 
the dissertation are overviewed in the next section.   
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In the case research, I offer a history of the international IP prohibition regime and 
two case studies that demonstrate the path of prohibitions in the European Union.  I 
chose Europe’s administration of the IP prohibition regime for several reasons.  
European nations have a long history of international copyright enforcement (Johns, 
2011) and the European Union is currently striving to build a dominant information 
market that is competitive globally and consistent with the formation of its common 
market (EC, 2012b).  The European Union is a TRIPS signatory and prioritizes a strong 
information economy (EC, 2012b).  The European Union has launched directives 
requiring minimums for IPR enforcement that are similar to those in the United States, 
and several E.U. nations have established prohibitions on the digital sharing of 
information that outweigh U.S. standards.  Burkart (2014) noted that the European Union 
may have surpassed the United States’ embrace of ratcheting up IP policy because of the 
greater importance of international trade in Europe (p. 73).  In addition to E.U. policy 
that increases and internationalizes IP prohibitions, the individual E.U. member states 
encounter lateral U.S. pressures to adopt higher standards of IPR.  Researching the 
European Union, then, gives insight into international prohibition regimes by presenting 
the internal information policy processes within Europe, the lateral pressures of the 
United States, and the response of a region to TRIPS and TRIPS­Plus. The European 
Union is indicative of the emerging IPR GPR in both the industrialized and 
informationalized world, and the outcome over its intellectual property disputes will 
eventually influence trade agreements and international development (Netanel, 2009).   
Overview of the Case Research 
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The cases selected to analyze the E.U.’s IP prohibitions were chosen because of their 
individual implications and because they are broadly applicable to situations occurring 
across the European Union during the same time period.  The case research is conducted 
in the form of a critical history that begins with the launch of global prohibitions toward 
digital copyrights near the turn of the 21st century.  After describing the launch of 
prohibitions, I provide the case of the file sharing site OiNK’s Pink Palace. I address 
legal actions against the site for digital copyright infringement, including the removal of 
the website and the arrests of several of its operators and users.  The second case 
documents the 2007­2014 formation and implementation of Spain’s copyright reform 
law, Ley Sinde, to regulate digital copyrights.  
Summary of the Case Analysis 
The cases are prefaced with a discussion of the launch of international prohibitions 
on digital copyright infringement through several operations by U.S. law enforcement, 
Interpol, and national police forces.  The operations were the first examples of 
international cooperation to enforce digital copyrights (Urbas, 2007, p. 20).  International 
police cooperation in the operations is the result of years of building an IP prohibition 
regime through trade agreements, corporate lobbying, and lateral pressures from the 
United States (Urbas, 2007, pp. 17­18).  The operations are important precedents in the 
evaluation of the rise of actual enforcement mechanisms that physically impose 
copyright prohibitions.  After analyzing the process through which international digital 
copyright enforcement arose, I move on to cases that analyze how the European Union 
has adapted the IPR GPR to further common market goals. 
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The first case regards OiNK’s Pink Palace, a file sharing website that was taken 
down in 2007 in an international European raid.  Several administrators and users were 
arrested, but the cases fell apart due to the recording industry’s insistence on trying the 
OiNK cases as criminal instead of civil (Wray, 2010, January 15, para. 5).  The case was 
a major failure for the International Federation for the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) and 
increased calls among British politicians and the entertainment industry for harsher 
copyright legislation in the United Kingdom (Wray, 2010, para. 7).  OiNK also 
illustrated the failure of prohibitions on digital copyrights when imitation sites popped 
up in the immediate aftermath of its demise (van der Saar, 2007, para. 1).  For the 
timeline of the OiNK case, I use research from Sockanathan (2011) and Carraway 
(2010) and several news articles to map the timeline of the raids, seizures and 
prosecutions involved with the site.  The value of the Pink Palace to this study is that it is 
the first major takedown of a file sharing site by U.K. authorities and it shows how early 
attempts at criminalization transpired among E.U. member states.  The website’s servers 
were raided internationally and several arrests occurred.  None of the defendants were 
found guilty, however, and failure of the criminal infringement prosecutions led the 
entertainment industry to lobby for stronger IP laws (Wray, 2010, para. 7).   
The second case is also noteworthy for the protests that it inspired in addition to new 
laws and policies for digital copyright protection that emerged in Spain.  The Ley Sinde 
case demonstrates how anti­democratic information policy formation feeds into national 
perceptions of democratic deficits in the European Union and contributed to social unrest 
in Spain.  The build­up to and aftermath of the Ley Sinde in Spain is also a prime 
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example of the ratcheting up of IPR legal harmonization and enforcement.  In the case 
analysis, I explain the dynamics of IPR law in Spain, including an analysis of relevant 
court cases including Promusicae v. Telefónica and Puerto 80 v. United States of 
America, both of which deal with copyright enforcement in Spain. I also analyze how the 
U.S. government was revealed by WikiLeaks to be working closely in secret with the 
Spanish government to reform and strengthen its copyright laws (Horten, 2011, p. 177).  
The proposed law, known as Ley Sinde, forced ISPs to monitor customer activity, made 
civil claims against alleged infringers easier, established an IP task force and 
criminalized much online activity (Horten, 2011).  The reporting of the law’s ties to U.S. 
pressure coincided with economic frustrations across Spain and contributed to mass 
protests in the streets of Madrid and Barcelona (Slattery, 2011).  Where the OiNK case is 
used to evaluate IP enforcement mechanisms in the European Union, the Spanish case is 
analyzed in order to evaluate the challenges of digital copyright harmonization across the 
European Union.   
The purpose of the case selection is to evaluate historically significant instances of 
IPR policy development, enforcement, and activism that are representative of the IPR 
GPR.  None of the cases exist in a vacuum, and their ties to information policy, past legal 
precedents, economic factors, and concurrent enforcement of digital copyrights are 
grounded throughout the study.   
Collecting and Analyzing the Data 
The data for this study are collected primarily through secondary sources.  I examine 
policy documents and commentary, trade agreements, legal cases, economic data, and 
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statements and analyses from politicians, social movement organizations, police 
organizations, dissident groups, and private companies in order to map the actions and 
debates taking place within the cases.  I also look to journalistic accounts in the form of 
press releases, news items, and investigative journalism in order to map a sequence of 
events relating to the cases.  Specific data sources include the official E.U. website, 
http://europa.eu, which provides access to information published by every E.U. 
institution, agency and body about a range of issues affecting the European Union.  I also 
evaluate texts of trade agreements and international disputes provided by industry and 
NGOs.  For the Spanish case, I analyze leaked diplomatic cables from WikiLeaks, 
provided by http://www.cablegate.com.  Official statements and reports from 
organizations representing intellectual property holders as well as law enforcement 
agencies including Interpol, Europol, and the FBI are included in the case research.   
From the data, I determine relevant stakeholders and determine cost­benefits to 
stakeholders due to the nature of the prohibition regimes. I conduct a historical analysis 
and integrate a stakeholder analysis to reveal a narrative of events occurring in and 
around the cases.  I utilize a critical legal framework that is expressly political economic 
and examines how law benefits the most powerful (Gordon, 1989, pp. 81­83), which 
allows the political economic critique of the IP prohibition regime to be integrated into 
the study.   
I also apply Majchrzak’s (1984) approach to stakeholder analysis by analyzing 
debates, conflicts, policy proposals, and results to determine the attitudes, interests, and 
motives of actors in the struggles over prohibitions.  The power of each group of 
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stakeholders is analyzed through a description of available resources, the ability to 
mobilize and access to primary decision makers (Majchrzak, 1984, p. 77).  Majchrzak 
suggests that groups of stakeholders are placed into a hierarchy, with the decision 
makers, usually representatives of the state, at the top, with others grouped on the basis 
of power and influence among the decision makers.  This aspect of the stakeholder 
analysis makes it possible to look at the negotiation process of policy and to make 
normative assessments about the legitimacy of policy.  The enumeration of stakeholders 
and their interests also allows the study to map the effects of prohibitions in terms of how 
well each policy addresses the social, political, and organizational contexts of intellectual 
property policy.   
Significance of the Study 
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to enhance the understanding of 
prohibition regimes, media law, and policy in order to analyze the implications of IP 
enforcement.  This study’s most significant contribution to information policy research 
is the application of the GPR model toward digital copyrights as a means of better 
evaluating the role of criminal enforcement and police organizations in digital copyright 
law.  I conclude after the case analysis that study of the IPR GPR highlights an important 
aspect of digital copyright regulation; namely, that as international and national 
proposals for criminal enforcement of copyrights are failing to be enacted, police agency 
involvement toward digital copyright enforcement is increasing.  Pro­A2K information 
policy proposals, then, must take into account the role of police organizations in 
enforcing copyright.  Even though the arrests, raids, and seizures that police agencies 
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conduct rarely result in convictions, the intimidation of police enforcement is used 
significantly in the governance of the digital exchange of information and 
communication.  The study, then, provides a unique contribution of policy analysis to 
information policy and media studies because it explores the influence of international 
police enforcement on policies and actions that are aimed at shaping social norms and 
principles regarding intellectual property and access to knowledge and culture.  Other 
studies that incorporate a critical legal analysis of intellectual property, such as May and 
Sell’s 2006 work on the evolution of global IP policy, Andersson’s 2014 analysis of file 
sharing practices, cultures, and politics, and Burkart’s 2014 work on the emergence of 
pirate politics, all evaluate the systems of power that underlie IP policy.  This study 
builds on the critical legal analysis of IP policy with its emphasis on the police 
organizations that are tasked with enforcing copyright law.  I argue, following Leman­
Langlois’ (2010, 2012) work on the political influence of international police agencies, 
that these organizations are also gaining increased influence in the construction of 
copyright policy.  Police practices such as surveillance, standardization of law 
enforcement, and perceptions of criminal activity are all deeply rooted in the IPR GPR.  
This study is applying criminological analysis of international police agencies 
(Anderson, 1995; Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006; Lemieux, 2010; Leman­Langlois, 2008, 
2012) to reveal how police influence IP law, strengthen prohibition regimes, endanger 
access to knowledge, and affect other potential problems related to the study of ICTs.  
The crime­and­punishment emphasis of police agencies is in direct conflict with the 
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A2K desire for Internet governance to incorporate openness, sharing, and cultural 
protections. 
This research contributes to A2K discourse and the study on the political economy of 
communication by mapping the power relations in a struggle over information and 
communication technologies.  I am specifically examining conflict over ownership and 
social norms in global capitalist society.  This study contributes to knowledge on how 
global capitalism affects states, policy, law enforcement, and activism.  The 
understanding of how commodification, digital enclosures, and internationalization affect 
policy and social conflict in an information regime are broadened in this study.  Political 
economic studies from Fuchs (2011) argue that the Internet provides an outlet for people 
to leftist political organization, and liberal legal notions of the networked society claim 
that the complex, user­friendly nature of ICTs generates a state of conflict between 
citizens and corporations (Benkler, 2006).  The assumptions of conflict and resistance are 
tested in this study with the analysis of information policy and enforcementFurthermore, 
this dissertation makes a significant contribution to information policy studies by 
uncovering the instrumentation and consequences of policies designed to govern the 
behavior of individuals.  Braman (2009) argues that effective information policy should 
take into account the constitutive nature of information, and this research analysis finds 
that policymakers take to crafting digital copyright law and how that approach and its 
consequences is experienced by civil society.  Finally, this dissertation is valuable as a 
study of the democratic legitimacy of law and policy in the IPR prohibition regime.   
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The dissertation contains four chapters.  Chapter II surveys and criticizes the history 
of information policy in the European Union.  The purpose of the chapter is to illustrate 
the political economic and historical background of the cases.  I review the European 
Union’s directives related to copyright and explain how each one affects the E.U.’s goal 
of creating a competitive common market with a thriving information economy.  I also 
discuss the concept of Europeanization as a driving factor for harmonizing prohibitions 
across Europe.  Arguments about the critical role of Europeanization in the development 
of E.U. politics, policies, and institutions from Europeanization scholars including 
Breatherton and Mannin (2013), Pollack (2005), and Ladrech (2010) are enumerated.  
Policy harmonization, the fostering of a European identity, and the relationships of 
power between European Union and national leaders all underlie the development and 
reception of IP prohibitions in the European Union.   
The historical analysis in Chapter II traces European copyright from the 19th century 
into the 21st and describes how the European Union works with multinational and 
regional media industry to craft directives and policy proposals.  The history implements 
the historical narrative of Drahos (1999) and May and Sell (2006). For an analysis of 
E.U. development and processes, I draw from both government sources regarding IP law 
and directives available from the European Commission (EC, 2004) and critical policy 
analysis from Mazziotti (2008) and Agarwal (2010).  I find through the historical 
analysis that the European Union has failed to implement criminal copyright 
enforcement across Europe due to civil society objections to proposed directives and 
trade agreements.  Despite its inability to implement criminal prohibitions, the E.U.’s 
Overview of the Chapters 
 88 
 
 
leadership, particularly the European Commission, still supports an upward IP ratchet 
and persistently works toward stronger prohibitions.  The historical description and the 
analysis of laws governing IP and ICTs inform the background of the case studies that 
appear in Chapter III. 
The third begins with a summary of related information policy research from Sell 
(2010), Larsson (2011a; 2011b), Sarikakis (2012), Burkart (2014) and Andersson (2014) 
in order to situate the case studies both theoretically and historically. I then detail the 
critical legal methodology that I use throughout the study and address the framework of 
the stakeholder analysis that I use in the cases.  The cases studies begin with a historical 
background of the IPR GPR’s enforcement of digital copyrights and details several U.S.­
led operations from the United States and international police agencies to crack down on 
digital copyright infringement through arrests, raids and extradition.  The background 
culminates with a description of the MegaUpload raid, which was briefly discussed at 
the beginning of this first chapter.  I argue that the MegaUpload raid and aftermath is 
unlikely to occur in the European Union due to its framework of civil liberties described 
in Chapter II.   
I then begin the first case, that of OiNK’s Pink Palace.  The OiNK case demonstrates 
a disparity between users of file sharing services, who value OiNK as an elite digital 
music library and community, and law enforcement and the music industry, which frame 
the site as a criminal organization (Sockanathan, 2011).  The OiNK case also shows the 
difficulty of prosecuting file sharing through criminal prosecutions.  Despite the 
coordinated police raids and charges against OiNK’s operators and some of its users, the 
 89 
 
 
criminal charges were dismissed (O’Connell, 2007, p. 3).  Additionally, multiple 
successful copycat sites emerged after OiNK was shut down (Jones, 2007).  I argue that 
the lack of legal alternatives that offering the depth and quality of OiNK’s digital music 
library caused users to be dismissive of the legal mechanisms that shut the site down.  I 
also note how the United Kingdom failed to implement its criminal copyright law, the 
Digital Economy Act, after OiNK was shut down but was able to create a new IP task 
force to combat copyright infringement (Solon, 2013).  From the observation that the 
United Kingdom created a copyright task force, I suggest that copyright police that can 
shut down websites and arrest individuals are expanding even as legislation for criminal 
copyright enforcement is failing to gain traction in the European Union.  I suggest that 
the strengthening of police forces without legal authority is indicative of the expansion 
of cybercrime enforcement that is integrated into the IP prohibition regime. 
The final case in Chapter III is the most expansive.  Spain’s Ley Sinde has been 
written about from multiple critical perspectives by authors including Horton (2011), 
Sarikakis and Rodriguez­Amat (2014) and Postill (2014).  This study combines their 
criticisms and histories to trace a narrative of the case that focuses on the struggle over 
IP prohibitions occurring among E.U. institutions, national governments, the United 
States, IP industries, ISPs, A2K activists and economic protest movements.  The case 
describes Spain’s implementation of E.U. E­Commerce and Copyright Directives and 
struggles with the USTR and the IPR industries.  I also give a legal history of digital 
copyrights in Spain and discuss noteworthy legal cases over file sharing and 
enforcement.  I note how the United States describes Spain as a rogue state in the global 
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prohibition regime and works closely behind closed doors to strengthen Spain’s 
copyright issues.  The pressures lead to vibrant protests from actors across the spectrum 
of the A2K movement and were eventually networked with Spain’s massive protests 
regarding the 2008 global financial collapse (Castells, 2012; Gerbaudo, 2012).  The 
protests and eventual weak implementation of the new copyright laws demonstrate the 
political economic limitations of the European Union, United States, and multinationals 
to impose policy changes on states and change norms and attitudes among citizens.  In 
closing, I note that U.S. pressure on Spain to change its copyright laws is still strong and 
Spain is currently proposing a new round of copyright enforcement legislation (“Spain 
readies hefty jail terms over internet piracy,” 2014, para. 1).  The Ley Sinde case serves a 
demonstration of the complications facing the prohibitions that govern IP in the 
European Union and elsewhere.  The implications of the case are drawn into the 
discussion at the end of Chapter III, where I note that the case demonstrates the obstacles 
to the legitimacy of IP governance through a prohibition regime through the creation of 
democratic deficits that lead to strong objections and protests from stakeholders in 
opposition to stronger copyrights.   
Chapter III’s discussion reassesses the importance of the GPR model as a theoretical 
framework for IP enforcement and determines that GPR theory’s emphasis on law 
enforcement agencies is extremely useful in analyzing information policy.  Particularly, I 
argue that the impact of police organizations in the OiNK case and other police­led 
copyright operations demonstrates that IP research needs to focus more heavily on the 
role of police agencies and cybercrime enforcement in order to better assess the how 
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information policy is executed in international society.  The discussion forms a bridge to 
the larger analysis found in the fourth chapter. 
Chapter IV concludes the dissertation by revisiting the research question and the 
theoretical implications of the study and offering suggestions for future research.  I 
address the research question with the observation that the legitimacy of IP law is 
complicated through global prohibition measures that rely on heavy­handed police 
enforcement, surveillance mechanisms and criminal law to enforce copyright issues.  I 
revisit the A2K conceptualizations of the digital commons and the public domain to 
discuss how criminal enforcement removes the copyright regulation from a robust 
cultural debate and turns the intellectual property into strictly a matter of crime and 
punishment.  I also observe how the IPR GPR is relevant to the discussion of 
commodification and spatialization as described by Mosco (2009) through continuous 
international efforts to harmonize copyright policy and enclose and commodify the 
digital commons.  I argue that a more effective, legitimated measure for digital copyright 
policy would incorporate A2K­oriented suggestions to scale back criminal law and 
police enforcement and to encourage market innovations that can normalize the sharing 
of digital culture without compromising the economic interests of the United States or 
the European Union’s common market.  I close the dissertation by discussing the need 
for future research that should further investigate the role of cybercrime and police 
enforcement on digital copyright law. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE EUROPEANIZATION OF INFORMATION POLICY  
 
The protection and expansion of information commodities is critical to the E.U.’s 
information economy because of the importance of the IP industries to the European 
Union, which in 2010 provided 26% of its employment and 39% of its GDP (Office for 
the Harmonization of the Internal Market, 2013, p. 6).  The growth of IP industries is 
advantageous to the E.U.’s common market, which is its system to eliminate barriers to 
trade and harmonize markets across the European Union (Dinan, 2010, p. 29).  The 
power structure within E.U. institutions supporting purely economic approaches to IP 
governance are able to outweigh A2K principles toward networked culture and society.  
Due to the importance and influence of IP industries in the European Union, the 
European Union often governs intellectual property through the enforcement 
mechanisms of a prohibition regime.  Chapter II, then, describes how the configuration 
of the E.U. institutions and their information policy agenda underlies European 
participation in the IPR GPR. 
Defining and Conceptualizing Europeanization 
This dissertation uses European cases to conceptualize broader global problems with 
information policy and prohibition regimes.  While the cases do have global implications 
and inform international policymaking, they are specifically European, and this chapter 
describes some key components from the E.U. system of policymaking.  The 
Europeanization of information policy and, more narrowly, digital copyrights, are 
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critical to understanding the case analysis in the next chapter.  “Europeanization” here 
refers to the European Union’s effects on policies, politics, institutions, culture, and 
identity across the European Union (Sassatelli, 2009, pp. 1­2; Ladrech, 2010, pp. 7­10).  
I use a broad definition from Europeanization studies that observes the process of 
Europeanization as one  
of construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs 
and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public 
policy and politics and then incorporated into the logic of domestic discourse 
identities, political structures and public policies. (Ladrech, 2010, p. 15)    
The strength of this definition is that it is not limited to state and legal institutions, 
and enables a description of how social and cultural norms are affected by European 
institutions.  Prohibition regimes generally fail when the norms of the regime are not 
transferred to the populace (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, p. 45), and so an 
understanding of how E.U. policy affects the norms of citizens in member states is 
qualified throughout this study in the discussion of directives.  The concept of 
Europeanization emphasizes the political and cultural effects of European integration 
and the social transformations that integration brings (Sassatelli, 2009, p. 1).  A common 
theme in Europeanization studies is that the development of a European cultural identity 
and social norms complement the integration of European politics, policies, and 
institutions (Pollack, 2005, pp. 40­41).  Shared cultural identity and European norms are 
important for the success of E.U. initiatives, as the European Union governs without any 
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claim to statehood and relatively weak coercive capabilities (Wallace, Wallace, & 
Pollack, 2005, p. 41).  Shared norms are especially important in supplanting digital 
copyright standards across member states, since, as articulated in Chapter I, citizens have 
to socially accept the new rules governing online cultural exchange and access to 
knowledge.  Particularly, Johns (2009, pp. 497­498) pointed out that various forms of 
media piracy would not have registered as illicit a few years earlier, and so states and IP 
industries must engage in vigorous antipiracy policing in order to shape individual 
behaviors.  On a global scale, this police enforcement is coordinated between coalitions 
of multinationals, IGOs, and organizations like the Motion Picture Association of 
America (MPAA), the UN, and Interpol, respectively (Johns, 2009, p. 499).  In the 
European Union, antipiracy efforts are also speared by various layers of the political 
system.   
The European Union is a partial political system that has little popular engagement 
outside of Parliament, which is perceived as relatively weak in comparison to the other 
branches of government and, as such, suffers from elections that are perceived as less 
important by voters and media (Wallace et al., 2005, p. 42).  The most powerful officials 
are the indirectly elected Council of Ministers and the unelected European Commission 
(Wallace et al., 2005, pp. 42­43).  The lack of representation found in E.U. governance 
contributes to democratic deficits that can cause citizens to question the legitimacy of the 
European Union (Mather, 1999, p. 278).  Another challenge toward policymaking in the 
European Union is the lack of a shared identity across the European Union (Ladrech, 
2010, p. 7).  Fostering a European identity is complex because of the various governing 
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structures and cultures within the European Union, and the integration of E.U.­wide 
policies and cultural integration is generally measured by the “goodness of fit” between 
the European Union and national policies, institutions, and norms (Ladrech, 2010; 
Bretherton & Mannin, 2013).  The goodness of fit relates to how different E.U. goals are 
than national goals, and how nations implement E.U. policies and suggestions; it is 
measured by analyzing the differences between an E.U. policy and national policies and 
norms, observing the national implementation of the European Union’s agenda, and then 
examining how effectively the European Union’s goals are implemented (Wallace et al., 
2005, p. 40).  The concept is important to this study because misfits have led to 
difficulties with the implementation of the telecommunication and IP directives 
discussed later in the chapter.  In the case of IPRED, which I discuss at length later in 
this chapter, a misfit between national agendas and E.U. legislation led to uneven 
adoption of the directive among member states (Agarwal, 2010, p. 799).  The difficulty 
in implementing IPRED underscored the problem of misfit and information policy.  
Copyright norms in particular have developed differently across European nations, and 
efforts by the European Union to harmonize standards to a questionably high degree of 
copyright maximalism are a difficult sell to nations that are trying to develop and protect 
their own cultural and economic interests.  Outside of the IP arena, high levels of misfit 
between E.U. policy and a national political agenda has led to the non­implementation of 
agricultural reform in France and the Euro’s failure to be adopted in the United Kingdom 
(Bretherton & Mannin, 2013, p. 16).  National leaders need to believe that by 
implementing E.U. policy, they will be in a better position to advance domestic goals at 
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the E.U. level, and E.U. policy breaks down at the national level when the costs of 
implementation outweigh the benefits (Ladrech, 2010, p. 51).   
Europeanization can be conceptualized through “uploading” and “downloading” 
(Ladrech, 2010, pp. 7­10).  Downloading occurs when nations integrate directives, laws, 
and suggested norms from the European Union, and uploading occurs when the 
European Union adopts precedents set by member states (Bretherton & Mannin, 2013, p. 
11).  A noteworthy example of uploading in the European Union that is relevant to the 
Spanish case study in Chapter IV is Germany’s push for anti­inflationary measures, 
austerity, and deregulation of labor markets as the E.U. solution for addressing the 2008 
global financial crisis (Daehnhardt, 2011, pp. 36­37).  The German­based measures were 
directed at Spain and led to social unrest during the timeframe of the Ley Sinde case.  
Uploading also stems from demands on member states that are made by the United 
States, global market forces, or other third party actors (Bretherton & Mannin, 2013, p. 
16).  In the realm of information policy, an example of uploading is the European 
Union’s information society directive (InfoSoc), which adopted anti­circumvention 
standards for digital media locks similar to those of the United States’ Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (Mazziotti, 2008, pp. 181­182). Downloading is the standard 
practice of European integration, and occurs through the use of hard and soft policies by 
the European Union (Wallace et al., 2005, p. 182).  Hard policies include directives that 
set minimum standard for policy adoption by member states, and soft policies include 
white papers, green papers, and other recommendations to nations that are not binding 
(Wallace et al., 2005, p. 182).  Soft policies are indicative of the policy norms that the 
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European Union wants to standardize and it is not uncommon for language, goals, and 
metaphors that first appear in green papers to later appear in official E.U. documents.  
The process of Europeanization heavily favors the downloading model, as the ability of 
nations to affect E.U.­wide change is structurally limited.  Typically, the executive body 
of the European Union, the European Commission (EC), passes policy proposals on to 
the Council of Ministers, which is made up of national executives, and the European 
Parliament (EP) (Ladrech, 2010, pp. 48­49).  Negotiation and implementation of policy 
follows this process, which is criticized for “de­politicization,” or taking national 
interests and participation out of policy­making (Ladrech, 2010, p. 145).  Political 
parties are then left without a voice on policy issues, which leads to a reduction in EP 
election participation among citizens who feel disenfranchised (Ladrech, 2010, p. 145).  
Simultaneously, national parliaments are weakened in the E.U. system because of their 
marginal representation in policies at the supra­national level (Ladrech, 2010, pp. 71­
75).  National courts are also influenced, though not mandated, by European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) decisions, and Europeanization in national law occurs through the 
implementation of ECJ precedents (Ladrech, 2010, pp. 129­131).  For instance, the ECJ 
can settle disputes between parties that object to the implementation of directives in 
member states.  Chapter III of this dissertation overviews the ECJ’s decision­making 
process through the example of Promusicae v. Telefónica, wherein the ECJ was referred 
by Spanish courts to decide whether or not Spain’s implementation of the E­Commerce 
and Copyright Directives was appropriate (Leistner, 2009, pp. 870­871).   
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A lack of democratic influence at the national level transforms the agendas and 
mobilization techniques of political parties, interest groups, and movements.  Strategies 
that re­politicize policy issues and force the highest levels of the European Union to 
confront politics and national interests are desirable, and the Europeanization of political 
parties involves the adoption of these strategies. In particular, political agendas that are 
critical of the European Union’s decision­making processes tend to be popular 
domestically, and so successful national parties are often vocallydisapproving of the 
European Union’s remote decision­making process (Ladrech, 2010, p. 131).  Green 
parties in the European Union, for instance, link their core issues of social justice, 
environmentalism, and grassroots democracy with a critique of the E.U. policy­making 
process (Bomberg, 2002, p. 44).  Greens also organize transnationally to successfully 
politicize issues such as opposition to genetically modified organisms and food safety 
(Bomberg, 2002, p. 34).  European Green parties, which developed from environmental 
social movements, Europeanize by becoming competent in the workings of the European 
Union, forming coalitions, and adopting anti­integration positions; these groups often 
work with interest groups or social movements that share their positions in order to 
further their goals (Ladrech, 2010, p. 132).   
Interest groups and social movements are Europeanized through a decision­making 
process that includes deciding how to best mobilize and use resources throughout 
multiple levels of governance.  Resource rich business associations and corporations 
usually prefer to pool their resources at the European level where influence will be more 
resonant throughout the European Union, but they still target national capitals to a lesser 
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extent (Ladrech, 2010, p. 154).  Conflicts over information policy reflect how interest 
groups prefer to promote policy interests.  For example in a push for patent reform, the 
IP industry directly participated in drafting and consultation phases of the legislative 
process and directly lobbied prominent members of the EP (Haunss & Kohlmorgan, 
2009, p. 116).  This direct, traditional lobbying is in contrast to the mobilization tactics 
of the social movement groups that protested patent reform.  Social movements have to 
overcome what Edwards and McCarthy (2006, p. 118), in a theoretical description of 
resource mobilization by social movements, refer to as resource inequality.  Overcoming 
resource inequality for digital rights and A2K activists meant conducting media 
outreach, alliances with sympathetic software companies, grassroots lobbying, public 
awareness seminars, and academic research to stand against patent reform (Haunss & 
Kohlmorgan, 2009, p. 116; Aigrain, 2010, p. 169).  Social movements rarely have the 
financial resources or political clout to directly lobby in Brussels to the extent that 
resource­rich industrial actors do (Ladrech, 2010, p. 155).  To make up for this resource 
deficit, social movements will engage in grassroots organization and identify with local 
and national cultures through outreach and public media campaigns (Ladrech, 2010, p. 
155).  Protest politics are also a potential resource for social movements when they have 
no voice in decision­making (Wallace et al., 2010, pp. 155­159).  In a breakdown of how 
social movement groups respond to Europeanization, Ladrech (2010, p. 158) refers to 
“Europrotests” as protests that are either directly targeted at the European Union or 
targeted at member states’ implementation of E.U. policies.  An example of this type of 
protest comes from anti­globalization movements that form alliances across Europe and 
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lead protest marches through Brussels over issues such as agricultural policy (Della 
Porta, 2007, pp. 194­195).   
Europeanization can resist more than just national policy and sometimes acts as a 
buffer against globalization: Europeanization is not simply the process of Europe being 
absorbed by globalization (Bretherton & Mannin, 2013, p. 10).  E.U. privacy policy is a 
vivid example of European resistance to influential globalization procedures such as an 
E­commerce infrastructure that exploits surveillance.  The European Union’s 1995 Data 
Protection Directive asserts privacy as a human right and puts restrictions on the 
collection and access of individual data (Heisenberg & Fandel, 2004).  Despite the initial 
protests of the U.S. government and multinationals, the European Union was able to 
implement its privacy policies and influence a global standard of data protection, 
analysis, and collection (Heisenberg & Fandel, 2004, pp. 120­121).  The European 
Union’s privacy policies most directly affect Europeans, but do provide a net benefit to 
foreign citizens by influencing multinationals to treat all personal data according to E.U. 
requirements (Heisenberg & Fandel, 2004, pp. 120­121).  Data protection may 
potentially suppress the growth the of the information technology sector that drives 
globalization, and so the European Union’s directive places the right to privacy over the 
immediate priorities of global trade and information flows (Long & Quek, 2002, pp. 
325­326).  Europeanized privacy policy runs counter to the common assumptions of 
globalization, while also projecting the European Union’s policy preferences abroad 
(Heisenberg & Fandel, 2004, pp. 127­128).   
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Where the European Union has resisted the marketization of personal information, it 
has embraced the information policy regime that transforms communication, 
information, and cultural products into commodities.  The information policy regime 
enables the creation of global copyright standards, as described by Birnhack (2000).  
Birnhack (2000) argued that global copyright standards are the product of the 
international commodification of information and expansion of copyright law.  Global 
copyright standards can only function with enforcement mechanisms and are the impetus 
for the IPR GPR.  Global copyright is solidified through multi­lateral treaties, lateral 
pressures, and free trade agreements (Birnhack, 2000, pp. 505­506).  Europeanization 
processes support global copyright standards through market regulation that strengthens 
the interests of IP industries.  The European Union is not a passive agent in the 
acceleration of global copyright, though, and European copyright law does separate itself 
in areas where its privacy conflicts with IPR and in traditions such as moral rights.  The 
next section of this chapter discusses how the European copyright system underlies, 
influences, and differs from the developing global copyright regime.  It also describes 
the effects of Europeanization on copyright law, and how this situates the European 
Union in the IPR GPR.   
The European Union and Copyright 
European nations played a significant historical role in the evolution of intellectual 
property rights.  This section that the European Union is expanding intellectual property 
in order to create an information society that enables the free movement of goods and 
services across European borders.  The expansion of IP is part of the gradual expansion 
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of international IP prohibitions and global structures of capitalism, but the regionalized 
make­up of the European Union and the diversity of national information policy 
manufactures tensions in the growth of intellectual property standards across Europe. 
Information policy that enhances and harmonizes the IP systems of member states takes 
place through proposals and directives.  These policies force member states to redirect 
state power in order to strengthen the market objectives of the European Union.  State 
power includes market regulation, the legal system, policing, surveillance, education, 
and the distribution of rights (Fuchs, 2008, pp. 77­81), and all of these powers are 
directed by the European Union to promote the Europeanized information society. 
However, the effort at a fluid information society is complicated by the European 
Union’s commitment to privacy, the difficulties of harmonizing policy across member 
states, the limitations of the European Union’s powers, and A2K politics and activism.  
Despite these complications, though, the European Union still perceives the benefits of 
its commoditized information society as worth the costs, and continues to push for the 
maximization of IPR across member states.  The most important directive in terms of 
implications for this dissertation, the 2000 European Directive on Copyright in the 
Information Society (InfoSoc), is described in the most depth at the close of the section.   
The Berne Convention and the Formation of International IP Norms 
European nations set the internationalization of copyright law in motion with an 
1886 trade agreement, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works (Johns, 2009, p. 284).  The agreement is significant to the political economy of 
communication because it established the first major international copyright regime.  
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Berne is also significant to this study because of the aspects of copyright that it 
prioritized and the way that the signatories framed the IP debate.  Prior to the agreement, 
national copyright systems were flourishing in European nations due to industrial 
advances in publishing (Drahos, 2002, p. 32).  Internationally, though, protections were 
not strong, and publishers throughout European nations were printing works from other 
nations (Drahos, 2002, p. 32).  Gradually, European nations began making bilateral 
agreements with one another to protect each other’s copyrights and ensure the flow of 
royalties; this copyright cooperation across Europe eventually led to the Berne 
Agreement (Drahos, 2002, p. 32).  In the Berne negotiations, stakeholder discourse 
primarily focused on the “immutable rights of authors” and protecting works of creative 
genius, but the process was actually driven by the trade agendas and economic interests 
of the nations involved (Drahos, 2002, p. 32.)  The trade and economic interests 
underlying Berne expanded and safeguarded the flow of resources and commodities 
across Europe.  Additionally, components of the modern IP agenda, such as minimum 
term limits and moral rights, stem from Berne.  The terms of the treaty were expanded to 
eventually cover radio, cable, and satellite communications, which makes Berne the 
groundwork for the function of international IP trade (Drahos, 2002, pp. 76­77).   
The Convention created a multilateral copyright agreement that required signatories 
to recognize each other’s copyright policies and to institute minimum copyright term 
limits (Drahos, 2002, pp. 32­33; Khan, 2008, p. 58.)  Revisions to the treaty would 
expand moral rights, or the ability of an author to control the modification of a work 
even when a work is licensed to a third party (Burger, 1988, p. 14).  Copyright law 
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across Europe prioritized the rights and autonomy of the author and viewed the social 
benefits of the creation of art and scientific discovery as a positive side effect (Birnhack, 
2006, p. 520).  Moral rights are a distinctive policy from continental Europe, and were 
exported to Berne signatories and several nations globally (Drahos, 2002, pp. 32­33)   In 
addition to establishing moral rights, Berne was also updated in the early 20th century to 
extend copyright protections to the life of the author plus fifty years.  Those extensions 
would come to cover various new media as Berne was updated throughout the century to 
keep pace with technological developments such as recording and broadcasting (Burger, 
1988, p. 14).  Each successive draft and update of Berne brought with it higher sets of 
copyright standards (Drahos, 2002, p. 75).   
Beyond Berne: Building Information Policy in the European Union 
The Berne Convention significantly shaped the future of copyright law and 
demonstrated European nations’ incremental harmonization of information as a 
commodity for trade.  Until the late 20th century, Europe was at the forefront of 
implementing and exporting strong copyright laws.  The United States, in the run­up to 
the WTO and TRIPS, eventually signed on to Berne in 1988 after a century of not being 
able to meet Berne’s copyright standards and concern that Berne accession would violate 
the U.S. Constitution’s standard of enacting copyright for the benefit of the public 
(Burger, 1988, p. 81).  By then, the European Community was taking steps to compete 
with the United States in the information sector.  A 1988 Green Paper, Copyright and the 
Challenges of Technology, focused on how the European community needed to 
harmonize national copyright policies and extend copyright protections for cable and 
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satellite services, emerging computer technologies, and databases (Seville, 2009, p. 24).  
The Green Paper expressed fear that digital copies could lead to piracy and concern with 
the advanced U.S. software industry, and debate over the paper led to a consensus that 
authors’ rights and copyright term extensions should be addressed (Seville, 2009, pp. 24­
27).  The paper concluded that standardization of copyright policy was a “matter of 
urgency” due to advances in communication technology (Commission of the European 
Communities [EC], 1988, p. 200).  The Green Paper was a blueprint for the future of 
IPR across Europe, but hard measures for implementation were not available until the 
early 1990s.  The signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the formation of the European 
Union would grant the Commission power over IP law and the ability to negotiate 
treaties independently of member states and other branches of the E.U. government.  The 
standardization of the European Union’s intellectual property policy became part of the 
EC’s mission to promote the common market through free movement of goods and 
services and free competition (Seville, 2009, p. 46).  Copyright legislation in particular 
became a tool for fostering market integration (Seville, 2009, p. 46).  Signing on to 
international treaties was also part of the effort to standardize copyrights.  The European 
Union became a signatory to the WTO in 1994 and is also part of the 1996 WIPO 
Copyright Treaty.  The European Union additionally began to pass directives and outline 
new policies in the 1990s that furthered IP expansion. 
The 1991 Software Directive, for instance, creates a universal definition of software 
and extended Berne copyright protections to computer programs (Seville, 2009, pp. 27­
28).  This definition stresses “originality” and protects the rights of the program’s 
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“author,” thus making moral rights the standard for software across the European Union 
(Mazziotti, 2008, pp. 47­48).  Moral rights are extended by the Rental Rights Directive, 
which gives artists, authors, and performers some control over the rental and lending 
rights of their work.  Copyrights were further strengthened with 1995’s Term Directive, 
which clarified, redefined, and standardized copyright limits across the European Union.  
1995 was also the year that another government report, Copyright and Related Rights 
in the Information Society, laid the legislative groundwork for new copyright rules that 
would attempt to ensure that free trade across the internal market was not hindered by 
complications arising from digitization of existing works and online innovations 
(Commission of the European Communities [EC], 1995).  The paper is a blueprint for a 
digital Europe and proposes ideas and directives that would build digital copyright rules 
and norms in the European Union.  The 1995 government report called for copyright 
protections over databases, DRM initiatives, and stronger laws regarding online 
copyright infringement (Mazziotti, 2008, p. 51).  The report also offered updated IP 
initiatives that were built around controlling digital technologies and harmonizing the 
laws surrounding them as they emerged and advanced across the European Union.  Not 
long after drafting the 1995 report, the European Union enacted many of its proposals 
through adoption of the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty (Mazziotti, 2008, p. 51).  WIPO, a 
UN agency, proposed the treaty to expand the Berne Convention to address digital IP; 
the treaty goes beyond TRIPS by requiring signatories to institute DRM initiatives to 
block the circumvention of locks on digital media (Birnhack, 2000, pp. 512­513).  The 
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European Union passed two directives to comply with the WIPO Copyright Treaty, 
including the Database Directive and InfoSoc (Birnhack, 2000, p. 514). 
The 1996 Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases, or Database Directive, 
defines databases as “a collection of independent works, data or other materials arranged 
in a systematic or methodical way and individually accessible by electronic or other 
means,” and gives database creators exclusive rights to reproduction, modification, and 
translation (Seville, 2009, pp. 43­44).  Additionally, the Directive does not allow nations 
to use standards of originality to protect databases in order to make protections more 
expansive (Mazziotti, 2008, pp. 47­48).  The Directive was widely criticized as being 
anti­competitive for facilitating expansive database protection, spurring monopolies of 
information, and failing at its primary goal of spurring database growth and innovation 
(Seville, 2009, p. 44).  In addition to the Database Directive, another important directive 
guiding the European Union’s digital copyright standards is the 2000 E­Commerce 
Directive, which mimics U.S.­style safe harbor protections for Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) (Seville, 2009, p. 48).  These safe harbor protections prevent ISPs or websites 
from liability from information transmitted over their networks as long as the ISP or 
website is plausibly ignorant of any illegal activity being conducted (Seville, 2009, p. 
48).  When informed of potentially infringing activity, though, the content provider is 
required to proceed with a “notice­and­takedown” procedure that removes the content 
and notifies the Internet user as to why the content was removed (Seville, 2009, p. 48).  
Notice­and­takedown procedures are often critiqued because copyright holders can have 
content removed without legitimate claims to copyright infringement (Seville, 2009, p. 
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49).  The importance of the E­Commerce Directive is stressed in Chapter III, where I 
describe how the music industry’s complaints about the Spanish telecommunication 
sector’s implementation of notice­and­takedown led to complaints from the IIPA and 
unilateral U.S. pressures toward Spain for copyright reform. 
The European Union Directive on Copyright in the Information Society, or InfoSoc, 
was created in 2001 and implementation among member states was required by 
December of 2002 (Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related 
rights in the information society [InfoSoc], 2001, p. 19). In what would become 
commonplace with IP directives issued by the Commission, the EC came under intense 
scrutiny for being influenced by U.S. interest groups representing copyright industries, 
while ignoring or blocking input from the EP and member states (Hugenholtz, 2000, p. 
501).  Although InfoSoc was initially to implement treaties that the EC signed with 
WIPO, the directive went well beyond the parameters of WIPO’s recommendations.  
The expressed goal of the directive was to create the “establishment of an internal 
market and the institution of a system ensuring” competition through the harmonization 
of the “legal framework on copyright and related rights, through increased legal certainty 
and while providing for a high level of protection of intellectual property” (InfoSoc, 
2001, p. 10).  The harmonization of copyright was to “take a basis of a high level of 
protection” and member states were to recognize IP as an “integral part of property” 
(InfoSoc, 2001, p. 11).  The two primary achievements of InfoSoc were the creation of a 
“right of reproduction” and the implementation of DRM standards.  The right of 
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reproduction orders member states to provide copyright holders with the right to 
authorize or prohibit reproduction by any means or in any form, including written works, 
performances, music, film, and broadcasts (InfoSoc, 2001, p. 16).  The right of 
reproduction, then, established guidelines for the presence of copyrighted works on the 
Internet.   
InfoSoc provides optional fair use provisions for member states.  An E.U. member is 
allowed to make exceptions for news broadcasts and services, libraries and museums, 
educational and scientific purposes, disability services, and an array of other non­
commercial activities traditionally protected by fair use (InfoSoc, 2001, pp. 16­17).  
However, all fair use provisions are completely optional for member states (InfoSoc, 
2001, p. 16), and InfoSoc provides guidelines for limiting copyrights in any manner.  
Additionally, the DRM provisions of InfoSoc trump fair use or other copyright 
exceptions (InfoSoc, 2001, p. 17).  Member states implementing InfoSoc have to make 
the circumvention of digital locks illegal for any purpose except private, individual, non­
commercial use (InfoSoc, 2001, p. 17).  The DRM protections also outlaw both the 
behavior of the individual user that bypasses the locks and the manufacture of the DRM 
circumventing technology (InfoSoc, 2001, pp. 17­18).  However, InfoSoc only offers 
broad definitions of circumvention and never states what anti­circumvention technology 
actually is.  The directive states that “[t]echnological development will allow 
rightholders to make use of technological measures designed to prevent or restrict acts 
not authorized by the rightholders” (InfoSoc, 2001, p. 14), but does not engage in any 
deeper analysis of what form the technological development will take.  The broad 
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definitions throughout InfoSoc have led to uneven implementation of the directive 
(Mazziotti, 2008, p. 51).  For instance, Danish law only protects anti­circumvention 
technology that prevents copying, so DRM that only prevents access is not protected 
(Mazziotti, 2008, p. 75).  Additionally, Hungarian law ignores InfoSoc’s demands that 
anti­circumvention is protected even in cases where copyrights are not violated and 
allows DRM circumvention for non­commercial use (Mazziotti, 2008, p. 75).  The 
directive also fails to harmonize copyright across the European Union because it never 
defines standards of originality and allows member states to maintain their established 
definitions of copyrights (Mazziotti, 2008, p. 75).  The directive also provides over 20 
categories of optional exceptions for member states in regard to copyright and related 
rights, including the broadly worded “certain other cases of minor importance where 
exceptions or limitations already exist under national law” (InfoSoc, 2001, pp. 16­17).  
The many exceptions contributed further to InfoSoc poorly meeting its aim of a 
harmonized legal framework for copyright (Mazziotti, 2008, p. 113).   
The primary problems with InfoSoc, then, was that there was too much involvement 
in its creation from IP industry stakeholders, too little representation in its creation from 
the EP and member states, and it was highly ineffective in its goal of harmonizing 
copyright policy.  A broader criticism of InfoSoc, though, is of the directive’s vision of 
increasing competition within the common market through a directive that implements 
DRM and commodifies the digital commons through restrictions on sharing and 
communication. As noted in Chapter I’s discussion of DRM criticism from Litman 
(2001), Vaidhyanathan (2001), Lessig (2004), and May and Sell (2006), anti­
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circumvention measures are argued to erode fair use and the digital commons by 
restricting access to information and culture.  DRM standards are inherently anti­A2K 
because they erode access to knowledge by expanding private ownership and eroding 
spaces for public access.  Competing visions of copyright call for more robust 
exceptions for fair use and the facilitation of a digital commons that is curated through 
greater consumer participation in the law­making process (Yu, 2006, p. 18). 
Despite the criticisms, InfoSoc remains near the core of E.U. information policy and 
is in place along with the Software and Database Directives to expand property rights 
online.  The European Union’s information policy directives have expanded Berne to 
address computer programs, commercial databases, and DRM protections.  Much of this 
policy­making was with the assistance of interest groups that lobbied the European 
Union to move beyond WIPO’s IP standards and offer broad protections for IPR.  The 
next set of directives and agreements discussed regard policymaking that uses the states’ 
power of criminal sanctions, policing, and surveillance to protect IPR.   
IPRED, IPRED2, and ACTA: Criminalizing IP Infringement 
The Intellectual Property Enforcement Directive, or IPRED, dealt with the 
harmonization of IPR enforcement.  IPRED was enacted in 2004 and is rooted in 1998 
and 2000 EC reports that continue the argument that piracy and counterfeiting are 
looming and growing threats to the common market (Agarwal, 2010, pp. 800­801).  
These reports demonstrate the European Union’s push for information policy that tightly 
enforces IP access.  Through the 1998 and 2000 recommendations, the European Union 
was formalizing its mission to harmonize criminal IP measures through E.U. directives 
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and TRIPS­Plus trade agreements.  The mission was implemented in the European 
Union with IPRED and later expanded to the global policy arena with ACTA. 
The 1998 EC report states that even though piracy and counterfeiting are difficult to 
quantify, police and customs reports and estimations from professional organizations are 
evidence that the problem is increasing (EC, 1998, p. 9).  Using the police and customs 
reports, the EC claims that 100,000 jobs were lost throughout the 1990s due to piracy 
and counterfeiting, and noted that the dangers to the audio­visual, software, and music 
industries are among the greatest (EC, 1998, p. 7).  IPRED was an attempt to combat the 
loss of jobs and capital.  The 1998 paper argued that the international community’s 
efforts to fight counterfeiting and privacy were not enough and stronger enforcement 
was needed (EC, 1998, p. 2).  The 1998 paper does distinguish differences in the severity 
of counterfeiting and piracy’s origins and effects, but does little to distinguish different 
legal measures to combat the activities.  Piracy and counterfeiting are lumped together as 
criminal activities that should receive the same legal treatment.  Counterfeiting, the 
unauthorized replication of trademarks, labels, or packaging of goods for commercial 
profit (Agarwal, 2010, p. 801), is branded as an extension of organized crime that should 
be addressed with strong criminal and policing measures (EC, 1998, p. 2).  Piracy, the 
unauthorized recording, copying, or broadcasting of an item protected by IP for the 
purpose of commercial gain (Agarwal, 2010, p. 801), is never expressly associated with 
organized crime, but the Commission also never disassociates piracy from the black 
markets that underlie counterfeiting.  Piracy is thus implicated as a danger related to 
organized crime that must be stamped out with criminal enforcement measures.  The 
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term “counterfeiting and piracy” recurs throughout the document, and the two are 
addressed as a joint economic and social problem.  The social problems range from 
concerns that counterfeit medicines will endanger lives to the complication that 
counterfeited and pirated goods may be of an inferior quality and deceive consumers 
(Agarwal, 2010, p. 803).  Discourse surrounding the social problem of inferior goods is 
evidenced in a 2012 press release from the European Police Office (EuroPol).  The press 
release is in regard to EuroPol’s cooperation with the United States in Operation 
InOurSites, which is detailed in the next chapter as an international police effort to seize 
websites suspected of peddling infringing goods.  EuroPol stated that the some of the 
websites it seized “duped consumers into unknowingly buying counterfeit goods as part 
of the holiday shopping season” (Europol, 2012, para. 2).  Undercover agents purchased 
“professional sports jerseys, DVD sets, cologne, and a variety of clothing, jewelry and 
luxury goods from online retailers” before seizing the domains (Europol, 2012, para. 3).   
The 1998 EC report also called for industry to monitor counterfeiting and piracy and 
for state actors to then build enforcement mechanisms around the industrial reports (EC, 
1998, p. 16).  The creation of enforcement mechanisms would include E.U.­wide 
financial support for training police and government agencies to combat counterfeiting 
and piracy (EC, 1998, p. 16).  The paper also supported consumer education about 
counterfeiting and piracy (EC, 1998, p. 16).  An example of the consumer education 
priority is evident in EuroPol’s aforementioned Operation InOurSites press release, 
which explained that when people visit the seized web domains they will “find a banner 
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that notifies them of the seizure and educates them about the federal crime of willful 
copyright infringement” (EuroPol, 1998, para. 7).   
Beyond describing the economic and social need for new laws to restrain 
counterfeiting and policy, the 1998 report also critiques TRIPS for giving too much 
latitude to individual nations in IP governance (EC, 1998, p. 20).  The paper instead calls 
for increased international harmonization of criminal enforcement.  The exemptions that 
TRIPS provides would be eliminated by the European Union, and criminal sanctions, 
injunctions, faster civil and judicial proceedings, international evidence sharing, and 
laws that force infringers to identity the providers of counterfeited and pirated goods 
would be standardized across member states (EC, 1998, p. 18­20).  The TRIPS­Plus 
measures were formalized with IPRED. 
IPRED’s initial goal was to end disparities in E.U. national enforcement and deal 
with the problems of piracy and counterfeiting through criminal enforcement measures 
(Agarwal, 2010, p. 797).  IPRED included criminal sanctions for copyright infringement, 
but these were eventually replaced with civil and administrative sanctions due to the 
objections of several member states (Agarwal, 2010, p. 798).  IPRED allows IPR holders 
to request the destruction of infringing goods and manufacturing operations, allows 
judicial injunctions on infringers, and provides rights holders with loss profits and legal 
damages in select cases (Agarwal, 2010, p. 798).  The directive also promotes criminal 
enforcement measures such as search and seizure and freezing the bank accounts of 
those accused of infringing intellectual property and creates a “right of information” that 
requires ISPs to reveal information about alleged infringers to rights holders (Hinze, 
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2004).  IPRED applies to “any infringement of intellectual property rights” and fails to 
distinguish between intentional commercial infringement and unintentional 
noncommercial infringement (Agarwal, 2010, p. 799).  Furthermore, the mere charge of 
infringement is enough to activate IPRED provisions, so alleged infringers are 
considered guilty until proven innocent (Hinze, 2004).  Partly because of the law’s 
breadth and lack of well­defined terminology, IPRED still has not been implemented 
among several member states (Agarwal, 2010, p. 799): Only five member states 
implemented the law by its 2006 deadline (von Ahsen, 2012, p. 5).  However, the 
directive is still in effect and eventual adoption is mandatory across the European Union.  
Though the original intent of IPRED—uniform criminal measures against IP 
infringement—was initially rejected, the European Commission is still driven by the 
criminal measures agenda outlined in the 1998 Green Paper.   It is also notable that 
IPRED, like any E.U. directive, only sets minimum standards, and member states are 
allowed to go beyond the directive.  Indeed, with the European Union’s push for tighter 
IPR controls and the ideology on display in the Green Papers, member states are 
encouraged to surpass IPRED.  The legislation is a potential stepping stone for criminal 
measures. 
The sequel to IPRED, IPRED2, contains the reintroduction of greater criminal 
sanctions toward copyright violations.  The directive was defeated at the EP level and 
has yet to be re­introduced (Logan & Burkart, 2013, p. 70), but it is significant because it 
signifies the continued efforts and failures of the EC to create criminal copyright 
prohibitions. The directive was resisted by the telecommunication sector, auto­parts 
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makers, generic drug makers, and civil society groups ranging from librarians to open 
software groups (Foundation for Information Policy Research, 2006, para. 2).  As with 
previous copyright directives, the IP industry worked closely with the Commission in 
drafting the criminal measures that appear in IPRED2 (Shadlen & Haunss, 2009, p. 118); 
the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) used direct lobbying to 
encourage an expansive criminalization of copyright infringement that included file 
sharing (Shadlen & Haunss, 2009, p. 118).  IPRED2 is justified under the premise that IP 
infringement is detrimental to the economic and social well­being of the European 
Union and criminal sanctions are necessary to protect from infringers (Agarwal, 2010, 
pp. 802­803).  The text of IPRED2 situates TRIPS as a starting point for IP 
harmonization, and states that IPRED is valuable but that criminal enforcement is 
necessary (EC, 1998, sect. 2, para. 4).  IPRED2 was approved by the European 
Parliament and passed on to the EC in 2007, but the directive became sidelined due to 
accusations from civil liberties groups and member states that the criminal enforcement 
measures required by the legislation overstepped the power of the EC to regulate 
criminal law in member states (Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure, 2005).   
The proposal was also greeted widely with protests and questions as to the EC’s 
authority and competence in matters of legislating digital copyrights.  Initial drafts 
criminalized “any intentional infringement of an intellectual property right on a 
commercial scale” and offered up to four years imprisonment for an individual violation 
(Agarwal, 2010, p. 808).  IPRED2’s opposition argued that the terms “aiding,” 
“abetting,” “incitement,” and “commercial scale” were ill­defined and ripe for abuse 
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against individuals (Agarwal, 2010, p. 810).  There was also concern over the authority 
that IPRED2 gave rights holders to pursue litigation and criminal investigations.  In 
particular, it was unnecessary for a complaint to be filed in order for a case to begin, and 
member states were required to allow IP holders to assist police authorities in 
investigations (Agarwal, 2010, p. 808).  The proposed text of the directive suggested that 
it was necessary to have rights holders involved in investigations because intellectual 
property infringement investigations are “very difficult” to carry out and so there is a 
need for “the active participation of the victims, or representatives” of the rights holder 
to confirm that goods are counterfeited (EC, 2005, p. 49).  There was also continued 
concern by IP experts within member states as to whether or not the European Union had 
the authority to order member states to impose criminal sanctions on copyright 
(Agarwal, 2010, p. 811).   
All of the problems enumerated above regarding IPRED2’s criminalization efforts 
led to their eventual sidelining (Jyrkkiö, 2010), but the legislation remains noteworthy 
for its expansive aims and for the struggles that it produced within international civil 
society and the E.U. legislature.  Interest groups and social movement organizations 
remained at the center of the criminalization debate in the European Union, and both 
multinational media industries and A2K advocates used lobbying, political influence, 
legal arguments, and public discourse in the struggle over information policy.  While the 
European Commission would like to impose standards for criminal liability for copyright 
and trademark infringement, criminalization is, as Chapter III’s discussion of Spain’s 
Ley Sinde law attests, a controversial issue among some member states and not an easily 
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Europeanized legal norm.  The European Union would likely prefer to increase criminal 
measures to stay in sync with the United States, which views such enforcement as a 
strong priority (Weatherall, 2011, p. 868).  The United States codified criminal liability 
to Internet users accused of infringement through the No Electronic Theft Act of 1999 
and has worked, with mixed success, for the global expansion of criminalization; for 
example, in 2009 the United States lost an argument before the WTO that China’s 
thresholds for criminal liability for counterfeiting and piracy was in violation of TRIPS 
(Weatherall, 2011, p. 868).   
Frustrations over the perceived shortcomings of TRIPS by the United States and the 
failure of intellectual property directives in the European Union led to a movement 
toward the internationalization of new TRIPS­Plus standards.  The proposed Anti­
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) was one such TRIPS­Plus agreement that was 
met with protest and eventually sidelined.  ACTA was initially proposed by the United 
States Trade Representative to curb global counterfeiting and piracy (USTR, March 
2010).  The trade negotiations initially included the United States, European Union, 
Japan, South Korea, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore, and Morocco (EC, 2010).  The 
goal was to create a global coalition that could sufficiently police counterfeiting and 
piracy more broadly than TRIPS or WIPO (Weatherall, 2011, p. 843).  ACTA was 
criticized by social movement and political activists across Europe for its secretive 
development, adherence to corporate interests, and anti­A2K policy measures (Burkart 
& Logan, 2013, pp. 72­73).  Its most controversial policy measures included graduated 
response laws, which ban Internet users for alleged infringement with little or no judicial 
 119 
 
 
oversight; these policies order ISPs to ban Internet users at the behest of third­party 
copyright holders (Burkart & Logan, 2013, p. 72).  Reaction to the graduated response 
model was large part of what drove the ACTA protests.  Another component that fuelled 
the protests was that ACTA fit into the narrative of democratic deficits facilitated by an 
overreach from Brussels (Burkart, 2014, p. 14).  The trade agreement was eventually 
rejected by the EP under the weight of the political protest (Burkart, 2014, p. 13).  As 
with IPRED2, the criminal enforcement measures supported by ACTA were unable to be 
legitimated internationally and represent the structural challenges to implementing 
digital copyright prohibitions on an international level.  
ACTA and IPRED2 represent the problem of the lack of democratic representation 
in information policymaking and showcase the difficulty of IP governance through 
international institutions.  The lack of democratic support for the maximization of IPR 
leads governments to supranational law and policy that is often constructed in secret and 
side­by­side with IP industries.  International information policy becomes a tool for 
redirecting the power of the state toward the enforcement of global capitalism and the 
specific interests of multinational corporations.  With both ACTA and IPRED2, the level 
of misfit was too high for either effort to be successfully implemented on an E.U.­wide 
scale, but many of their aims have been taken in at the national level.  The United 
Kingdom and France have both implemented InfoSoc and IPRED with legislation that 
goes well beyond either directive.  Both sets of law could potentially ban people from 
the Internet over alleged digital infringement and fund mandatory so­called piracy 
education programs (Ryan & Heinl, 2010).  These national laws do have international 
 120 
 
 
implications, particularly when the USTR pressures other European governments, 
including Spain, to adopt the French and British standards (Hinze, 2010, para. 3).   
ACTA fell apart in Europe due to activist coalitions, street protests, and political 
coalitions in the EP, and IPRED2’s failure was based on the inability of the Commission 
to institute ill­defined criminal sanctions across the European Union.  Both faced 
opposition from A2K organizations and activists and the telecommunication and 
technology sector, and in these cases, the opposition was enough to temporarily slow the 
growth of IP prohibitions.  However, A2K activism and objections from the private 
sector are often not enough to stop the escalation of the law, especially when the policy 
agenda is transformed from one of intellectual property to one of national security.  The 
Data Retention Directive was passed in 2006 in a rush to enhance security after the 2004 
bombing in Madrid, and was passed despite massive protests at the national and E.U.­
levels (Larsson, 2011a, p. 46).  The directive mandated that telephone companies and 
ISPs retained all user data in order to use that data to stop “serious crime” (Larsson, 
2011b, p. 20).  The definition of serious crime is left to member states, however, and the 
European Court of Justice has ruled that the Data Retention Directive’s “serious crime” 
requirement does not preclude member states from passing laws that force ISPs to 
supply information about subscribers that have allegedly infringed copyright (Crijns, 
2012).  The Data Retention Directive is a piece of the expanding boundaries of 
cybercrime discussed in Chapter I and further examined in Chapter III’s discussion on 
international police enforcement of IPR.  The Directive is an example of a piggyback 
policy in which law and legislation meant to deal with issues such as terrorism, child 
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pornography, organized crime, or counterfeit drugs is affixed by IPR holders to increase 
prohibitions related to digital copyright infringement. Piggybacking is a danger in broad 
directives and trade agreements that seek to prohibit a wide range of behaviors with 
criminal remedies, as evidenced by the interest group lobbying that occurs to keep 
digital copyright infringement as a major component of these policies.  The Data 
Retention Directive was ideal for piggyback policy since it was rushed through on the 
heels of terror and was marketed as a remedy for more substantive security goals than 
IPRED2 or ACTA.   
The success of the European Union’s efforts at Europeanizing copyright 
infringement through soft and hard policies has been mixed, but the European Union is 
clearly gradually moving in the direction of more copyright maximalism.  The 
prohibition regime on digital copyrights is difficult to implement across the European 
Union due to hesitancy to grant the European Union the authority to impose criminal 
law, social movement groups that effectively articulate A2K priorities, and privacy 
norms in the European Union.  The Data Retention Directive did manage to remove 
layers of privacy protection in the European telecommunication system, however, and 
individual nations including the United Kingdom and France have embraced 
criminalization through national laws including the British Digital Economy Act and the 
French HADOPI, which are discussed in the next chapter.  In the next section, I 
conclude with a description of the trajectory of European copyright standards and 
enforcement. 
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European Copyright Law and the Limits of the IPR GPR 
Birnhack (2000) described the expansion of global copyright standards as “emerging 
from a few mega­corporations that captured international organizations and managed to 
channel their business models through international treaties, provisions of which would 
later be incorporated into national legal systems” (p. 494).  The business models are then 
protected by the state.  The capitalist ideology that underpins the internationalization of 
copyright standards views efficiency of the free market above all other priorities, 
including speech and privacy (Birnhack, 2000, p. 494).  The regime consists of multi­, 
bi­, and unilateral treaties and agreements that broaden the scope of IP and enhance 
enforcement.  The European Union is a structural component of this regime as a 
signatory of TRIPS and WIPO’s copyright treaties and through its promotions of TRIPS­
Plus agreements like ACTA.  E.U. policy works to further commodify information, 
culture, and communication by expanding IPR and enhancing state and private 
enforcement of the law globally and regionally. At the regional level, the European 
Union acts through mandates and directives handed down to member states.  For the 
European Union to speak with one voice to other nations, IGOs, and corporate 
stakeholders, it needs copyright harmonization among member states. The challenge for 
European copyright standards, though, is Europeanizing copyright norms in several 
different member states populated with citizens that often distrust the European Union’s 
legitimacy.  The importance of privacy in the European Union makes digital copyright 
law, which relies on data collection and surveillance, difficult to impose on member 
states.  The same EC that wants to criminalize digital infringement and give ISPs the 
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responsibility to police users is the legislative body that supports a “right to be 
forgotten” online (Rosen, 2012, p. 89).  This right theoretically forces private entities 
like Google to remove all digital references of an individual from the Internet (Rosen, 
2012, p. 89), and was put into practice in 2014 after an ECJ ruling (Arthur, 2014).  
Strong privacy norms were uploaded from European nations into the European 
Community from its earliest days, and these values complicate the push for increased 
prohibitions over online activities.  European copyright ambitions, then, are marked by 
an impetus to criminalize digital infringement and allow the private sector to take a 
prominent role in targeting Internet users, but are also bound by a need to honor the 
privacy of European citizens.  In this system, free speech is secondary to free trade, but 
privacy is still a valued human right that has its place in the European Union’s vision for 
an information society.  Privacy is a structural constraint to the expanded 
commodification of information and culture in the European Union.  The process of 
balancing European norms of privacy and speech with restrictive copyright policies are 
difficult, as shown through the difficulties and barriers facing some of the policy 
proposals by the European Union described in this chapter.   
Jakobsson and Stiernstedt (2012) argue in a political economic assessment of E.U. 
media policy that media policy discourse in the European Union is beginning to reject 
the assertions of media industries that stronger copyrights are necessary to protect 
creativity and economic interests (p. 51).  The authors describe the practice of digital 
enclosure as a state and corporate effort to expand private rights into the cultural 
commons and “enclose, privatize and commercialize” online social production through 
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policies that define the Internet as an economic platform (p. 49).  The authors 
acknowledge WIPO’s role in resisting the enclosure of the commons, but take account of 
other stakeholders, as well.  For instance, the Computer & Communications Industry 
Association, a trade organization that includes Facebook, Google, and Yahoo, actively 
supports more flexible digital copyright standards (Jakobsson & Stiernstedt, 2012, pp. 
51­52).  At the E.U. level, Jakobsson and Stiernstedt (2012) are encouraged by E.U. 
politicians and propose legislation that emphasizes the need for openness as opposed to 
enclosures in expanding the economic opportunities of the European information 
economy (p. 52).  Jakobsson and Stiernstedt’s assertion that E.U. media policy is on a 
path toward innovative reform rather than upward to maximalism may be overstated 
when contrasted with E.U. policy increase of European IP prohibitions, but their 
assessment is nevertheless important in identifying the European Union’s structural 
constraints in advancing surveillance, digital enclosures, and criminal online copyright 
enforcement.  The European Union has strong civic norms toward the protection of 
privacy and data retention that may constrain its ability to enforce maximalist digital 
copyright laws.  A Wired article on the influence of the Pirate Party’s political platform, 
for instance, reported that the European Union is turning a corner in its emphasis on 
civic concerns within information policy: The report itemizes a series of events 
including the establishment of net neutrality, British copyright reform, the defeat of the 
TRIPS­plus trade agreement ACTA, greater protections against Internet bans, and new 
privacy protections that indicate a pro­A2K direction for European information policy 
(Geere, 2014).  I argue in the case analysis that emerging, A2K­influenced policies in the 
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European Union may only be an obstacle for IPR prohibitions, as the structures and 
institutions that support maximalist IP law are still in place and influential in Europe.  
The stakeholders I identify in the analysis are still pushing for anti­A2K policies in the 
IP sector, and I determine in the case analysis that while the forward trajectory 
maximalist copyright policies have been tempered at times, the so­called “range wars of 
the Internet” (Boyle, 2009, p. 31) over digital copyrights are ongoing.  The E.U. 
information policy research that informs the case studies offer perspectives into these 
range wars.   
The criminalization efforts and heightened importance of copyright protections in the 
European Union differ dramatically between member states, and this disparity leads to 
problems like the slow adoption of IPRED.  Additionally, the political and social 
protests that derailed IPRED2 and ACTA, and that met the Data Retention Directive 
with mass protests, are evidence of obstacles that prevent the European Union from 
being able to fully commit to a prohibition regime on IPR.  There is resistance to 
criminalization measures throughout Europe to a greater degree than is seen in the 
United States (Weatherall, 2011, p. 849), and the question of the European Union’s 
authority in such matters is contested (Agarwal, 2010).  On the other hand, EuroPol 
already coordinates with the United States and other governments in censoring websites 
that are alleged to promote copyright infringement (Europol, 2012) and individual 
nations including the United Kingdom and France are more than ready to embrace 
prohibition models to deal with digital copyright infringement (Burkart & Logan, 2013, 
pp. 73­75).  In addition to passing criminal measures in its InfoSoc adoption, the United 
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Kingdom has also interpreted its extradition treaty with the United States as permission 
to extradite citizens for inducement to infringe (Prodhan, 2012).  Other member states, 
though, are more hesitant or outright resistant to maximalist digital copyright policy.  
One of these hesitant nations is Spain, whose difficulties in adopting IP prohibitions are 
described in Chapter III.  The next section reviews the complexities of Europeanization 
and serves as an introduction to the third chapter. 
Conclusion 
Europe’s long and influential history in the creation of IPR is rooted in the Berne 
Convention and the development of intellectual property rights throughout the 20th 
century.  Leading into the 21st century, discrepancies remain in regards to the way that 
certain laws are enacted within nations, despite the fact that the European Union and its 
member states are participants in the major international treaties that govern global 
copyright.  This chapter analyzed the state and trajectory of E.U. information policy 
through a discussion of Europeanization and the history  of such policies in the European 
Union.  I argued that criminalization is a primary goal of the European Union with 
digital copyright policy.  However, the results of this push for copyright maximization 
have been complicated due to resistance from social movement groups and the 
perception by member states that these directives are guilty of an overreach of the 
European Union’s powers.  These problems complicate E.U.­wide harmonization of IP 
law, which was demonstrated by the poor implantation of InfoSoc and IPRED among 
member states.  Additionally, the European Union’s multi­level governance and 
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democratic deficits lead to significant political and social movements that may resist the 
its policy­making mechanisms.   
The next chapter evaluates the European Union’s efforts at stronger copyright 
prohibitions through a critical legal historical analysis of significant cases.  The cases 
include an overview of the U.S. police coordination that launched the IPR GPR, the 
international takedown of the private file sharing site OiNK’s Pink Palace, and efforts to 
grow copyright enforcement in Spain.  Many of the actions taken by the actors in the 
cases are dependent on E.U. processes, recommendations, and directives that were 
described in detail in this chapter.  The manner in which the cases unfold is directly 
related to processes of Europeanization and the European Union’s legislative efforts to 
harmonize the common market.  The cases are also constrained by the political 
economic factors of commodification and spatialization addressed in Chapter I.  Chapter 
III also breaks down the methods used to analyze the case studies and enumerates the 
stakeholders in the struggle over information policy in the European Union.  The 
discussion that closes the chapter connects the cases with the difficulties of harmonizing 
prohibitions across the European Union, and I argue that the challenges to E.U. 
copyright enforcement exemplify the problems of the IPR GPR. 
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CHAPTER III 
CASE STUDIES  
 
Overview 
 
 Chapter III is a historical analysis of the emergence of international prohibitions 
targeting digital copyrights.  The first section bridges Chapter I’s literature review with 
the case studies by offering an overview of research and findings in the field of 
information policy and digital copyright studies that are similar to the analysis presented 
in the review.  I identify laws, legislation, and other cases that were concurrent to the 
events described in this chapter’s analysis in order to better situate and stress the 
generalizability of my case research.  The second section describes the methodology of 
the research and stresses critical legal traditions from Hutchinson (1989) and Gordon 
(1989) and case study methods developed by Gerring (2007).  In the third section I then 
offer the framework for a stakeholder analysis based on Majchrzak’s (1984) 
recommendations for stakeholder analysis in policy research and enumerate the 
stakeholders within the cases.  The fourth section consists of the actual case studies, 
which are presented as a critical legal history of the development of the European 
implementation of the IPR GPR.  The section opens with a discussion of a series of 
police raids that began international prohibitions over digital copyrights; the discussion 
of the raids begins with the U.S.­led Operation Buccaneer and ends with a discussion of 
the MegaUpload siege in New Zealand.  After describing the emergence of criminal 
enforcement of digital copyrights based on U.S. standards, in a fifth and final section I 
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describe how the enforcements developed in Europe with an examination of two cases.  I 
first review the case of OiNK’s Pink Palace;  OiNK was the first torrent­related case in 
the United Kingdom and involved international seizures, extradition, and a major 
criminal trial.  I detail OiNK because it is representative of several other similar raids 
that occurred around Europe in the 2000s.  The second case that I analyze, that of the 
copyright law Ley Sinde that was secretively woven into an economic reform bill, is 
actually a documentation of  years of debate and struggle surrounding copyright reform 
in Spain from 2007­2014.  In researching the Spanish case, I overview digital copyright 
policy through a discussion of Spain’s copyright laws, legal norms, and major court 
decisions.  I also overview the U.S. seizure of peer­to­peer websites in Spain by the 
United States in order to emphasize the presence of international IP prohibitions and the 
divergence in Spanish and U.S. standards of IP enforcement.  While Spanish case is 
unique to the historical circumstances in Spain, the case is highly comparable to the 
struggles of other European nations dealing with pressures from the European Union and 
United States to ratchet up digital copyright laws during a period of economic collapse 
and emerging A2K activism.   
I conclude with a discussion section, arguing that in lieu of the two cases, it is clear 
that police enforcement and criminalization of copyright law is increasing, but 
implementation of the IP prohibition regime is inconsistent and the legitimacy of its 
governance is contested.  The discussion highlights the historical and theoretical 
importance of the cases, which are addressed further in Chapter IV.   
 130 
 
 
The section immediately following bridges the political theory described in Chapter I 
and the enumeration of E.U. processes and policy mechanisms in Chapter II with 
information policy studies emphasizing European developments and cases; its purpose is 
to spatially and temporally situate the OiNK and Ley Sinde cases within a generalizable 
framework of European IP prohibitions.  
Multi-Stakeholderism, Policy Laundering and Policy Transfer as Policy Features 
Undermining IPR Legitimacy 
The OiNK and Ley Sinde cases are referenced in this chapter as historical instances 
of the progression of the European Union’s IPR prohibition regime.  The cases are 
analyzed to assess the question of how the European prohibition regime influences the 
legitimacy and governance of IPR.  The European Union is, in Sarikakis’ (2012) analysis 
of legitimacy and governance, a state­like formation that operates alongside states, 
economic actors, and legal, regulatory, normative, and cultural institutions in the 
formation of institutional functions and the creation of policy regimes (p. 143).  
Sarikakis (2012) argues that the legitimacy problem that arises with E.U. governance is 
the lack of democratic input into leadership and the multi­stakeholder approach to 
governance (p. 149).  The multi­stakeholder approach is problematic because it removes 
policy­making authority from national governments in favor of multilateral 
organizations and the private sector.  The transfer of policy away from the state is a part 
of E.U. harmonization and is done at the E.U. level through directives (Sarikakis, 2012, 
p. 150).  Policy transfer is not the only obstacle to the legitimacy of E.U. governance, 
though, and Sarikakis (2012) also points to the problem of policy laundering (p. 149).  
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Policy laundering occurs in IP policy when specific laws to strengthen IP are inserted 
into larger, potentially unrelated legislative packages (Sarikakis, 2012, p. 150).  
Sarikakis discusses policy laundering in the context of several media policies, including 
Ley Sinde.  I specifically incorporate the policy laundering critique into the case study 
later in the chapter, but it is noteworthy how widespread the practice is.  For instance, 
Sarikakis discusses how the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, initially 
assembled to address security concerns, became “a checklist for data preservation 
requests, procedures, and legal frameworks” that was heavily influenced by the United 
States and media industry influence (p. 150).  ACTA and the French law HADOPI’s 
graduated response measures for copyright infringement and a rule inserted into the 
United Kingdom’s Digital Economy Act (DEA) to force ISPs to shut down infringing 
websites are also addressed by Sarikakis (2012) as laundered policy (pp. 151­152).  
ACTA, HADOPI, and the DEA are spatially and temporally related to the OiNK and Ley 
Sinde cases and are rooted in many of the same law and policy initiatives from the same 
stakeholders described in this chapter’s analysis. According to Sarikakis (2012), the 
laundered policy found in IP trade agreements and legislation lacks legitimacy because it 
bypasses democratic and parliamentary institutions and gives control of legal formation 
to non­voting, non­representative actors (p. 150).  The Ley Sinde case continues and 
builds on Sarikakis’ discussion of policy laundering as a problem for media governance.   
Larsson’s (2011a; 2011b) critique of the legitimacy of European digital copyright 
policy furthers the discussion of policy transfer, the phenomenon that was discussed in 
Chapter II in terms of the Data Retention Directive being created with the stated purpose 
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of stopping  terrorism but becoming a tool for the surveillance and control of file 
sharing.  Larsson also engages in an analysis of policy’s relation to social norms.  As 
discussed in Chapter I, the legitimacy of prohibition enforcement requires the alignment 
of legal and social norms (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, p. 22).  Larsson identifies 
previous data and conducted survey research in Sweden to conclude that file sharing is 
viewed as normatively legitimate within the European Union and that prohibitions are 
generally obeyed only out of fear of punishment (2011b, p. 129; 2012, pp. 1015­1016).  
Larsson (2011b) notes that a problem with the divergence in legal and social norms is 
that legal enforcement has to be strengthened in order to properly function, since many 
Internet users have no moral qualms about file sharing (p. 129).  Larsson does not 
directly address what the enforcement mechanisms are or the police institutions that 
regulate enforcement.  The case studies in this chapter elaborate on the expansion of 
enforcement through analyses of police institutions and their influence on prohibition 
mechanisms.   
The emphasis on enforcement mechanisms has appeared elsewhere in information 
policy literature.  Burkart and Andersson (2013) use the metaphor of gunboat diplomacy 
to describe the United States’ strategy of threatening discourse and secretive negotiations 
in ratcheting up global IP enforcement (p. 134).  The authors describe an increasingly 
unilateral approach by the United States to protect its multi­billion dollar media, culture, 
and services trade agenda through the Special 301 and through trade agreements 
including ACTA (Burkart & Andersson, 2013).  The Special 301, as described in 
Chapter I’s discussion on the history of IP prohibitions, contains the Watch List of 
 133 
 
 
countries that the USTR is pressuring to reform IP law (Drahos, 2002, p. 96).  Sell 
(2010), in an article critical of the IPR provisions in ACTA, notes that Special 301 is 
used to enhance the global enforcement of IPR.  Sell (2010) describes how police 
institutions including the World Customs Organization (WCO) and Interpol that have a 
role in establishing and enforcing international IP policy.  Both the WCO and Interpol 
appear as stakeholders throughout this chapter’s research, and I expand on Sell’s 
analysis with a discussion of numerous other police actors involved in prohibition 
enforcement.   
Situating the Case Research: Concurrent Cases  
Previous research on E.U. information policy and digital copyright disputes is useful 
for historically situating the case studies in this chapter, identifying concurrent digital 
copyright­related events in the European Union, and emphasizing the role of relevant 
stakeholders.  I selected OiNK and Ley Sinde because I found them to be representative 
of E.U. processes of prohibition implementation and because the events within the cases 
are generalizable in regard to similar cases across the European Union.  The three most 
relevant cases that run concurrent to OiNK and Ley Sinde within the European Union are 
Sweden’s The Pirate Bay, the United Kingdom’s DEA and France’s HADOPI.  The 
three are mentioned consistently throughout the case studies, so it is important to offer a 
brief summary here.   
The Pirate Bay 
Of the three, The Pirate Bay is the largest scale case in relation to the IP prohibition 
regime because of the judicial and police involvement in the case and the use of criminal 
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enforcement and extradition in prosecuting the site’s founders.  I discussed The Pirate 
Bay briefly in the first chapter in terms of its place in the A2K spectrum as an actor 
openly opposed to digital copyright law and defiant toward media industry’s legal 
threats.  The site has been the addressed in several IP policy studies (Bogdan, 2010; 
Larsson, 2011a; Andersson, 2014; Burkart, 2014) and is a fundamental illustration of 
global prohibitions on digital copyrights.  The Pirate Bay was founded in 2003 as an ad­
financed BitTorrent tracker (Andersson, 2014, p. 132).  BitTorrent is a type of file 
sharing protocol that allows users to download files, or torrents, from multiple other 
downloaders at the same time, enabling a quick, efficient method of sending and 
receiving data (Choi & Perez, 2007).  In 2006, fifty police officers raided The Pirate 
Bay’s servers and hundreds of other servers belonging to its hosting company 
(Andersson, 2014, p. 133).  The Pirate Bay raid is the largest and most explicit example 
of the IPR prohibition regime in action until the MegaUpload case described below in 
the case studies.  As Andersson (2014) outlines, a Swedish public broadcaster revealed 
U.S. pressure and lobbying from the MPAA as the impetus for the raid (p. 136).  The 
Pirate Bay takedown inspired articles and profiles across the popular press, and the trial 
of its founders made international headlines (Andersson, 2014, p. 133).  The site’s 
founders, known as ‘The Pirate Bay Four,” were unable because of Swedish law to be 
extradited to the United States despite efforts from the plaintiffs to hold the trial in the 
United States (Burkart, 2014, p. 64).  U.S. pressure on Sweden to reform its copyright 
system was later revealed by WikiLeaks in 2010 during its “CableGate” dump of 
diplomatic documents (Andersson, 2014, p. 136).  The same release of diplomatic cables 
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revealed U.S. pressure on Spain to reform its copyright legislation, and I detail the 
backlash to the cables in the discussion of Ley Sinde below.  At the time of this writing, 
The Pirate Bay still serves as an index for torrents.  The Pirate Bay is important to the 
analysis of the European IP prohibition regime not only because of the police force and 
international pressures used to shut down the site and arrest the founders, but also 
because of its link to the Pirate Party.  The Pirate Party, a political party, emerged in 
2006 after the Pirate Bay raid with an A2K platform and a strong emphasis on digital 
rights (Burkart, 2014, p. 17).  Though the successes of the party appear to be on the 
decline, the “pirate politics” that emerged from the movement have become more 
mainstream in European political discourse (Geere, 2014, para. 1) and have been 
adopted by the larger European Green Party (Burkart, 2014, p. 145).   
The DEA and HADOPI 
The Digital Economy Act and HADOPI are also discussed throughout this chapter as 
concurrent events to the critical legal timeline given in the case studies.  The two 
initiatives are primarily discussed throughout this chapter as examples of what the 
United States considers to be ideal policy when recommending copyright reform through 
unilateral pressures to other countries.  Several IP policy researchers (Meyer, 
Audenhove, & Morganti, 2009; Sarikakis, 2012; Burkart & Logan, 2013) have discussed 
the two policies in tandem because they both emerged around 2009 and were both 
initially viewed as frameworks for graduated response systems.  HADOPI, an acronym 
from the French “Law Promoting the Distribution and Protection of Creative Works on 
the Internet,” is best known for its graduated response measures (Meyer, Audenhove, & 
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Morganti, 2009, p. 16).  The initial proposal for the law did not include any judicial 
review and would allow users to be banned from the Internet after three warnings, but 
mobilization within civil society pressured the law to be changed to require a judge to 
order the Internet blockages (Meyer & van Audenhove, 2012, p. 268).  The law was 
passed in 2009 and establishes the HADOPI authority to send warnings to Internet users 
accused of infringement.  In contrast to HADOPI, Britain’s Digital Economy Act was 
part of a larger piece of legislation.  The legislation, Digital Britain, was designed to 
facilitate the growth of the U.K.’s digital economy (Meyer, Audenhove, & Morganti, 
2009, p. 29).  The DEA was, to borrow Sarikakis’ (2012) term, “laundered policy” 
inserted into Digital Britain at the behest of media industries.  The policy did not initiate 
a graduated response system, but left the U.K.’s Office of Communications the option of 
instilling such a system if it found that the Act was ineffective in stemming infringement 
(Burkart & Logan, 2013, p. 75).  The Digital Economy Act requires ISPs to notify 
Internet users if their accounts are suspected of digital infringement and requires the ISP 
to maintain the user data of individuals who receive the warning; the initial version of 
the bill gave the Office of Communications the authority to block websites and 
discipline ISPs for failure to comply with the law’s requirements (Meyer, Audenhove, & 
Morganti, 2009, p. 23).  The requirements for ISPs included tracking infringement, 
slowing the speeds of suspected infringers, and halting their service (Burkart, 2014, p. 
108).  The DEA was heavily debated across the United Kingdom (Burkart, 2014, p. 108) 
and was eventually attenuated through reforms (Masons, 2014, para. 1).  In 2014, after 
years of complications, the DEA was effectively abandoned for a market regulatory and 
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education scheme that involved cooperation with ISPs and various media trade groups in 
the United Kingdom (Masons, 2014, para. 4).  While the DEA was never fully 
implemented, it is still relevant to this case because it was, in its original framework, a 
model openly supported by the USTR in its unilateral pressures against Spain, and 
because the impetus for the law is directly related to the aftermath of the OiNK case.  
Additionally, the shift to market regulation of digital copyright infringement in the 
United Kingdom could actually be equally as problematic from an A2K perspective, 
though the British case is outside the scope of this study.  
The case studies developed here coincide with the aforementioned events in Sweden, 
France, and the United Kingdom, and are connected to those events through shared 
experiences of Europeanization and regional and international pressures to adopt 
stronger IP law.  The focus in these studies is on enforcement mechanisms and EC, U.S., 
and IP industry pressures to instill enforcement mechanisms where they do not already 
exist or have historically diverged from the framework of the IPR prohibition regime.  
Before developing the case studies, I introduce the methodology for the study and 
describe the stakeholder analysis. 
Critical Legal Methodology 
The methodology that I implement to highlight the cases’ theoretical significance is a 
critical legal analysis of the history of the IPR GPR and an examination of two case 
studies.  Critical legal studies is, as discussed in Chapter I, a methodology for exploring 
the relationship between power and law in society, particularly how the law is construed 
as a legitimizing mechanism for the powerful (Hutchinson, 1989, p. 3). The critical legal 
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methodology is used in this chapter as a tool for analyzing power imbalances within 
stakeholder dynamics and IP policies and enforcement.  I also use the methodology to 
address international IP governance through a critical spectrum that recognizes the 
power imbalances in the formation and administration of legal laws and norms.  
The critical legal paradigm has been used to assess how U.S. law legitimizes racism 
(Freeman, 1989), various leftist critiques of the development of contract law (Mensch, 
1989), and, more closely related to this dissertation, the development of intellectual 
property law (May & Sell, 2006).  The critical tradition holds that legal systems should 
be described in terms of their responsiveness to social needs, and historical analyses in 
this practice tend to view how the law is engineered to protect elite interests (Gordon, 
1989, pp. 81­83).  I evaluate the IP prohibition regime to determine if it is based in 
institutions and norms that privilege powerful stakeholders over other groups and, if so, 
analyze critical legal solutions to change the status quo regarding digital copyright 
enforcement.  I also analyze the capability of international institutions to substantively 
address problems of inequality in the law.  The construction of IP law as a tool for 
legitimating the business models of media industries has been discussed in the analysis 
of digital copyrights by Larsson (2011a, p. 25), and I build on this critique by evaluating 
how IP prohibitions are used as tools to legitimize the economic and political interests of 
the IP industries and the United States.  I also use critical legal studies to address 
perceptions of democratic deficits through an analysis of how IP policymaking is opaque 
and divorced from democratic procedures.   
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I am also aware of two major critiques of critical legal studies from both liberal legal 
and leftist thought.  Liberal legal critique of critical legal studies is that the field lacks 
functional solutions to problems and is overly critical of the law as a tool of oppression 
(Hutchinson, 1989; Hunt, 1999).  I acknowledge the first critique by only offering 
carefully constructed solutions to legitimacy contentions that exist within the IPR GPR.  
The second critique is addressed by stressing the importance of liberal legal ideals of 
freedom of expression and a human right to access information and knowledge, and 
expand on the value these ideals in the discussion below on A2K policy discourse.  
Another set of critiques toward the critical legal methodology comes from leftist 
scholars that are wary of an over­emphasis on legalism in critical thought (Brown & 
Halley, 2002).  I agree with this critique insofar as it recognizes problems of identity and 
power that exist outside of legal mechanisms, but solutions to those problems are beyond 
the scope of this study.    
Critical legal analysis is used here to examine the emergence of international 
prohibitions on digital copyrights and to apply the political economic theory described in 
Chapter I, particularly the concepts of commodification and spatialization, to the cases.  
The OiNK case, for instance, is heavily influenced by perceptions of not only the control 
of commodified cultural goods by the law, but also the enclosure of a digital commons 
where music creators and aficionados shared and discussed the art.  In the Ley Sinde 
case, the spatialization of IP prohibitions and the Europeanization of copyright law are 
integral to the disputes between the stakeholders.  Additionally, throughout the critical 
history I demonstrate with the cases studies, I build on the argument that the IPR GPR is 
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part of a system of international governance that seeks to expand and protect 
commodities and harmonize international standards of IP law.  Structuration, Mosco’s 
(2009) third aspect of the political economy of communication that describes how social 
systems are mutually constituted through human agency (p. 185) , is not directly 
addressed in this analysis even though it offers an explanation for how social movements 
bring together individuals across boundaries of identity (Mosco, 2009, p. 203).  The Ley 
Sinde case does involve social movement politics and activism, but the unique 
contribution of this study is its critique of regime governance of IP prohibitions.  The 
theoretical underpinnings the student­led Indignado movement that arose in Spain after 
Ley Sinde  is addressed and debated exhaustively by Castells (2012), Gerbaudo (2012), 
Martin and Urquizo­Sancho (2012) and Postill (2013).  I refer to their works throughout 
the study when explaining the sociological and communicative motivations of the social 
movements and activism in Spain.  All accounts regard the movement as highly 
networked through communication technology and capable mass online mobilization 
through social media, though, as I discuss in the stakeholder enumeration, Castells 
(2012) and Gerbaudo (2012) differ in their interpretation of leadership within the 
movement.  If I were to include structuration in the case analysis, I would potentially 
replicate findings from the previous authors that the Indignado movement was a 
networked collective of activists in Spain converging online and on the ground to protest 
common market initiatives in a time of economic crisis.  The replication of findings, 
within the scope of the study, would potentially limit the unique contributions of the 
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critical legal analysis of the policy laundering and leak of diplomatic cables that I 
examine throughout the study. 
I map the history of IP prohibitions in order to chart the escalation of copyright 
criminalization and its impacts within the European Union.  The underlying reasons for 
IP prohibitions—trade agreements, E.U. directives, U.S. pressure, and the economic 
impact of copyright infringement—are examined in each case.  Following the case study 
recommendations of Gerring (2007), I utilize the cases as tools for contextualizing, 
narrativizing, and categorizing phenomena that occur within the cases.  An advantage to 
studying the OiNK and Ley Sinde cases is that they are important markers in global 
copyright prohibitions and are similar to other spatially and temporally congruent events 
across the European Union, and also because of data availability.  The generalizability 
and data availability of the cases allow this research to remain narrow in scope while 
capturing the depth of GPR issues across the European Union.  The cases that I study are 
representative of the political economic and communicative trends described throughout 
this dissertation.  The cases broaden the analysis of the stakeholders by documenting the 
pressure that the European Union, United States, and the culture industry places on 
weaker actors, policy formation, law enforcement, and resistance from social movement 
and activists.   
Since I am observing emergent phenomena, the historical impact of the cases is still 
developing.  However, the cases do offer an opportunity for contextualizing issues of IP 
governance within states, regions, and international regimes.  This case analysis also 
offers an opportunity for description and observation of copyright contestation.  I 
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distinguish the legal, political, social, and cultural results of the cases for an overview of 
how international copyright prohibitions are developing across Europe.  In particular, I 
look for evidence of a global prohibition regime as defined by Andreas and Nadelmann 
(2009) that includes the discursive, regulatory, and legal mechanisms that create legal 
prohibitions (p. 3).  I also explore the presence of criminalization measures, public 
education campaigns, censorship, surveillance, and resistance that is evident in the 
emergence of a modern prohibition regime as described by Andreas and Nadelmann 
(2009, pp. 3­5).  I search for elements of global prohibition regime in digital copyright 
prohibitions in part to more fully interpret the cases, but also to determine the actual 
value of the GPR model in studying information policy, digital copyrights, and regimes 
as compared to established models of information policy, IP harmonization, 
Europeanization, or other legal paradigms.  I evaluate the value of GPR theory in the 
study of IP policy in Chapter IV.  In the next section, I distinguish the process for 
stakeholder categorization and enumerate the stakeholders. 
Overview of the Stakeholders 
The stakeholder categorization is based on the research conducted for the case 
studies and previous work by other authors related to information policy and digital 
copyrights.  I categorize the stakeholders as follows: the European Union, the United 
States, the British government, the Spanish government, IGOs, IP industries, the 
telecommunication sector, police institutions, A2K public interest groups, social 
movement groups and activists, and p2p sites.  Each stakeholder is categorized based on 
their policy interests regarding digital IP and each is described in this section.  Not every 
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stakeholder fits neatly into each category, and the differences between each segment of 
actors is evaluated.  In order to trace the phenomena that are occurring in the cases, I use 
strategies of stakeholder analysis as defined by Majchrzak (1984).  These strategies 
involve a historical approach in examining the debates, conflicts, and results of the 
policies.  Stakeholders are grouped by their attitudes, motives, and interests toward the 
policies put forward (Majchrzak, 1984, p. 76).  The power of each group of stakeholders 
is analyzed through a description of available resources, the ability to mobilize and 
access to primary decision makers (Majchrzak, 1984, p. 77).  Majchrzak (1984) suggests 
that groups of stakeholders are placed into hierachies that include representatives of the 
stateat the top, and others grouped on the basis of power and influence among the 
decision makers (p. 77­79).  Below, I have provided a sub­section for each stakeholder. 
Stakeholders Representing the European Union 
A history of the political composition and legislative framework of the European 
Union was offered in Chapter II.  As noted in the previous chapter, the European Union 
is continuously working to expand its Common Market through directives that 
harmonize intellectual property policy throughout each member state.  The unelected 
European Commission is consistently in support of greater protections for IP in order to 
expand the information economy of the European Union.  The EC planned to double the 
European Union’s 2012 revenue of online goods and services €311.6 billion ($417 
billion) by 2015, and proposed that part of the plan to meet this goal was to increase its 
anti­piracy agenda by requiring ISPs to police users and ban copyright infringers from 
the Internet (EC, 2012a).  IPR prohibition regime tools such as amplifying digital 
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copyright policing through proposing directives including IPRED2 and entering into 
TRIPS­plus agreements including ACTA are illustrations of the EC’s desire for a largely 
commodified Internet with marginal consideration for the resources of a digital 
commons.  The EC’s positions on and proposals for digital copyright laws are 
occasionally hindered through protests from A2K groups and political pressure from 
within the European Parliament, as was the case with the Pirate Party’s influence within 
the EP in assisting with the European Union’s rejection of ACTA (Burkart & Logan, 
2013, p. 73).  The European Union’s foundation for digital copyright policies in the form 
of its Software, E­Commerce, Copyright, and IP Enforcement Directives are in place, 
however, and member states are required to implement each directive as a bare 
minimum for copyright policy. 
The democratic deficit inherent in the EC can lead to discontent and disillusionment 
among national citizens when they perceive that Brussels has overreached it authority 
(Ladrech, 2010, p. 7).  The anger over democratic deficits and violations of sovereignty 
is demonstrated in the Ley Sinde case later in this chapter, where the protests over 
proposed copyright prohibitions are encompassed by a greater social movement 
protesting E.U.­backed austerity measures throughout Spain (Pegeura, 2010; Morell, 
2012; Postill, 2014).  While a more thorough analysis of the economic crisis is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation, the influence of the 2008 global financial collapse in E.U. 
and Spanish politics cannot be understated in throughout the Ley Sinde case.  The EC’s 
primary concern within the case is pressuring Spain to reform its overall economy, and 
concerns over the upward ratchet of its copyright laws are minimal.  As I demonstrate in 
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the case study, the EC is the most powerful stakeholder in regard to pressuring Spain to 
implement economic and legal reforms. 
During the Spanish case, the European Court of Justice is also mentioned as an actor 
influencing the direction of copyright reforms.  The role of the ECJ as it relates to the 
case study is ensuring that E.U. directives are applied equally throughout all member 
states.   
Stakeholders Representing U.S. Trade Interests 
Chapters I and II described in depth the role of the United States in establishing 
international intellectual property laws and policies.  I argue throughout the dissertation 
that the United States and its dominance in the WTO­TRIPS negations are responsible 
for the emergence of the IPR GPR.  The United States’ priorities in the case studies are 
based on its will to protect the entertainment industry’s contributions to the U.S. 
economy.  In 2005, near the time that the case studies begin, the entertainment industries 
accounted for $9.5 billion of the United States’ positive trade surplus (Burkart & 
Andersson, 2013, p. 134).  The economic importance of IP industries to the United 
States cannot be understated in the analysis of how the USTR and U.S. Ambassador to 
Spain approached unilateral pressures at the time of the case studies.  The United States 
is highly attentive to the recommendations of industry lobbyists in formulating 
suggestions for IP prohibitions and in recommending copyright legislation to other 
nations.   
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The other primary U.S. stakeholders analyzed throughout the critical history of 
digital copyright prohibitions and the case studies are U.S. enforcement agencies 
including the FBI, Department of Justice, and the Department of Homeland Security.  
These four institutions underpin the United States’ implementation of police 
enforcement in the international IP prohibition regime. The FBI is directly involved in 
the enforcement of IPR, and, on its website, warns of the growing threat of IP crime due 
to “rise of digital technologies and Internet file sharing networks” and notes that it works 
internationally with the private sector and law enforcement agencies (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, n.d., para. 2).  The Department of Justice maintains a Task Force on 
Intellectual Property that claims to serve “as an engine of policy development to address 
the evolving technological and legal landscape” of IP crime (United States Department 
of Justice [U.S. DOJ], n.d., para. 3).  The task force also focuses on “the links between 
IP crime and international organized crime” (U.S. DOJ, n.d., para. 2). The Department of 
Homeland Security oversees another task force called the National Intellectual Property 
Rights Center (IPR Center).  On its website, the IPR Center states that it “stands at the 
forefront of the U.S. government’s response to global intellectual property theft” and 
uses its expertise to “to share information, develop initiatives, coordinate enforcement 
actions, and conduct investigations related to IP theft” (IPR Center, 2014, para. 2).  The 
IPR Center partners with several national and transnational police organizations, 
including Interpol and the World Customs Organization.  Interpol appears throughout 
the case studies as assisting in several U.S.­led enforcement operations and as working 
with the British police and the U.K.’s Hi­Tech Crime Unit during the OiNK raids.  The 
Police Agencies and Organizations 
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OiNK case also examines the Dutch Fiscal Information and Investigation Service (FIOD 
ECD).  FIOD ECD is an elite Dutch task force that primarily focuses on financing, 
money laundering, and fraud associated with organized crime and terrorism 
(International Monetary Fund, 2011, p. 34).   
I focus on areas of emphasis from GPR and cybercrime theory when analyzing the 
enforcement stakeholders.  Andreas and Nadelmann (2006) argued that GPRs require 
resources and dedication to international governance and cooperation, legal regimes, and 
investment in law enforcement coalitions (pp. 22­28).  How national stakeholders 
support and invest in enforcement regimes is noted throughout the study, particularly in 
light of economic troubles facing Spain.  I also focus on the problem of police 
enforcement of digital activities described in the cybercrime literature reviewed in 
Chapter I.  Leman­Langlois (2008) warned that the composition of cybercrime 
enforcement leads to extreme police measures that are out of proportion with the 
suspected crimes and individuals (pp. 4­5).  The examples of the various U.S.­led 
operations, the MegaUpload raid, and the OiNK raids and prosecution given in the case 
studies and history of the IPR GPR here are analyzed for examples of disproportionate 
policing measures.  The primary reason that disproportionate policing occurs is because 
international policing is dependent on the standardization of police procedures and the 
harmonization of criminal enforcement regimes (Lemieux, 2010, p. 5; Leman­Langlois, 
2008, pp. 4­5).  The cases analyze how police tactic harmonization and the use of 
primarily anti­terror and organized crime agencies like the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security and Dutch FIOS ECD implement standardized procedures to enforce 
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digital copyright law.  I also noted literature in Chapter I describing the difficulty of 
using criminal enforcement to manage digital copyrights on the Internet due to the 
socially legitimated attitudes toward file sharing, and the OiNK case analyzes how pro­
OiNK stakeholders ignored and bypassed the police activities against the Pink Palace.   
Intellectual Property Industry Stakeholders 
Numerous representatives of the IP industries are analyzed throughout the cases.  
These include trade groups previously mentioned throughout the dissertation—the 
RIAA, MPAA, IFPI, and the IIPA—and several others that serve the same function of 
lobbying for coalitions of rights holders.  The stakeholders introduced in this chapter 
include two IIPA members—the Business Software Alliance (BSA) and the 
Entertainment Software Association—in addition to the British Recorded Music Industry 
(BPI), and three Spanish IP coalitions.  The Spanish coalitions include the music trade 
association Promusicae, the MPAA­supported Federation for the Protection of 
Intellectual Property, and the umbrella IP industry collective of the Coalition of Content 
Creators.  The lobbying and policy influence of these organizations is analyzed 
throughout this chapter.   
Telecommunication Sector Stakeholders 
The telecommunication sector actors that are addressed in the cases are examined for 
their role as ISPs.  These organizations have a vested interest in moderate digital 
copyright prohibitions because they thrive off of the distribution content (Andersson, 
2014, p. 17).  Laws that force telecommunication industries to police users or ban file 
sharers are generally opposed in the telecommunication sector because such laws 
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endanger profits.  The telecommunication sector is larger, wealthier, and more 
influential than any of the A2K stakeholders enumerated here, so it is arguable that they 
are the most significant stakeholders in limiting digital copyright enforcement.  
Technology companies such as Google and Yahoo and streaming services such as 
Netflix are similarly invested in open distribution standards (Jakobsson and Stiernstedt, 
2012, pp. 51­52; Andersson, 2014, p. 17), but are not present in the stakeholder analysis 
because, outside of a comment about Google’s influence from the Spanish Minister of 
Culture to a U.S. Ambassador when justifying the reasoning behind Spain’s refusal to 
implement criminal copyright enforcement, I found no outward evidence of their 
contributions to the cases.   
The primary telecommunication stakeholder explored in this study is Spain’s 
Telefónica.  Telefónica is the oldest and largest telecommunication and broadband 
provider in Spain, and was its public sector telecommunication monopolist until being 
fully liberalized in 1997 (Bel & Trillas, 2005, p. 26).  The company is currently the third 
largest telecommunication company in the world and maintains a strong presence 
throughout Latin America and Europe (Powell, 2010, pp. 2­3).  The company is also a 
member of RedTel, a trade association made up of Spanish telecoms Vodaphone, ONO, 
and Orange.  RedTel is a noteworthy stakeholder in the Ley Sinde case because the trade 
group uses its considerable resources and influence to resist laws requiring them to 
police ISP users through surveillance and data collection and reject proposals from the 
IP industries for graduated response laws in Spain.  The analysis of the 
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telecommunication companies focuses on their stakeholder power and interests in 
negotiations for new copyright laws in Spain.  
The U.K. Government 
The U.K. government is not a central stakeholder during the OiNK case, but the 
events after the case including the emergence of the Digital Economy Act and the 
creation of new IP task forces are analyzed.  U.K. government stakeholders operate 
closely with intellectual property industry in drafting IP law and enforcing copyright 
violations.  The Crown Prosecution Service, the English and Welsh authority for 
prosecuting criminal cases, is shown to operate as an intermediary for the entertainment 
industry during the failed OiNK prosecutions.   
The Spanish Government 
Spanish government stakeholders primarily include Spain’s former Prime Minister 
José  Zapatero and former Minister of Culture Ángeles González­Sinde.  In the cases, I 
describe the pressure that these two politicians face to enact copyright prohibitions, and 
analyze how the two are influenced by and interact with the other stakeholders.  The 
actions of both the Prime Minister and Minister of Culture are described within the 
framework of the exceptional economic crisis affecting Spain and competing pressures 
from various stakeholders to address both the crisis and copyright enforcement.   
A2K Public Interest Groups 
Throughout the cases, I analyze the arguments and preferred policy models of the 
A2K public interest groups.  I also examine their role within the policymaking process in 
order to address issues of transparency and policy laundering in the creation of IP 
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policies.  A2K non­governmental organizations analyzed here include the U.S.­based 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Public Knowledge, and the Center for Democracy 
and Technology.  Throughout the cases, these organizations condemn the actions of 
governments, lawmakers, and police organizations in enacting what the A2K groups 
consider to be unjust, detrimental, and illegitimate copyright policies that favor the 
interests of IP industry stakeholders.  The organizations act through press releases and 
blog posts, provide legal defenses for accused infringers after the OiNK raids and 
RojaDirecta seizure, present amici briefs, and attempt to advise policymakers.  In the 
course of events during the Ley Sinde case, the public interest group Sustainable Net is 
formed to represent the interests of bloggers, tech lawyers, artists, and other activists to 
protest proposed changes to Spain’s copyright laws (Horten, 2011, p. 176).  Another 
major Spanish public interest group is the Asociación de Internautas (Association of 
Internet Users), referred to throughout this chapter as Internautas.  Internautas were 
established in 1998 and have been an influential enough actor in Spanish Internet politics 
to be granted a “seat at the table” during policy and legislative debates (Horten, 2011, p. 
167).  The group can be differentiated from the U.S.­based interest groups in that it is 
willing to break the law through tactics such as launching DDoS attacks, which 
temporarily disable websites, on stakeholders in support of stronger copyright laws 
(Postill, 2014, p. 4).  Internautas also has close ties with the social movement groups 
described below.   
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The Spanish case focuses on the disputes between the United States, A2K 
organizations and activists and Spanish politicians, courts, and lawmakers.  An 
examination of social movements and activism related to the financial collapse in Spain 
during the cases is, like the economic collapse itself, outside of the scope of this study.  
However, the actions of activist groups, particularly Spain’s Indignado movement, 
overlap and contribute to the protests against Ley Sinde.  At the movement’s height in 
2011, the Indignado protests reached 2.2 million people (Castells, 2012, p. 114) and the 
movement was organizing sit­ins, occupying major city centers in Barcelona and 
Madrid, and mobilizing supporters through social media on the ground and in the 
physical headquarters of established public interest groups (Gerbaudo, 2012; Postill, 
2014).  Authors including Castells (2012) and Gerbaudo (2012) have detailed the 
Indignado movement alongside research on the Occupy Movement and the Arab Spring.  
Castells (2012) argued that the Indignados were a leaderless, decentralized networked 
coalition that was based in communication networks and materialized in the streets of 
Madrid.  Gerbaudo (2012) countered that while Spain’s thriving digital culture, 
extensive Internet access, and social media mobilization facilitated and organized the 
Indignados, the movement was highly structured, centralized, and led by various 
established organizations and prominent activists (p. 100).  Gerbaudo’s assertions on the 
organization and centralized leadership of the Indignados inform the research I conduct 
more clearly than does Castells’ (2012) portrayal of the movement as a loosely 
networked, leaderless collective because throughout the Ley Sinde case, I identify 
movement leaders in the form of groups including Internautas, No Les Votes and 
A2K in the Periphery: Social Movement and Activist Stakeholders 
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Sustainable Net.  I stress that Internautas and other actors in the Ley Sinde protests were 
forerunners of the Indignados and held leadership roles in the build up to the 2011 
protests.  Within the breadth of this research, I am primarily focusing on the Indignado’s 
emphasis on digital rights issues and the extent to which A2K public interest groups and 
networks protesting Ley Sinde contributed to the mass activist mobilization across Spain 
in 2011. 
The online and street protests in Spain were also assisted by Anonymous, the 
leaderless hacktivist collective described in Chapter I as a contributor to A2K activism.  
I trace the actions of Anonymous in Spain during the protests in regard to its role in 
coordinating demonstrations and spreading information about Ley Sinde.  WikiLeaks is 
also relevant to the Spanish case, and I use information from their leak of diplomatic 
cables to outline the communication between the U.S. and Spanish governments in 
coordinating copyright reform.  WikiLeaks is not a stakeholder in the sense that anyone 
involved in the organization was involved in policy debates or protest movements, but 
its role in providing, as Burkart & Andersson (2013) describe, “visibility, transparency 
and influence” (p. 143) to negotiations over copyright police is highlighted in the Ley 
Sinde case. 
p2p Websites and Services 
Both the OiNK and Ley Sinde case are related to controversy over p2p websites and 
technology.  I describe the underlying technology behind file sharing and streaming sites 
and also analyze the websites and their owners, operators, and communities as 
stakeholders.  OiNK’s Pink Palace, for instance, promoted itself as a non­profit service 
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that used all donations to upkeep the website, and its community worked meticulously to 
build and curate OiNK’s index of media files (Sockanathan, 2011, p. 38).  Other p2p 
stakeholders, including the RojaDirecta, attempt to profit from advertising revenue 
(McSherry, 2011, para. 2) and are not concerned with cultivating a community.  
Throughout the cases, I find that the metaphor of “piracy” is applied to all p2p sites 
indiscriminately, and criminal enforcement organizations view p2p services including 
OiNK, ShareMula.com, MegaUpload, and the RojaDirecta to be responsible for 
copyright infringement with the primary intent to profit.  I also stress how law 
enforcement agencies view the proprietors of these websites as criminal leaders.  An 
early example of law enforcement’s focus on criminal leaders in digital copyright cases 
is given in the critical history section before the case studies, which describes the 
prosecution of individuals involved with the group DrinkOrDie.   
IGOs 
The WTO and WIPO are important stakeholders in the IP prohibition regime and 
their influence was addressed in depth throughout the first two chapters.  However, 
neither organization displays direct involvement throughout the case studies.  TRIPS and 
WIPO’s direction in international copyright law underlie the events of the cases, though, 
and the impact of IGOs in copyright prohibitions is reintroduced in the discussion 
section after the cases.  The cases and the historical trajectory that leads to them are 
described in the next section. 
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The first part of this section is an overview of the emergence of the IPR GPR’s 
enforcement of digital copyrights.  The prohibition regime’s attention to copyright fully 
developed through the U.S. DOJ and FBI’s Operation Buccaneer and subsequent 
operations.  After discussing the U.S. operations, I briefly overview the MegaUpload 
raid in New Zealand to illustrate the escalation of international prohibitions on digital 
copyright and use of police enforcement to stem infringement.  The MegaUpload 
example is not, I argue, currently replicable in the European Union due to institutional 
protections regarding civil liberties and civic freedom.  The European Union’s potential 
for implementing the IPR GPR is described throughout the two case studies.  The OiNK 
case demonstrates the criminal enforcement of digital copyrights in the European Union, 
whereas the Ley Sinde case focuses on the attempted implementation of prohibition 
measures in Spain and the backlash to the proposed measures.  Both cases involve a 
critical analysis of the stakeholders enumerated earlier in this chapter, and I follow the 
cases with a comparative analysis of case results and stakeholder dynamics.   
Precursors to the OiNK Action 
I discussed previously that while the European Berne Convention developed the 
international trade of intellectual property, the United States overtook Europe as the 
primary supporter and beneficiary of IP in its development of an informationalized 
economy.  The United States was the core nation in the development of trade law 
regimes in the form of GATT, the WTO, and the WTO’s TRIPS.  In addition to being at 
the forefront of multi­lateral measures to globalize standards for IP policy, the United 
States also pressured other nations to increase IP protections through unilateral pressures 
OiNK’s Pink Palace 
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from the USTR and its Special 301 List.  The 301 is heavily influenced by the 
recommendations of the IIPA, and so media industries are heavily involved in the 
“gunboat diplomacy” (Burkart & Andersson, 2013) that pressures nations to adopt 
heightened IP standards.  At the domestic U.S. level, the RIAA took the first major steps 
against “digital piracy” in 1999 with the lawsuit against Napster.  Napster was a peer­to­
peer file sharing service that allowed users to upload files to its servers to be downloaded 
by other users (Fagin, Pasquale, & Weatherall, 2002, p. 460).  Napster differed from 
BitTorrent sites like The Pirate Bay because Napster stored user files on its own server 
instead of merely acting as a search directory for files indexed elsewhere.  Napster, as a 
centralized database of infringing files, was able to be prosecuted civilly by the record 
companies using established U.S. copyright law (Fagin, Pasquale, & Weatherall, 2002, 
p. 460).  In a later U.S. case, Metro-Goldwyn Meyer v. Grokster, Ltd., the U.S. Supreme 
Court addressed file sharing services that did not directly host infringing files and 
instead simply supplied file sharing software to users (Hancock, 2006, p. 199).  The 
major precedent from the Grokster case came in the Court’s decision that Grokster was a 
service that provided “inducement to infringe” by encouraging individuals to violate 
copyrights (Hancock, 2006, p. 198).  Implementation of the inducement doctrine later 
became a key demand of the United States in unilateral IP negotiations with other 
nations; Spain’s lack of inducement standards lead to the international legal troubles of 
the RojaDirecta.  I detail RojaDirecta’s struggles in the Ley Sinde case, but here it is 
important to note that both Napster and Grokster were instances of civil prosecution that 
ended the operation of both sites.  No large­scale criminal enforcement is evident in 
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either case.  Concurrent to RIAA v. Napster, however, the FBI and U.S. DOJ were 
preparing the first international criminal enforcement of IP law. 
In 2001, Operation Buccaneer was the first major international action for the 
enforcement of digital IP (Urbas, 2007, p. 20).  The operation is noteworthy not only 
because it is the original cross­border police digital copyright enforcement, but also due 
to its success and precedent.  The raids led to multiple computer seizures, jail sentences, 
fines, and cases of extradition in several nations (Urbas, 2007, p. 20).  While Buccaneer 
primarily targeted individuals working with warez sites, which specialize in 
circumventing DRM in digital media to enable software and other media to be 
distributed freely online, the operation created a precedent for police actions that would 
soon after be used against individual file sharers and online communities as well.  
Operation Buccaneer was the beginning of the IPR GPR’s expansion to digital copyright 
enforcement, and it asserted the role of police organizations as engaged institutions in 
the governance of international IP.   
Buccaneer was led by the U.S. DOJ and the United States Customs Service (Urbas, 
2007, p. 210).  It included cooperation with government officials and police in the 
United Kingdom, Sweden, Australia, Finland, and Norway and also led to computer 
seizures in Canada and the Netherlands (Urbas, 2007, p. 210).  The raids also relied 
heavily on cooperation from universities, notably MIT, UCLA, Duke, the Rochester 
Institute of Technology, and Norway’s University of Twente (Koning, 2001).  Over 130 
seizures were carried out and dozens of corporate executives, network administrators, 
and college students were arrested for uploading software, movies, music, and other 
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digital media to the Internet (Lemos, 2001, para. 8).  Over 40 criminal convictions 
resulted from the raids, many of which were of individuals involved with the warez 
collective DrinkOrDie (U.S. DOJ, 2007).  Government and police organizations 
promoted the Business Software Alliance’s claims that software companies in the United 
States lost $2.6 billion to piracy in 2000 (Nguyen, 2007, para. 3).  According to the 
BSA, the people uploading files to the Internet were as damaging to the industry as those 
selling illegal physical copies of DVDs, CDs, and other physical media around the globe 
(Nguyen, 2007, para. 3).  The BSA, then, was claiming the need for enclosure of digital 
spaces in order to protect its commodified goods.  The BSA’s distinction of digital 
infringement as equal to physical infringement is legally significant because criminal 
copyright is based on the intent of someone to either make a profit from infringing 
materials or to intentionally enable someone else to make a profit (Natividad, 2008, p. 
479).  If hackers are working through warez sites merely to develop hacking skills, share 
information or cultural goods, or even to protest the practices of software and 
entertainment industries, they are not criminally liable.  Criminal liability for the hackers 
was dependent on the legal assertion that their activities were occurring in violation of 
property rights and not as part of communicative activity within a cultural commons; 
thus it was important for the BSA to argue this distinction.  A central part of criminal 
copyright infringement are the ideas of theft and piracy, and courts need to be convinced 
that the individuals engaged in hacking and file sharing are doing so for profit 
(Natividad, 2008, p. 479).  The successful criminal copyright cases in Buccaneer made 
the claim that people were profiting from stolen goods (Urbas, 2007, p. 20). 
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The most publicized case in the DrinkOrDie crackdown was that of Hew Griffiths, 
an Australian national accused of being a co­leader in the warez group (Urbas, 2007, p. 
16).  Griffiths was arrested by the Australian Federal Police and placed in a Sydney 
prison for three years before being extradited to the United States for violating U.S. 
copyright law (Nguyen, 2007).  Griffiths pleaded guilty in a Virginia court to criminal 
copyright violations and conspiracy to commit copyright infringement and was 
sentenced to 51 months in prison in 2007 before being returned to Australia six months 
later (Martin, 2012).  The extradition was possible because of bilateral treaties between 
the United States and Australia, including the U.S.­Australia Free Trade Agreement that 
enhanced Australia’s copyright protections (Ackland, 2007).  For his part, Griffiths 
claimed that U.S. officials were acting as proxies for the multinational software 
companies Adobe Systems and Microsoft, which was why his jail sentence was so 
severe (Martin, 2012).  In the OiNK case described below, lawyers for OiNK defendants 
made similar accusations toward the British government as being proxies for the music 
industry (Curtis, 2010, para. 4).  Griffiths claimed that U.S. Customs officials and 
upward of 20 police officers raided his workplace, confiscated computers, and arrested 
him (Parker, 2002).  Other intellectual property and legal scholars and activists criticized 
the Australian government for the extradition, as Griffiths had never set foot in the 
United States and could have easily been tried for similar crimes in Australia 
(Weatherall, 2007).  A former Supreme Court Justice in New South Wales also criticized 
the extradition, expressing that while IP infringement is a grave crime, Australia should 
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not extradite its citizens over the commercial interests of foreign nations (Nguyen, 
2007).  
In addition to Griffiths, Christopher Tresco, an MIT economics graduate student, 
received three years in prison for violating the U.S. Copyright Act with DrinkOrDie 
(Winstein, 2002, sect. 2, para. 4).  Four British members of the warez scene were sent to 
prison for multiple years after being arrested by the United Kingdom’s National Hi­Tech 
Crime Unit during Buccaneer (Urbas, 2007, pp. 215­216), and several students at the 
Dutch University of Twente were also arrested for copyright infringement (Koning, 
2001).  In the time since the raids, the U.S. DOJ has increased its calls for extradition 
due to copyright infringement and made attempts to extradite individuals from the 
United Kingdom and elsewhere for running file sharing and streaming services 
(Manhire, 2012; Walker, 2012); furthermore it launched a Joint Strategic Plan in 2010 to 
increase collaborative raids and extradition by working with other nations, Interpol, and 
the World Customs Organization (JOINT, 2010, p. 15).  In the immediate aftermath of 
Operation Buccaneer, the United States conducted several other such “Operations,” most 
notably Operation Fastlink in 2004.   
Operation Fastlink was another FBI/DOJ joint operation in coordination with 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, the Netherlands, Singapore, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom (U.S. DOJ, 2004, para. 1).  The FBI and DOJ heralded 
the operation as the largest global operation to combat online piracy (U.S. DOJ, 2004, 
para. 1).  Investigations were assisted by the BSA, RIAA, MPAA, and the Entertainment 
Software Association (U.S. DOJ, 2004, para. 10).  The operation led to the seizure of 
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120 computers and dozens of investigations and arrests in every participating nation, and 
the closure of several major warez and file sharing sites (Natividad, 2008, p. 482).  
Fastlink also provided the RIAA with the first ever criminal conviction for music piracy 
against a member of the Apocalypse Production Crew (RIAA, 2008).  Apocalypse 
specialized in uploading leaked copies of music before their official release date, and 
one member was convicted in the United States for conspiracy to commit copyright 
infringement and was given five years in prison (RIAA, 2008, para. 3).  This case laid 
the groundwork for future criminal prosecutions against early release sites, including 
OiNK’s Pink Palace. 
Criticisms of both the efficacy and the legitimacy of the international piracy 
operations abound.  While the U.S. government asserted that DrinkOrDie was the crown 
jewel of Operation Buccaneer and one of the “oldest and most security conscious piracy 
groups” (U.S. DOJ, 2001, para. 5), many software experts and A2K advocates were 
skeptical of the DOJ’s claims, noting that it was made up primarily of students testing 
their code cracking abilities (Lemos, 2001, sect. 2, para. 3).  Additionally, the $50 
million estimate of the worth of the software and entertainment dispersed by DrinkOrDie 
assumed that all of the pirated media would have been purchased legitimately (Nguyen, 
2007).  Critics further argued that Fastlink’s role as a major entity in the warez scene 
was vastly overstated, and was being used being dramatized by the feds to enhance the 
narrative of police efficacy (Manjoo, 2001).  A Wired article critical of the raid noted 
that of over 40,000 cracked software releases during a seven month span, barely over 
400 were from DrinkOrDie (Manjoo, 2001).  Wired claimed that DrinkOrDie was “small 
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potatoes” in the software cracking world, and that the raids did little to address digital 
piracy (Manjoo, 2001, para. 5).  The skeptic discourse of Wired’s and of warez 
developers themselves is in stark contrast to the formal pronouncements of U.S. 
Customs and the FBI, which accused DrinkOrDie of being a “notorious elite Internet 
piracy organization” (Manjoo, 2001, para. 9) and asserted that “whether committed with 
a gun or a keyboard–theft is theft” (U.S. DOJ, 2007, para. 1).  One U.S. Customs official 
claimed of warez groups that their members “believe in a free Internet.  They don’t want 
any rules or any laws that inhibit what they do” (Lemos, 2001, December 12, sect. 2, 
para. 4).  The Customs official’s idea of a “free Internet” is different from notions of 
Internet freedom engaged within the A2K community of advocates and activists that 
emphasize the need for a communicative commons and freedom to create online, and 
betrays a central difficulty encountered by global prohibition regimes.  Namely, police 
organizations are ill equipped to deal with problems that fall outside the dichotomy of 
crime and punishment and tend to categorize individuals engaging in prohibited 
activities as morally deficient criminals (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2009, pp. 11­12).  The 
international police tactics used in Buccaneer, Fastlink and similar operations eliminated 
a few actors in the warez scene, but took no steps to address the alleged social problem 
of free distribution of software and entertainment media.  The international legitimacy of 
U.S.­coordinated cybercrime operations were questioned by technology publications, 
software experts, and activists due to their extremity and perceived ineffectiveness 
(Manjoo, 2001).  The operation system involves the leadership of the United State’s 
police institutions in conjunction with various national and international police 
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organizations.  As a tool in the governance of international IP, the social legitimacy of 
the international legal norms that allow U.S. enforcement leadership and extradition can 
be critiqued because of its dependence on foreign and supra­national institutions to arrest 
people for threatening the business model of media industries. 
The IP operations of U.S. police organizations created a foundation for a global 
prohibition regime over digital piracy that included coordination across the European 
Union and other strategic allies, particularly Australia.  In the years since the Operation 
system was launched, Australia’s neighbor across the Tasman Sea, New Zealand, 
embraced the U.S.­led IPR GPR.  New Zealand’s willingness to cooperate with the 
United States is exemplified in the raid that shut down the popular cyber locker site 
MegaUpload.  MegaUpload was a massive cyberlocker website, meaning that the site 
hosted files uploaded by users and allowed other users to search and download its 
directory (Martin & Newhall, 2013, p. 106).  The FBI installed used digital surveillance 
to monitor the communications of MegaUpload operators, including Skype 
correspondence, for five years before the eventual raid (Martin & Newhall, 2013, p. 
149).  A federal court in Virginia, where MegaUpload’s web hosting service was 
located, ordered the seizure of eighteen web addresses associated with MegaUpload 
(Raymond, 2013, pp. 377­378). The investigation into the site culminated with a New 
Zealand police raid, directed by the U.S. DOJ, of MegaUpload founder Kim Dotcom’s 
$24 million mansion.  The raid included police with paramilitary gear, tactical firearms, 
dog units, and a helicopter (Martin & Newhall, 2013, p. 102).  Dotcom was found in a 
safe room and put into a police van, where he was told that he was being arrested for 
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“copyright infringement” (Martin & Newhall, 2013, p. 102).  The actual charges against 
MegaUpload’s operators included copyright infringement, crimes related to aiding and 
abetting copyright infringement, criminal conspiracy, and fraud (Martin & Newhall, 
2013, p. 116).   
Dotcom would later comment to the Financial Times that the raid “used the same 
number of helicopters and a few less people in the Osama bin Laden raid” in order to 
present him as a “criminal mastermind” (Pilling, 2013, sect. 2, para. 4).  The “aiding and 
abetting” charges were pressed under the logic that MegaUpload served to help 
infringers distribute copyrighted media, and the fraud charges stem from MegaUpload 
allegedly lying to copyright owners about removing copyrighted material upon request 
(Martin & Newhall, 2013, p. 116).  Hong Kong Customs froze $39 million in 
MegaUpload, Ltd.’s assets and MegaUpload operators were subsequently arrested in 
Holland and New Zealand (Martin & Newhall, 2013, p. 135).  As an example of the 
European limitations to IP criminal enforcement and the inconsistencies in E.U. member 
state enforcement mechanisms discussed throughout this chapter, one of MegaUpload’s 
founders escaped to his home country of Germany because it does not allow extradition 
to the United States (Martin & Newhall, 2013, p. 135).  Dotcom is still awaiting 
extradition to the United States, though, and was widely accused in New Zealand of 
trying to avoid extradition by having founded a digital rights­based political party called 
“The Internet Party” to help unseat New Zealand’s Prime Minister and gain political 
protection (Wilson, 2014, para. 1).  The party failed to make any parliamentary gains in 
New Zealand’s 2014 elections (Wilson, 2014). 
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The reasoning behind MegaUpload’s criminal investigation and subsequent raid is 
straightforward.  The surveillance required to build evidence against MegaUpload’s 
operators could not be achieved through civil litigation (Martin & Newhall, 2013, p. 
146).  Additionally, extradition can only be achieved through criminal charges, and since 
most file sharing and streaming services are located outside of the United States, 
extradition is deemed necessary by the U.S. government (Martin & Newhall, 2013, p. 
145).  The MegaUpload raid and litigation is problematic in regard to the treatment of 
the non­infringing content uploaded to the website, and the raid did invoke the criticism 
of individuals and activists from a variety of backgrounds.  Many MegaUpload users 
complained that they used the site for storing photos, home videos, original music, 
developing and distributing phone applications, distributing content in the public 
domain, and other legal uses (Brodkin, 2012).  Popular comment and dissent against the 
seizures ranged from Apple co­founder Steve Wozniak comparing the seizure to 
“shut[ing] down the post office” for crimes committed through the mail (Sandoval, 
2012, para. 2) to Anonymous launching DDOS against the U.S. DOJ, FBI, and Universal 
Music, among others (C. Williams, 2012, para. 1).   
Digital rights organization Public Knowledge condemned the MegaUpload seizure 
for causing too much “collateral damage” by seizing many servers that hosted legal, 
non­infringing content (Rangath, 2012, para. 5).  In a legal analysis of copyright related 
seizures, Raymond (2013) identifies the seizure of lawful communications, information, 
and personal creative works as a form of “over capture” that places undue burden on 
individual users (p. 369).  Raymond (2013) argues that a balance between ISPs, content 
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providers, IPR holders, and individual users is central to creating fair and effective 
governance of digital copyrights (p. 383).  Working against Raymond’s 
recommendations, however, is the problem of enclosure and the commodification of 
digital spaces.  The DOJ and FBI’s indiscriminate seizure of MegaUpload’s servers and 
subsequent statements from courts that the U.S. government has no intention of 
returning legal material demonstrates that for the enforcement agencies, the importance 
of MegaUpload as a digital commons for individuals to share legal communications was 
secondary to its ability to facilitate copyright infringement.  The cyberlocker is part of a 
commodified space where property rights govern opportunities and limitations for 
communication.  The problem of over capture as a consequence of commodification and 
enclosure is evident in the seizure of OiNK’s Pink Palace, detailed in the next section, 
which is rooted in U.K. legal and enforcement mechanisms and occurred five years 
before the MegaUpload raids.   
OiNK’s Pink Palace: An Introduction to the Case 
The case of OiNK’s Pink Palace was chosen because it highlights the disparity 
between law enforcement and policymakers and life and culture as experienced online.  
As an invitation­only music­oriented BitTorrent tracker that specialized in high quality 
audio formats and required users to share in order to download, OiNK contained a 
vibrant community of music fanatics, industry insiders, and musicians.  One famous 
user, Trent Reznor of the band Nine Inch Nails, hailed OiNK’s massive music selection, 
quality audio formats, DRM­free files and early releases as being far superior to 
anything he had encountered in retail or legal digital stores like iTunes or Amazon 
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(Westhoff, 2007, para. 3).  When OiNK was shut down by the IFPI, BPI, and Interpol in 
2007, the site’s users and owners were branded as criminals and pirates, news outlets 
were reminded of the toll that file sharing takes on the music industry, and criminal 
charges were pressed against users and administrators (O’Connell, 2007).  In the wake of 
the OiNK raids, copycat websites emerged and criticism of the takedown emerged online 
from former users, digital rights groups, and activists (Jones, 2007).  The case analysis 
of OiNK summarizes the infrastructure and culture of the site, details the takedown and 
the legal actions taken afterward, and evaluates the conflict between file sharers, law 
enforcement, and the music industry.   
As source material, the OiNK case study utilizes journalistic accounts of the case, 
most considerably from profiles in Wired (Phan, 2007) and New York Magazine (Day, 
2007).  I also apply a timeline of the events and aftermath of the raid from a previous 
case study in communication studies on OiNK conducted by Sockanathan (2011).  In 
addition to OiNK, its operators, and its users, the primary stakeholders in the case 
include the IFPI and BPI (as supporting the raid and criminal charges against OiNK 
operators and users), the British police, Interpol, and the Dutch FIOD ECD special task 
force as enforcement agents.  The case demonstrates the spatialization of copyright 
enforcement across the European Union, the difficulty of copyright criminalization, and 
the influence of the recording industry on legal actions against websites.  The case also 
displays the inefficiency of closing down file sharing websites by blocking user access 
and physical seizures; the failure to successfully prosecute OiNK’s stakeholders is 
associated with the U.K. government’s move toward the Digital Economy Act. 
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OiNK’s emergence and closure: The Pink Palace under siege.  OiNK’s Pink 
Palace was launched in 2004 by then­20 year old British programmer Alan Ellis 
(Carraway, 2012, pp. 576­577).  The site relied on the BitTorrent file sharing protocol 
for users to upload and download music, software applications, e­books, and comics 
(Sockanathan, 2011, pp. 18­19).  Movies, games, and pornography were banned from 
OiNK (Phan, 2007, para. 10).  At its peak, OiNK had 180,000 members (Phan, 2007, 
para. 10).  OiNK was a private BitTorrent tracker, meaning that users had to register 
with the site after accepting an invitation (Carraway, 2012, p. 577).  Keeping a tracker 
private is partly done to help sites avoid anti­piracy crackdowns, but also to help 
maintain a high quality of content that is devoid of spamming and computer viruses 
(Andersson, 2014, p. 103).  Invitations to OiNK were heavily sought after in online 
message forums and chatrooms around the web, and selling invites was strictly 
forbidden by administrators (Sockanathan, 2011, pp. 18­19).  Invites could only be given 
out by OiNK users after users accrued a high ratio of materials downloaded to materials 
uploaded (Sockanathan, 2011, p. 19).  OiNK’s entire system of rules and sharing 
practices was based on ratio requirements.  If users did not maintain a high enough ratio, 
they were banned from the site (Phan, 2007, para. 3).  If a user invited someone to OiNK 
and the new member abused the ratio system, both the inviter and the invitee were 
banned (Phan, 2007, para. 3).  Ratio could not be bought or sold with money, and could 
only be accrued through sharing (Phan, 2007, para. 3).  The Pink Palace’s ratio system 
was notoriously particular, and many users were banned for not meeting ratio 
requirements (Phan, 2007, para. 9).  However, the underlying construction of OiNK’s 
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sharing economy was not abnormal for a file sharing site.  Communication research has 
often recognized the sharing economies of file sharing websites and software (Lessig, 
2008; Carraway, 2012; Andersson, 2014), and while OiNK’s requirements were more 
strict than other sites, it was not particularly different from sharing systems researched 
elsewhere.  Lessig (2008), for instance, defined sharing economies as environments 
where “access to culture is regulated not by price, but by a complex set of social 
relations” that are “insulted by the simplicity of price” (p. 145).  Indeed, the social 
relations required to access culture on OiNK were, as described below, bizarrely 
complex. OiNK took donations for server maintenance and rental space, but giving 
money gave donors no special privileges (Phan, 2007, para. 3).  Requesting special 
privileges in return for donations would result in a user being banned (Phan, 2007, para. 
3). 
OiNK’s administrators went to great lengths to keep the site discreet, going so far as 
to remove attempts to create a Wikipedia page and avoiding talking to press (Kravetz, 
2010, para. 3).  Users were required to have “cute” avatars such an image of a stuffed 
animal or pet, and civility was strictly enforced in the site’s message boards and 
chatrooms (Sockanathan, 2011, pp. 336, 340).  The site was reputed for the depth and 
variety of its music selection, and had very strict rules regarding audio quality 
(Sockanathan, 2011, p. 20).  Administrators would not allow any music files to be 
uploaded that were not of a higher quality than those found in Apple’s  iTunes store or 
any other legal music store at the time, and there were strict rules regarding file labeling 
and presentation (Phan, 2007, para. 2).  OiNK’s audio quality standards led one Wired 
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journalist to liken them to a “persnickety record store clerk” (Phan, 2007, para. 2), and 
users were frequently kicked out for violations.  A New York Magazine feature on OiNK 
echoed the sentiments of many users with the statement that OiNK was “the greatest 
record store of all time, filled with not­yet­released albums, obscure live performances, 
the rarest of B­sides, and a fabulous bonus—everything was free” (Day, 2007, p. 1).  
The early releases were largely provided by industry insiders, meaning that journalists, 
studio employees, and musicians were uploading pre­released albums on the Internet and 
linking them directly to OiNK (Day, 2007, p. 2).  Record companies also used OiNK as 
a means to promote albums (Lightfoot, 2010, para. 3).  These users were part of the 
community that made OiNK’s Pink Palace an enormous, meticulously managed digital 
music bibliothèque with an infrastructure and catalog depth that rivaled any legal 
alternative (Sockanathan, 2011, p. 24).  The site was rooted in the users’ propensity for 
sharing, systematizing and classifying files, filling holes in the library, reporting 
violations, and other efforts at infrastructure maintenance (Sockanathan, 2011, p. 35).   
The site was monetarily free, but extremely labor intensive and users had to earn 
continued membership through their own shared work.  OiNK ran on social capital and 
relied on the sharing and reciprocity of its users.  It was a user­driven service that was 
only sustainable because of the demand for an extensive digital music catalog that was 
not being offered by other p2p and retail sites.  Sockanathan (2011), assessing OiNK 
from a cultural perspective, surveyed various OiNK users and found a collection of fans 
and musicians that turned to the invite­only torrent site because they were tired of the 
record industry’s price fixing, iTunes’ relatively poor quality, lack of selection and 
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disrespect for musicians (pp. 35­37).  OiNK’s Pink Palace was an online forum where 
communal labor was used to create a commons for file sharing and communication 
about culture, fandom, and a massive digital library project. 
However, OiNK’s contribution to the digital commons was not highly regarded by 
the rights holders that saw music, software, and literature that they owned openly traded 
amongst 180,000 users.  For media industries, OiNK was, in the words of an IFPI 
official, “central to the illegal distribution of prerelease music online...this was not a case 
of friends sharing music for pleasure. This was a worldwide network that got hold of 
music they did not own the rights to and posted it online” (O’Connell, 2007, para. 3).  
The IFPI’s statement is a condemnation of OiNK’s sharing economy as a criminal 
enterprise whose purpose was to steal cultural commodities.  After a two­year 
investigation by the IFPI and BPI, OiNK’s servers were raided in the Netherlands and 
the site’s founder, Alan Ellis, and six British OiNK users were arrested in the United 
Kingdom (O’Connell, para. 2).  The raid was named Operation Ark Royal and included 
cooperation with British and Dutch police and Interpol (O’Connell, 2007, para. 3).  
Visitors to the site after the raid were greeted with a graphic from the IFPI and BPI 
warning of a criminal investigation into user identities (O’Connell, 2008, para. 3).  Ellis’ 
home, place of employment, and father’s home were all raided by police, along with 
several buildings in Amsterdam over the period of a week (O’Connell, para. 3).  The 
Dutch police unit responsible for the raid was the Fiscal Investigation Unit of the Dutch 
Police, or FIOD ECD (Day, 2007, para. 3).  FIOD ECD is an elite Dutch task force that 
primarily focuses on financing, money laundering, and fraud associated with organized 
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crime and terrorism (International Monetary Fund, 2011, p. 34).  This task force seized 
OiNK’s servers and $300,000 in donations which British police claimed made the site 
“highly lucrative” (O’Connell, para. 3).  From a perspective evaluating prohibition 
regime development, the use of FIOD ECD is significant because it signifies that Dutch 
police were using resources developed for high financial and violent crime to focus on 
enforcing IP prohibitions in cooperation with British enforcement agencies.  The sweeps 
on OiNK’s servers are similar to the Pirate Bay raid by dozens of Swedish police and the 
paramilitary raid of MegaUpload’s Kim Dotcom’s mansion, in that enforcement was 
carried out with large quantities police resources.  The police were also acting at the 
insistence of the IFPI and BPI (O’Connell, 2007, para. 2).  In Chapters I and II, I 
explained the influence of media industries on trade agreements, national laws, the 
USTR, and E.U. directives, and the OiNK case demonstrates how that influence expands 
to police organizations by showing the extent of enforcement used to protect IP from 
distribution within a digital commons.  In Chapter I, I relayed Leman­Langlois’ (2012) 
description of how multinationals and trade groups create a discourse regarding the 
impact of and intent behind piracy, and the discourse is passed on and ingrained into 
police organizations (pp. 4­6).  The phenomena of media industry discourse on copyright 
infringement being passed along to police organizations is evident in that, according to 
Sockanathan (2011), police insisted after the raid that OiNK was a for­profit enterprise, 
in spite of no evidence that the seized donations were being used for anything but site 
maintenance (p. 38).  The accusations of piracy and theft from the IFPI, BPI, and police 
agencies presumes that the possibility of OiNK’s proprietors running a file sharing site 
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for the purpose of non­commodified cultural exchange is preposterous.  A prosecutor 
representing the British government in the case claimed that OiNK was a “cash cow” 
and that it was “common sense” that Alan Ellis was engaging in criminal activity 
(Lightfoot, 2010, para. 9).  The assumption of criminal infringement that the prosecutor 
supported was the undoing of the OiNK prosecutions, as there was not enough evidence 
of criminal wrongdoing for any of the prosecutions to result in convictions (Curtis, 2010, 
sect. 3, para. 1).   
Resolution: OiNK and its piglets. Ellis was charged with conspiracy to defraud the 
music industry and was found not guilty after a ten­day trial in 2010 (Wray, 2010, para. 
1).  The court agreed with Ellis’ defense that he was simply trying to further his skills as 
a programmer through OiNK and never profited directly from donations to the website 
(Wray, 2010, para. 2).  The court also found evidence that IFPI members used OiNK to 
promote their own releases (Lightfoot, 2010, para. 12).  The OiNK users that were 
arrested were cleared of all or most charges, as well, and found to have no link to or 
relationship with Ellis (Cheng, 2010, para. 1).  The users were arrested for uploading 
pre­release music to the site, and one 17 year­old uploader was arrested for sharing three 
albums that he downloaded from other websites (Curtis, 2010, para. 3).  This user’s 
parents’ house was raided and their computers seized (Curtis, para. 2).  The charge 
included “distributing copyrighted material so as to prejudicially affect the copyright 
holder” (Curtis, 2010, para. 3), which was punishable by up to ten years imprisonment.  
The teenager’s case was dismissed after the IFPI failed to provide evidence that the 
music was even copyrighted (Curtis, 2010, para. 3).  The user’s lawyer complained that 
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the case should have been civil and not criminal and that the IFPI was setting out to 
make an example out of file sharers (Curtis, para. 1).  The lawyer also accused the 
Crown Prosecution Service of acting as a proxy for the IFPI and BPI (Curtis, 2010, para. 
4).  The other OiNK uploaders were all sentenced to 50 to 180 hours of community 
service or given a £500 ($800) fine (Breihan, 2010, para. 2).   
The music industry bemoaned the failure of the prosecutions.  The Guardian, in an 
article dubbing OiNK the “British Pirate Bay,” quoted a BPI representative as saying the 
verdict was “hugely disappointing” (Wray, 2010, para. 5).  The representative pointed to 
the allegation that over 20 million files were shared on OiNK, the claim that copyright 
infringement was costing thousands of British jobs, and the estimated £414 ($700) 
million that file sharing cost the U.K. music industry in 2006 alone (Wray, para. 7).  The 
IFPI and BPI also used the failure to prosecute the OiNK arrestees as evidence that 
copyright law in the United Kingdom needed to be strengthened (Wray, para. 7).   
While media industries perceived OiNK as a disruption in the accumulation of 
capital and responded with the legal and police force of the state, users of the Pink 
Palace likewise responded with counterarguments and protests on blogs and social 
media.  Two memorial blogs were set up for OiNK’s supporters and former users and 
were used to raise funds for Ellis’ legal defense (Sockanathan, 2011, p. 34).  These blogs 
also hosted a large volume of fan created art in support of OiNK and were home to 
dozens of articles defending OiNK and waxing nostalgic about its past (Sockanathan, p. 
34).  TorrentFreak, a popular pro­file sharing and digital privacy site, reported that The 
Pirate Bay was to launch a replacement for OiNK called “BOiNK” (van der Sar, 2007).  
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The Pirate Bay soon canceled its plans when two other OiNK replacements, What.cd and 
Waffles.fm, were launched as nearly identical substitutes for OiNK (Jones, 2007).  
These “piglets” were born just days after OiNK was shut down and nearly two and a half 
years before the OiNK case was resolved.  Both sites were still up and running at the 
time of this writing.  The launch of Waffles.fm and What.cd are indicative of what the 
BitTorrent news blog TorrentFreak refers to as the media industry’s “hydra” problem of 
growth and replication (Jones, para. 3), and what commentary on other technology sites 
like Ars Technica refer to as part of a futile game of “whac­a­mole” (Anderson, 2007).  
Sockanathan’s (2011) analysis of OiNK argues that it is the organizational infrastructure 
of OiNK’s users and curators, not the site itself or its programmers, that are disruptive to 
media industries (p. 35).  These users appreciate the potential of organizing and sharing 
media online and bypass laws that forbid such activity.  Andersson (2014) warns 
researchers not to look too deeply into private trackers similar to OiNK as unified 
communities or activist collectives (p. 77).  Rather, the users utilize the trackers and 
obey the rules because it offers them access to media that they could otherwise not 
access due to price, availability, or the quality of marketed versions (Andersson, 2014, 
pp. 76­77, 103).  Andersson (2014) found that users are content to utilize file sharing 
sites until legal alternatives arise that can match the depth of content available in the 
private trackers (p. 76).  Andersson’s (2014) research specifically notes how Spotify, the 
advertising and subscription­supported streaming music service, is an example of a 
practical alternative to file sharing that could stem illegal activity (p. 45).  However, no 
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such legal alternative exists that can accommodate the users of private trackers’ desire 
for high­quality, meticulously catalogued audio collections.   
The normalization of file sharing among users is problematic for IP prohibitions 
because, as Andreas and Nadelmann (2006) argued, prohibitions for activities that are 
supported by strong social norms are unlikely to meaningfully reduce an activity (p. 22).  
The rush to establish copycat sites immediately after the international efforts to shut 
down OiNK demonstrate a potential weakness of using law enforcement to eliminate file 
sharing sites, and the failure to successfully prosecute any of the parties involved shows 
the limitations on the recording industry’s ability in the United Kingdom to criminalize 
file sharing.  In the months after OiNK, the United Kingdom did attempt to increase its 
IP prohibitions through the Digital Economy Act, which would criminalize file sharing 
(Giblin, 2014, p. 166).  The Act was passed in 2010, but as I discussed earlier in this 
chapter, the DEA was never fully implemented.  The inability of the United Kingdom to 
implement IPRED through its Digital Economy Act also hints at the political economic 
limitations of E.U. member states to implement IP prohibition mechanisms.  However, 
the transnational coordination of police organizations in shutting down the physical 
means for operating an individual website was demonstrated fully through the British 
and Dutch raids on OiNK and affiliated parties.  OiNK’s Pink Palace served as an arc in 
the cycle of contention existing between IP prohibitions and file sharers.  Additionally, 
the United Kingdom did establish a permanent IP task force in 2012—the Police 
Intellectual Property Crime Unit—that has cracked down on numerous websites 
allegedly hosting copyrighted materials (Solon, 2013, para. 1).  The crackdown by the 
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British task force is called Operation Creative and has conducted numerous website 
seizures and physical raids to enforce copyright prohibitions (Solon, 2013).  While IP 
legislation appears to have stalled in the United Kingdom, copyright police have taken a 
more active role as stakeholders in intellectual property governance.  For the United 
Kingdom, then, addressing the governance of IP enforcement through the concept of a 
prohibition regime is especially useful, as digital copyright enforcement is currently 
based on the creation of new police agencies rather than the enactment of new 
information policy. 
The next case, regarding Spain’s Ley Sinde law, also illustrates the escalation of 
digital copyright prohibitions and democratic and legitimacy issues that appear during 
battles over media production and distribution.  Where the case of OiNK focused on 
police and prosecutorial actions against file sharers and the political economic conflict 
between peer­to­peer web communities and the music industry, the Spanish case is a 
case of information policy laundering and implementation that directly addresses 
problems of Europeanization, harmonization, and activism in efforts to expand the IPR 
GPR through the European Union.  
The Ley Sinde and the Digital Copyright Struggle in Spain 
The Ley Sinde case traces the digital copyright prohibitions, court cases, and activist 
reaction that occurred in the lead­up and aftermath of the Spanish law from 2007 to 
2014.  Previous communication research on this case was conducted by Sarikakis 
(2014), who framed Ley Sinde in terms of the problem of policy laundering.  Ley Sinde, 
or the Sinde Law, was discreetly and hastily added to a larger economic reform bill, thus 
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creating widespread concern over the democratic legitimacy of the law (Sarikakis, 2014, 
para. 2).  The case was also studied by Horten (2011) in a larger historical critique of 
digital copyright law.  I refer to Horten’s timeline of the case throughout the study.  I 
primarily focus on the larger issue of digital copyright prohibition emergence in Spain, 
but also emphasize the case of the RojaDirecta, a Spanish sports streaming website and 
BitTorrent tracker.   
RojaDirecta is important to this research because it demonstrates the difficulty of 
enforcing international copyright through purely civil measures.  RojaDirecta’s web 
domains were seized through the U.S. DOJ and Homeland Security’s Operation 
InOurSites, and the civil case that followed was questioned in much activist commentary 
that regarded InOurSites as an overreach of U.S. power (Anderson, 2012).  RojaDirecta 
is also relevant because it addresses a type of digital copyright infringement—
streaming—that is technologically different than the forms of file sharing I have 
previously addressed in this chapter.  Streaming involves the live broadcasting of a 
television event (Mellis, 2008, p. 264).  A streaming site’s servers, owners, and users are 
typically highly dispersed internationally, and media streams are often sourced from 
Russia and China, where copyright litigation is difficult (Mellis, 2008, p. 265).  The 
challenges in prosecuting the Spanish streaming site provide evidence of legal 
difficulties that temper the spatialization of international copyright enforcement. 
The Ley Sinde case follows how the EC, United States, and media industries pressure 
states into adopting global copyright standards and the resistance that organizes against 
this adoption.  I chose the Spanish case because it typifies the escalation of copyright 
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laws that occurred throughout the European Union in this period of time.  It also 
illustrates the challenges of Europeanizing copyright norms across divergent European 
cultures, in particular the difficulty of instituting copyright prohibitions in a nation where 
norms strongly conflict with proposed legislation.  I begin with a brief background of the 
Spanish government and the political, economic, and social crisis in Spain during the 
time of the case. 
A background of Spanish digital copyright laws and contestations.  At a time 
when the European Commission was promoting IPRED2, and torrent sites like The 
Pirate Bay and OiNK were being shut down by international coalitions of police across 
Europe, the practice of file sharing was still relatively protected in Spain.  While Spain 
was an early signatory of IPRED and in good standing with other IP­related E.U. 
directives and international treaties, the legal measures that it instituted to protect rights 
holders tended to only follow the minimum requirements of its obligations to the 
European Union and international community (Sarakakis, 2014, sect. 4, para. 2).  
Additionally, the Attorney General of Spain released an official statement in 2006 to 
judges, law enforcement, and prosecutors that file sharing was only illegal if it was 
committed with a profit motive and to the direct detriment of a third party (Horten, 2011, 
p. 151).  This statement from the Attorney General’s office had no legal authority, but 
was released in the wake of several Spanish court decisions regarding file sharing and 
was widely interpreted by the courts as a government endorsement for the legality of file 
sharing (IIPA, 2011).  Users engaging in peer­to­peer downloading were widely 
considered by Spanish courts to be making private copies as opposed to stealing for 
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profit; additionally, the Attorney General’s statement considered file sharing to be 
strictly a matter of civil jurisdiction and stated that criminal prosecutions for file sharing 
would be overstepping Spain’s “minimum intervention” standards for law enforcement 
(Horten, 2011, p. 152).  For example, in the immediate aftermath of the Attorney 
General’s statement, a criminal case filed by Columbia TriStar Home Video, the Spanish 
music industry trade group Promusicae had its criminal case against the file sharing site 
Sharemula.com dismissed (Peguera, 2010, para. 72).  Sharemula operated similarly to 
BitTorrent sites like The Pirate Bay and OiNK in that it was a website offering a 
decentralized index of files for users, but the actual files were hosted on p2p networks.  
The judge ruled that Sharemula merely acted as an intermediary and was not guilty of a 
“non­authorized act of communication” by posting an index to files (Peguera, 2010, 
para. 73).  The judge further stated that Sharemula.com’s profits came from 
advertisements, not from download fees or subscription, so the website was not actually 
profiting from file sharing (Peguera, 2010, para. 74).  With no claim to commercial 
infringement, the criminal cases against file sharing sites could not go forward in Spain. 
Over thirty cases similar to Sharemula.com were dismissed in Spain between 2007 and 
2008, which included every criminal file sharing case except for two in which the 
defendants plead guilty (Peguera, 2010, para. 73­74).  The judicial interpretations of 
Spain’s copyright law in Sharemula and other criminal copyright cases acted as a buffer 
against the commodification of the digital commons by protecting online spaces for 
sharing information.  The Spanish cases are in stark contrast to the United States’ 
Grokster ruling and the precedent of “inducement to infringe,” in that the Spanish cases 
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considered the indexes to be neutral and not an incentive for theft (Hancock, 2006, p. 
199).   
Another significant feature of digital copyright law in Spain was 1987’s Tax for 
Private Copy—later known as the Digital Canon—which levied a tax on CDs, blank 
tapes, digital music devices, and other material goods used for copyright copyrighted 
materials that was then redistributed to IPR holders (Sarikakis & Rodriguez­Amat, 2014, 
sect. 4, para. 7).  The Digital Canon provided compensation for IP holders when their 
work was downloaded (Horten, 2011, p. 156).  Spain had a rich history of levying 
special taxes on material goods used for copying, which led to a powerful system of 
consumer advocacy groups that resisted laws against digital downloading and streaming 
(Horten, 2011, pp. 156­157).  Combined with the Attorney General’s statements on file 
sharing, the Digital Canon gave digital rights groups in Spain a strong standing on in 
regard to resisting regulation on digital copying.  Trade groups representing the IP 
industries, however, viewed Spanish copyright law as disastrous (Horten, 2011, p. 158).  
For instance, the IFPI criticized Spain’s Internet piracy problem in its 2010 Digital 
Piracy Report, claiming that the “victims” of Spain’s lax copyright laws were “local 
acts” (IFPI, 2010, p. 6).  The IFPI claimed that Spain’s “state­sponsored apathy” toward 
piracy has lead to the near­death of Spanish music industry, and cites a drop in sales of 
local music in Spain (IFPI, 2010, p. 19).  Similarly, the IIPA, in its 2008 Special 301 
recommendations to the USTR, claimed that 1.1 billion illegal music downloads 
occurred in Spain in 2007 (IIPA, 2008, p. 3).  The IIPA further claimed that 240 million 
illegal film downloads occurred in 2007, and that music sales in Spain fell nearly 59% 
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from $807 million to $331 million between 2001 to 2007 (IIPA, 2009, p. 303.)  The 
Entertainment Software Association’s contribution to the IIPA’s report noted that 50 
million video games were illegally downloaded (IIPA, 2009, p. 350).  The BSA claimed 
that software downloads were negligible in the context of Western Europe, but was 
concerned about street piracy (IIPA, 2009, p. 350).  The street piracy problem in Spain 
was also of concern to the IIPA, but it considered police cooperation among the 
entertainment industry and the Spanish police to be positive, with 4,636 people arrested 
in 2007 for selling illegal compact discs (IIPA, 2008, p. 51).  In contrast, only one 
online­related raid was reported, which regarded police action against a warez ring 
(IIPA, 2008, p. 51).  The IIPA also lamented the difficulty of IPR prosecutions in Spain, 
and accused Spain of not fully implementing various E.U. directives (IIPA, 2009, p. 
160); the IIPA claimed that Spain was lacking in its implementation of the Copyright 
Directive because it failed to clarify its laws against circumvention devices (IIPA, 2008, 
p. 349).   
The IIPA also accused Spain of being in violation of the IP Enforcement Directive 
because it did not fully adhere to the so­called right of information, discussed earlier in 
the IPRED analysis, which allows rights holders to identify copyright infringers by 
obtaining information about infringements (IIPA, 2008, p. 352).  In Spanish law, only 
criminal violations—those of a commercial scale—are included in the right of 
information  (IIPA, 2008, p. 352).  Criminal charges were necessary for legal access to 
the broadband data of Spanish Internet users.  Civil cases against file sharing in Spain 
were then difficult to prosecute, then, because specific information involving the accused 
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infringer’s online activities were not allowed in the court (Horten, 2011, p. 152).  The 
IIPA expressed its frustration with the difficulty of prosecuting for infringement in Spain 
by noting that the “fundamental principle” of the right of information is that only ISPs, 
not individual users, should be held to a commercial scale standard (IIPA, 2008, p. 352).  
However, the right of information as written in the IPRED is more ambiguous than the 
IIPA claims.  The text of IPRED states that after a “a justified and proportionate request” 
by the IP holder, judicial authorities may order that information about the origin and 
distribution of allegedly infringing material “be provided by the infringer and/or any 
other person” who was involved in infringement on a commercial scale (European 
Commission, 2004, sect. 5).  The IIPA believed the phrase “and/or any other person” 
meant that the copyright infringer, in addition to any affiliated person infringing on a 
commercial scale, be the subject of a court order.  In contrast, Spanish lawmakers 
interpreted the right of information to mean that the alleged copyright thief was only 
criminally liable when also infringing on a commercial scale.  In practice, the difference 
in Spain and the IIPA’s interpretation of the right of information means that Spanish 
courts could hold a website criminally liable for copyright infringement if the site hosted 
copyrighted material, but the user of that website was not subject to the right of 
information unless the user was profiting from downloads.  The difference in 
interpretation led to fundamental disagreements on how the right to information 
functioned in Spain.  
The demands of rights holders that Spain needed to create laws to force ISPs to hand 
over the identity and usage records of customers also suffered a defeat at the E.U. level 
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in a case that was referred from Spain: The recording industry failed to convince the 
European Court of Justice of the argument that Spain was not upholding E.U. directives 
in the 2008 case of Promusicae v. Telefónica. In the Telefónica case, the European Court 
of Justice settled a suit between Spain’s largest music trade group and its largest ISP 
over demands from Promusicae that Telefónica release the information of users of the 
internationally popular file sharing site Kazaa (Coudert & Welkers, 2008, p. 51).  The 
ECJ determined that neither the Information Society Directive nor the E­Commerce 
Directive mandated that member states are obliged to create laws that force ISPs to 
disclose identifying information about users of peer­to­peer networks in civil cases 
(Leistner, 2009, pp. 870­871).  The ECJ instead determined that it was the responsibility 
of member states to determine how to balance the European Union’s privacy and data 
protection standards with obligations to protect private property online (Leistner, 2008, 
p. 870).  The decision then put the impetus on IPR trade groups to lobby member state 
governments directly in order to change IP law to the benefit of the recording industry.  
For Promusicae and the Spanish recording industry, the decision was exceptionally 
problematic because it dealt directly with the Spanish government’s unwillingness to 
force Telefónica to collect and distribute user data.   
The IIPA accused Spain of being in violation of other aspects of the E­Commerce 
Directive besides alleged infringer identification.  The group also accused Spain of not 
implementing the notice­and­takedown procedures required by the directive (IIPA, 2008, 
p. 352).  As discussed in Chapter II’s section on the E­Commerce Directive and its 
similarities to the DMCA, notice­and­takedown procedures allow a rights holder to alert 
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an ISP or website that infringing content is being made available, and the ISP or website 
is then required to take down the material.  The complaint of Spain’s slack 
implementation of notice­and­takedown was that, due to pressure from ISPs and digital 
rights groups during Spain’s adoption of the E­Commerce Directive, only the courts 
were allowed to process complaints about copyright infringement (IIPA, 2008, p. 352).  
The judicial review—that is, approval from a judge before taking down material—
required by Spain’s notice­and­takedown guidelines was based on constitutional 
safeguards surrounding information and speech (IIPA, 2008, p. 352).  The IIPA 
considered Spain’s implementation of the Directive to be too lax, and wanted fewer 
burdens on rights holders to get infringing materials removed. 
The solutions offered by the IIPA for digital piracy in Spain were for the government 
to be more “transparent and cooperative” with copyright industry groups and to 
implement graduated response laws (IIPA, 2008, p. 352).  The recommendations would 
be adopted by the USTR in its Special 301 Report’s section on Spain.  Additionally, 
Spanish peer­to­peer sites were also targeted by the United States in its international 
anti­piracy enforcement operations.  The police action taken against the Spanish 
streaming site RojaDirecta and the subsequent civil case against the site reveals the 
process of information policy’s spatialization and the challenges of enforcing global 
prohibitions.   
The legal struggles surrounding the streaming and peer­to­peer sports site 
RojaDirecta as part of the larger Operation InOurSites gives perspective as to how the IP 
industry and the U.S. government worked around Spanish copyright law.   
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RojaDirecta and Operation InOurSites: Seizing the Red Directory.  The 
RojaDirecta is a sporting event streaming directory and BitTorrent site based in Spain.  
The site allows individuals to post links to live streams of sporting events for users to 
search for and access.  Much of the sporting content is not under copyright, but the site 
does link to live pay­per­views and sporting events owned by sports organizations 
around the globe.  These organizations typically have contracts with major television 
networks and cable and satellite companies to host their content.  The National Football 
League’s television contracts were worth $27 billion in 2013 (Badenhausen, 2013), for 
instance, and the league also had a deal with a satellite provider for another billion 
dollars in the same year (Glover & Baker, 2013).  According to a 2007 European 
Commission report on sports, sport encompasses 3.2% of the European Union’s GDP 
and 15% of its labor force (Sports Rights Owners Coalition, 2007, para. 2).  For sporting 
leagues and broadcasters, illegal streams are viewed as a direct threat to broadcast 
revenue models (Mellis, 2008, p. 261). 
One Spanish sports television rights holder, Audiovisual Sports, sued RojaDirecta in 
2007 for copyright violations (McSherry, 2011).  Echoing the sentiments of the Spanish 
Attorney General that I described in the previous section, the judge in the case dismissed 
the suit because RojaDirecta did not actually host the files or streams of the sporting 
events in question (McSherry, 2011).  RojaDirecta was, in effect, only an intermediary 
and not responsible for any infringement in question.  The RojaDirecta suit was 
dismissed after the Sharemula.com precedent protecting intermediary websites from 
liability for copyright infringing linked material (Horten, 2011, p. 152).  The Spanish 
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legal system’s unwillingness to prosecute intermediaries led to frustration in the United 
States, which targeted Spanish websites in an international police operation. 
Operation InOurSites was conducted by the U.S. government to shut down multiple 
sports p2p and streaming sites with no judicial review (Sellars, 2011).  The operation 
was conducted in three phases, the largest of which was conducted to reduce streaming 
services in advance of the National Football League’s 2011 Super Bowl (Sellars, 2011, 
p. 12).  The third phase of the operation included the confiscation of two of 
RojaDirecta’s domain names, http://rojadirecta.com and http://rojadirecta.net.  Visitors 
to these domains after the raid were greeted with a web page adorned with the bronze, 
bald eagle­adorned insignia of the U.S. DOJ, U.S. Customs, and the Department of 
Homeland Security (Sellars, 2011, p. 13).  The web pages also included a message that 
Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement unit seized the site 
pursuant to a warrant issued by a U.S. federal court; the seizure banner also warned that 
“willful copyright infringement is a federal crime” that can result in five years in prison 
and several hundred thousand dollars in fines (Sellars, 2011, p. 13).  In an affidavit that 
led to the warrants to seize the sites, a federal agent argued that seizures were the most 
effective way to prevent the sites from being used for illegal activity (Sellars, 2011).  
Criticism of the legality, effectiveness and ethics of the raid appeared on various 
technology blogs online (Sellars, 2011).  Criticism also came from NGOs including the 
digital rights group Public Knowledge, which argued that the raid represented the 
“constant expansion of copyright enforcement laws” that has created “a system where 
website owners are effectively treated as guilty until proven innocent” (Anderson, 2012, 
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para. 11).  The Electronic Frontier Foundation condemned the seizures for being an 
unconstitutional, ineffective overreach of copyright enforcement that was a waste of the 
Department of Homeland Security’s resources (McSherry, 2010).  The EFF also pointed 
to multiple seized websites that neither hosted nor linked to any infringing content 
(McSherry, 2010, para. 2). The lack of judicial review in the operation led to, the EFF 
argued, a reckless approach to law enforcement that was comfortable with the collateral 
damage of taking down several legal websites in order to shut down infringing services 
(McSherry, 2010).   
In a legal analysis of the seizures, Sellars (2011) identified three primary criticisms 
of the raids, including free speech issues, copyright overreach, and the impracticality of 
prosecution.  The free speech critique is that the non­infringing speech found on 
RojaDirecta and other seized sites, chat rooms, discussion boards, and blogs unrelated to 
infringement were entirely removed (Sellars, 2011, p. 11).  The other problem from a 
legal free speech standpoint is that the lack of judicial review potentially violated U.S. 
First Amendment guidelines toward prior restraint, which is considered a form of 
censorship on speech that has not yet taken place or been adjudicated upon (Sellars, 
2011, p. 20).  Enforcement agencies may view copyright infringement as a strictly 
commercial enterprise not subject to speech protections, but Sellars (2011) counters that 
speech protections for copyright infringements are increasingly common in U.S. courts 
(p. 22).  As discussed earlier, the Spanish courts already considered the actions of the 
RojaDirecta to be a protected form of communication.  The dispute of whether or not a 
website that indexes links to potentially infringing material is afforded free speech 
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protections or is considered to be engaging in commercial activity can be identified as 
part of the larger tensions in the formation of information policy.  In Chapter I, I 
discussed Braman’s (2004) conceptualization of information policy as a commodity or 
as a cultural force, and of information as a private or public resource (pp. 35, 37).  In the 
seizures of Operation InOurSites, U.S. enforcement stakeholders were approaching 
information in the form of websites as private commercial entities in violation of IPR.  
The Spanish courts, by contrast, viewed these websites as public spaces for depositing 
information.  
Sellars (2011) also pointed to the practical technological problems of the seizures (p. 
27).  InOurSites only seized individual domains, so the owners of the websites were able 
to relocate to different domains (Sellars, 2011, p. 27).  For instance, RojaDirecta 
relocated from its .com and .net domains to a Montenegrin address 
(http://RojaDirecta.me), thus giving users an easy route to bypass the seizure (Anderson, 
2011).  After tech blogs reported on InOurSites and revealed the new domain names of 
seized sites, many saw a notable uptick in traffic (Sellars, 2011, p. 24).  In terms of 
copyright overreach, Sellars (2011) notes that many of the sites, by not themselves 
hosting copyrighted content or encouraging copyright infringement and cooperating with 
the United States’ Digital Millennium Copyright Act, were not in violation of copyrights 
(pp. 25­26).  RojaDirecta’s parent company, Puerto 80, was one of many site owners 
seized by InOurSites to challenge the seizure in court and allege prior restraint against 
the U.S. government.  In an amicus brief in defense of Puerto 80, the EFF, Public 
Knowledge, and the Center for Democracy and Technology (2011) argued that the 
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Spanish court’s decision in favor of RojaDirecta.com should have prevented the United 
States from seizing the domain (p. 14).  The digital rights groups claimed that 
RojaDirecta should have been protected from the seizures because while foreign 
decisions are not binding to the U.S. judiciary, there are “exceptionally high standards” 
for ignoring foreign judgments that were neither met nor applied in the Puerto 80 case 
(Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U. v. United States of America, Department of Homeland 
Security and Immigration and Customs, 2011b, p. 14).  Generally, bypassing foreign 
judgments in the United States requires evidence that the foreign court is not in a 
competent jurisdiction and that “the laws and public policy of the forum state and the 
rights of its residents will not be violated” (Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U. v. United States of 
America, Department of Homeland Security and Immigration and Customs, 2011b, p. 
13).  Whether or not a U.S. court would have decided the case differently than the 
foreign court is considered irrelevant (Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U. v. United States of 
America, Department of Homeland Security and Immigration and Customs, 2011b, p. 
13).  The argument that the U.S. government did not have the authority to seize the 
website was rejected by enforcement agencies both in the courts and in public.  A DOJ 
lawyer in support of the raids stated in an interview that “[t]he fact that a country doesn’t 
protect intellectual property is no excuse to just give them free reign to do whatever they 
want” (Anderson, 2011b, para. 7).   
In 2012, the U.S. government, after defeat in a case in which a federal court ruled 
that webmasters are not responsible for copyrighted videos embedded by others on their 
sites, gave up the courtroom battle against Puerto 80 and sent a letter to a New York 
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federal court requesting that the RojaDirecta case be dismissed (Singel, 2011).  
RojaDirecta was one of several sites that were returned by the United States in response 
to litigation against Operation InOurSites, but many others never protested the seizures 
and thus were never restored (Singel, 2011).  The U.S. DOJ considered the operation 
successful, and noted that 81 of the seized sites shut down with no objections (Anderson, 
2012, para. 9).  Public Knowledge, as part of its criticism of the InOurSites seizures, 
noted that the U.S. government was not responsible for any financial harms incurred by 
RojaDirecta and other returned domains (Anderson, 2012, para. 7).  Public Knowledge 
further complained that no barriers existed to the U.S. government’s ability to seize 
websites and that in copyright cases, infringers are “guilty until proven innocent” and 
that the federal government has no incentive to cease raids (Anderson, 2012, para. 7).   
Outside of its borders, too, the U.S. government was still working with the IP 
industries and the European Union to change copyright laws in Spain.  Many of the 
changes encouraged were designed specifically to make it easier to eliminate sites like 
RojaDirecta and Sharemula.com by making linking sites criminal and quickly removing 
them from the web.  In the next section, I describe those lobbying efforts through a 
secondary analysis of the development of Spanish laws and popular protest toward the 
proposed revisions to the Spanish copyright system.  I begin with a description of 
economic and political realities in Spain leading up to copyright reform. 
Spanish leadership in a time of crisis.  The Socialist Worker’s Party’s José  Luis 
Rodríguez Zapatero became prime minister of Spain in an upset victory over the center­
right Popular Party days after the March 11, 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid (Chari, 
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2004, p. 955).  Zapatero’s campaign was based on increasing housing and removing 
Spanish troops from Iraq (Chari, 2004, p. 955).  His party remained popular until the 
2008 global financial crisis created mass unemployment in Spain (Godina & Molina, 
2011, p. 6).  Youth unemployment in Spain reached a staggering 41% in Spain in 2010 
(Gerbaudo, 2012, p. 78) and reached 51.5% by 2012 (“Eurozone crisis explained,” 
2012).  Spain’s overall unemployment was the highest in the European Union at 24.3%, 
with one in four Spaniards at risk for poverty (“Eurozone crisis explained,” 2012).  
Unlike elsewhere in the European Union and in the United States, Spain’s financial 
sector was not immediately affected by the crash, and so Zapatero denied that there was 
an economic problem in Spain despite the collapse of its labor market (Gordino, & 
Molina, 2011, p. 6).  The denial eroded Zapatero’s popularity, which waned further in 
2010 after the government began cutting social services due to pressure from the 
European Union and European financial institutions to adopt austerity policies (Martín & 
Urquizo­Sancho, 2012, p. 351).  Zapatero was widely regarded by critics as a puppet for 
Brussels and too eager to succumb to European Union pressures to implement the 
reduction of labor rights and cuts in public spending in order to secure bailouts for 
Spain’s banks (Gerbaudo, 2012, p. 78).  The financial collapse and the onset of policy 
reform caused unrest across Spain in the form of trade union protests and a growing 
student­led youth activist movement that culminated in 2011 (Martín & Urquizo­Sancho, 
2012, p. 351).  The next section describes the lead­up to the mass protests and eventual 
ouster of the Zapatero’s Socialist party, with Ley Sinde and issues related to copyright 
reform at the forefront of the analysis.  I describe how a prodigious free culture scene, 
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the unpopularity of the Spanish government, and economic and political frustration in 
Spain and perceptions of democratic deficits created a perfect storm for protest when the 
government tried to ratchet up its copyright laws.  I begin by continuing the earlier 
discussion of U.S. and IP industry pressures on Spain to strengthen its copyright 
standards.  
Ley Sinde, WikiLeaks, and the birth of a movement.  The United States worked to 
further the IIPA’s recommendations for copyright reform in Spain by lobbying at the 
national and local levels of government.  Between 2004 and 2010, U.S. officials visited 
the Spanish ministries of culture and industry to advise the copyright revisions suggested 
by the MPAA, including renouncing the Spanish Attorney General’s official statement 
on digital copyrights and creating a graduated response system (Horten, 2011, p. 162).  
The bilateral discussions also included pushes from the United States for Spain to revise 
privacy and E­commerce laws to make it easier for websites to be taken offline and site 
owners to be prosecuted for copyright infringement (Horten, 2011, p. 162).  The United 
States insisted that copyright infringement have more “personal consequences” including 
arrests and Internet service bans (Horten, 2011, pp. 162­163).  At the local level, the 
U.S. Embassy held frequent meetings with Spanish officials and conducted “educational 
initiatives” about best practices in digital copyright policy (Horten, 2011, p. 162).  
Horten (2011), in an analysis of U.S. lobbying in Spain, describes these luncheons as 
involving U.S. officials informing rights holders and telecom representatives that the 
United States was working in their interests to stop copyright infringement and that 
greater cooperation between the two nations was needed to stop infringement (p. 162).   
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Frustrated with the slow pace of bilateral discussions, in 2008 the United States 
decided to increase pressure by putting Spain on the Special 301 list (USTR, 2008, p. 
42).  As discussed earlier in this chapter and in Chapter I, the Special 301 is the United 
States’ mechanism for pressuring nations to adopt recommendations for IP reform.  The 
list is heavily influenced by recommendations from the IIPA, and the USTR’s 301 
complaints against Spain in 2008 include the IIPA’s 2008 grievances against the 
Attorney General’s defense of intermediary websites and the lack of requirements for 
ISPs to provide user identity and online activity to aid civil prosecutions.  The USTR 
also accused Spain of having the worst Internet copyright infringement problem in 
Europe (USTR, 2008, p. 43), and later editions of the report would attack the Spanish 
Attorney General’s comments on digital copyright violations and expressed concern that 
Spain would be too slow in prosecuting infringers (USTR, 2011, p. 40).  The USTR’s 
2011 Special 301 lamented Spain’s lack of criminal enforcement procedures, and 
expressed a desire to continue working with Spain on the implementation of enhanced 
police efforts to tackle IPR infringement (USTR, 2011, p. 43).  The new police efforts 
were to include new branches of the Ministry of Interior, Civil Guard, and National 
Police to administer “Internet piracy enforcement” (IIPA, 2011, pp. 2­3). 
In response to the initial 2008 Special 301 listing, Spain formed a bilateral 
commission with the United States to discuss and monitor its progress in changing its 
copyright policy (Horten, 2011, p. 165).  In the commission talks, Spanish officials 
explained that they were worried about implementing graduated response because the 
ruling Zapatero government was too weak to handle the backlash from citizens’ 
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advocacy groups and digital rights organizations (Horten, 2011, p. 166).  The United 
States called on Spain to implement a more active approach to copyright reform in spite 
of these protests, and so the Spanish government called for talks between the 
telecommunications and content industries to draft policies to combat Internet piracy 
(Horten, 2011, p. 167).  A 2009 diplomatic cable leaked by WikiLeaks in 2011 describes 
how the negotiations between the telecoms and rights holders fell apart.  In a section 
titled “Moving Towards a Graduated Response System,” the cable confirms that the 
Spanish government was handing off its piracy policing to the private sector because it 
was worried about crafting a graduated response system of its own (“Internet Piracy in 
Spain: Suspension Of Private­Sector Negotiations,” 2009).  The two groups in charge of 
drafting policy were RedTel and the Coalition of Creators and Content Industries, made 
up of a prominent Spanish copyright licensing agency, the recorded music association 
Promusicae, and the MPAA­backed Federation for the Protection of Intellectual 
Property, which represents Spanish film and entertainment software interests (“Internet 
Piracy in Spain,” 2011, para. 3).  According to the leaked cables, the two sides were 
incapable of reaching an agreement.  RedTel wanted rights holders to make copyrighted 
material available online so that the ISPs could include the material with their own 
services, but the Coalition refused this offer, in large part because the MPAA was 
worried about anti­trust issues in the United States if they offered content exclusively to 
Spanish ISPs (“Internet Piracy in Spain,” 2011, para. 4).  The Coalition, in turn, was 
pushing for a graduated response system that RedTel was hesitant to endorse.  RedTel 
agreed with the Coalition to request that the government amend its E­commerce laws to 
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implement a graduated response regime and to remove obstacles hindering rights holders 
from successful civil procedures against “internet pirates” (“Internet Piracy in Spain,” 
2011, para. 4).  In its final draft of policy recommendations, though, RedTel turned away 
from all of the Coalition’s requests and insisted that while the ISPs would send warning 
letters to people accused of infringing, no individual’s service would be disconnected 
(“Internet Piracy in Spain,” para. 4).  As such, the negotiations fell apart and the Spanish 
government was forced to approach the problem of copyright reform without mutual 
agreement from the IP and telecommunication sectors.  The Ministry of Culture was 
hopeful that upcoming European Parliament elections and graduated response laws in 
France would persuade RedTel to alter its stance in support of Internet disconnections 
(“Internet Piracy in Spain,” para. 10).   
Soon after the Coalition/RedTel negotiations fell apart, the new minister of culture, 
Ángeles González­Sinde, was appointed, leading to the hardening of Spain’s stance on 
copyright reform (Horten, 2011, p. 167).  González­Sinde’s appointment was considered 
a victory by the United States for its unilateral pressures (Horten, 2011, p. 168).  One of 
the leaked diplomatic cables praised González­Sinde’s appearance at a major Spanish 
movie awards ceremony in which she pronounced that while “times are tough 
everywhere,” the Spanish movie industry was in a particularly extreme crisis and 
copyright reform was needed to save the film trade (“Madrid Economic Weekly, April 
6­17,” 2009, para. 1).  Leaked cables also revealed González­Sinde’s eagerness to work 
with the U.S. government for copyright reform, and the authors of the cables encouraged 
the U.S. government to leverage her influence, stating:  
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It is in our interest to support her efforts, and post recommends that we do so 
through arranging visits, meetings, and/or video conferences with experts in the 
coming months. Her receptivity also gives us an opportunity during Spain’s E.U. 
presidency to influence developments beyond Spain. (“New Culture Minister on 
Fight Against Internet Piracy,” 2009, para. 5) 
In the same document that calls on the United States to work with González­Sinde, 
the U.S. government also dismisses the opposition as “pro­piracy,” including the 
Spanish digital rights group Association of Internet Users, or Internautas (“New Culture 
Minister on Fight Against Internet Piracy,” 2009, para. 4).  Internautas is a vocal A2K 
organization founded in Spain in 1998 that is dedicated to activist and legal action 
against copyright overreach by the IP industries; Internuatas was well­known for 
challenging copyright law in Spain and protesting efforts to strengthen IPR at the time 
that it was being criticized by the United States (Horten, 2011, p. 167).  In the 
stakeholder enumeration earlier in the chapter, I described Internautas as an A2K 
organization that offers policy recommendations and engages in online and digital 
activism.  The group occupied a major role in the eventual Ley Sinde protests, and the 
group also coordinated with other activist stakeholders during the larger protests against 
the Zapatero government and economic policies (Postill, 2013, p. 10).   
The Internautas are also a major stakeholder in Spain’s longstanding A2K 
movement (Morell, 2012, p. 387).  The movement was described by Postill (2014) in an 
ethnographic study of social movements in Spain as thriving throughout Barcelona and 
Madrid and including “law firms specialized in digital commons, the world’s largest 
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WiFi network (guiffi.net), free software communities, journalistic and blogging 
initiatives … publishing houses” and a strong programming and hacking culture(p. 6).  
Internautas’ presence within the A2K community would continuously help it mobilize 
Spanish activism in protest of government policy. In 2004 and 2008, the group 
mobilized against changes to Spain’s digital canon (Postill, 2013, p. 10), which, as 
described earlier in the chapter, imposed a tax on media products that was redistributed 
to rights holders (Sarikakis & Rodriguez­Amat, 2014, sect. 4, para. 7).  Internautas was 
legitimated as a stakeholder in Spanish politics in that it was regularly invited to 
government seminars to discuss information policy issues (Horton, 2011, p. 154).   
The U.S. diplomatic cables offered continuous updates on González­Sinde’s efforts 
at copyright reform and detailed how the U.S. government and MPAA were working 
with her to create new anti­piracy legislation.  In October 2009, ahead of a meeting 
between Zapatero and the Obama administration in the United States, an Inter­
Ministerial Commission was formed within the Spanish government to address digital IP 
violations in Spain; the MPAA and RIAA had been putting pressure on U.S. officials to 
address Internet piracy with Zapatero, and IP policy talks took place throughout the visit 
(Horten, 2011, p. 171).  At the same time in Spain, the Coalition of Creators released a 
list of 200 websites that it claimed were engaging in online piracy, and the government 
used this list for the public relations benefit of claiming that any legislation it passed 
would only target those particular sites (Horten, 2011, p. 172).  Soon after, the Spanish 
government went through with its first major efforts stop digital piracy in Spain. 
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The SEA. The Sustainable Economy Act (SEA) was introduced as the first major 
effort to reform the ailing Spanish economy (Sarikakis & Rodriguez­Amat, 2014, sect. 5, 
para. 1).  The Act was introduced to take meaningful measures to combat recession 
through renewable energy and the digitization of public administration (Sarikakis & 
Rodriguez­Amat, sect. 5, para. 1).  Woven into this bill was a series of anti­digital piracy 
measures that came to be collectively referenced as “Ley Sinde” (Horten, 2011, p. 170).  
In a critical analysis of Ley Sinde, Sarikakis and Rodriguez­Amat (2014) describe its 
inclusion in the Act as policy laundering (sect. 6, para. 2), which I have discussed here 
as proposed laws that disguise unpopular policies in larger, seemingly unrelated 
legislation and rush them into law with little public scrutiny.  Policy laundering is 
increasingly common in the information policy sector, where strong civil liberties and 
digital rights groups are able to hinder the efforts of international political and private 
pressures to regulate and commodify digital spaces (Sarikakis & Rodriguez­Amat, 2014, 
sect. 6, para. 1).  With the strength of A2K organizations including Internautas, a strong 
sector of consumer’s rights advocates, and the Spanish Attorney General’s support of 
p2p intermediary sites, a laundered policy was perhaps the only policy that was going to 
be able to amplify digital copyright standards in Spain.  Due to the difficulty of 
strengthening the law through transparent legislative processes, Ley Sinde was inserted 
into the SEA in a series of short annexes distributed throughout the Act (Horten, 2011, p. 
172).  The annexes were revisions to Spain’s law implementing the E­Commerce 
Directive (Peguera, 2011, p. 164).  The E­Commerce Directive, which is discussed in 
Chapter II as containing the European Union’s guidelines for safe harbor provisions to 
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keep ISPs from being held liable for illegal user activity also gives member states the 
option of requiring ISPs to store user information and release it in the instance of alleged 
illegal activity (Seville, 2009, p. 48).  Under Ley Sinde, Spain would institute the 
optional guidelines and require ISPs to hand user data over to a Commission of 
Intellectual Property (Sarikakis & Rodriguez­Amat, 2014, sect. 6, para. 2).  As noted in 
the ECJ’s decision in Promusicae v. Telefónica, member states are able but not obligated 
to make user identification demands of ISPs.  Whereas the Telefónica case was viewed 
as a defeat by the music industry in the direct aftermath of the decision because it did not 
force the telecommunication company to reveal user information, Ley Sinde would make 
the ECJ’s decision beneficial to rights holders by mandating user identification.  Despite 
their earlier objections to the procedures, telecommunications stakeholders did not object 
to the new requirements, and RedTel was supportive of user identification so long as no 
graduated response measures were implemented; this change of opinion from the ISPs 
was due to previous negotiations with the Ministry of Culture and the IP industries 
(Horten, 2011, p. 169).   
Ley Sinde’s overarching purpose was to establish the Commission of Intellectual 
Property.  The Commission is made up of appointees from the Ministry of Education, 
Culture, and Sports (Sarikakis & Rodriguez­Amat, sect. 6, para. 2).  The creation and 
structure of the Commission of Intellectual Property is informed by phenomena 
discussed previously in this dissertation.  As noted in Chapter I’s literature review during 
the discussion of TRIPS and the USTR, intellectual property commissions are a staple of 
anti­piracy initiatives recommended by the United States and IIPA (Drahos, 2002, p. 
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95).  Additionally, education campaigns to teach students and citizens in general about 
copyright infringement from an industry perspective are a common demand of the IP 
industry (Drahos, 2002, p. 127), and this demand is reflected in the Spanish Commission 
through the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports appointment.  The Commission’s 
powers include the authority to enact preventative measures to stop infringement, 
including starting judiciary procedures and shutting down Internet access to a firm or 
individual with final approval from a judge (Sarikakis & Rodriguez­Amat, 2014, sect. 6, 
para. 3).  The Commission can also request that an appeals court block online content 
that the Commission finds to be in violation of IP law (Sarikakis & Rodriguez­Amat, 
2014, sect. 6, para. 3). Notably, the judicial review was only implemented after 
protesters argued that seizures would be unconstitutional without judicial approval 
(Horten, 2011, p. 175).   
In addition to constitutional obstacles, complaints from news media and activists 
contended that the Commission’s takedown orders could be in violation of the Spanish 
rights to freedom of expression and privacy (Peguera, 2010, p. 164).  The release of a 
public draft of the SEA on December 1, 2009, led to immediate protest from Spain’s 
consumer and digital rights groups. The Internautas reacted with the rapid release of a 
manifesto of digital rights for Spanish citizens that denounced Ley Sinde for trampling 
civil liberties, hindering innovation, creating legal uncertainty, and privileging authors 
over other citizens (Doctorow, 2009, para. 3).  The manifesto also included calls for a 
guarantee of net neutrality—the principle that regulations and ISPs do not prioritize 
broadband allocation among online content or applications—by the Spanish government 
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and a Spanish IPR overhaul to “ensure a society of knowledge, promote the public 
domain and limit abuses from copyright organizations” (Doctorow, 2009, para. 10).  
Internautas’ manifesto ends with a call for more public debate and consultation with 
relevant parties during the lawmaking process (Doctorow, 2009, para. 11).  The 
manifesto was posted to Facebook and garnered 240,000 comments in 24 hours, and 
feeds related to the protest were among Twitter’s most shared conversations globally 
(Morell, 2012, p. 390).  Ley Sinde’s early draft was criticized on popular technology 
blogs including BoingBoing (Doctorow, 2009) and Ars Technica (Anderson, 2010), as 
well as from A2K stakeholders such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (Hinze, 2011) 
and Public Knowledge (Tasker, 2012).  The websites and NGOs categorized the 
response to Ley Sinde within the context of activism against national copyright measures 
in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Sweden and regional protests against 
E.U. directives and reforms.   
The level of attention and protest had the immediate effect of putting Minister 
González­Sinde on the defensive; she appeared in front of the Spanish senate to assure 
that criminalization was not part of her proposal, that the Sustainable Economy Act was 
in compliance with the E.U. directives, and that her primary intent was to protect 
creators (Horten, 2011, p. 174).  Yet social media and street protests emerged despite her 
assurances (Horten, 2011, p. 175).  Prime Minister Zapatero responded on television by 
reiterating that no websites would be cut off, freedom of expression was in no way under 
fire, and IP infringement was a large problem for Spain (Horten, 2011, p. 175).  Zapatero 
was also under tremendous pressure from the European Union and international financial 
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institutions to take immediate action to address Spain’s economic crisis, and was 
unwilling to risk delaying or even failing to pass the Sustainable Economy Act due to 
objections over copyright reform (Horten, 2011, p. 175).  A revised draft of SEA, 
released in January 2010, added a judicial review clause that required the Commission of 
Intellectual Property to seek the approval of a judge before removing online content.  
After the revised draft, a copyright complaint would move through Ley Sinde as follows:  
First, the Commission of Intellectual Property would be told by a rights holder that a site 
is infringing (Peguera, 2010, p. 165).  If the Commission agreed with the complaint, the 
Commission would tell an appeals judge that the site is infringing on copyright and 
needs to be taken down.  The judge would then review the complaint, but would be not 
allowed to question the merits or validity of the copyright infringement in the case 
(Peguera, 2010, p. 165).  Rather than analyze whether or not infringement occurred, the 
judge’s only duty is to weigh the importance of the copyright infringement with the 
rights to expression and information (Peguera, 2010, p. 165).  The judge can then 
approve or disapprove, but not modify, the Commission’s request for blocking material 
(Peguera, 2010, p. 165).  Peguera (2010) describes this system as “peculiar” because 
judicial review is removed from the actual accusation of copyright infringement and 
because it makes the Commission the absolute authority on deciding whether or not a 
work is infringing (p. 166).  The Spanish government and IP industries, which, as I have 
documented earlier in this chapter, had little success proving copyright infringement in 
Spanish courts, could now rely on the Commission to take down websites while only 
dealing with a relatively weak review system. 
 204 
 
 
Growing protest. The revisions implementing limited judicial review in Ley Sinde 
were not enough to stem the protests.  Sustainable Net, a protest group made up of 
bloggers, lawyers, artists, and other activists, was formed to combat Ley Sinde (Horten, 
2011, p. 176).  The group formed alliances with the Internautas and the programmers 
collective Hacktavistas (Horten, 2011, p. 176).  These groups facilitated intense Internet 
activism against Ley Sinde, and worked to create negative attention toward the law’s 
purpose and potential misuse (Horten, 2011, p. 175).  The extent of influence that this 
A2K activism had on the political process is unclear, but González­Sinde did react 
immediately by reaching out to the U.S. Embassy for assistance in passing the law 
(Horten, 2011, p. 176).   
According to leaked diplomatic cables, in February 2010, the U.S. Ambassador Alan 
Solomont visited González­Sinde to “discuss bilateral cooperation on cultural issues, 
intellectual property rights, and draft legislation that would enhance the government's 
ability to combat digital piracy” (“Spain: Ambassador’s Meeting with Minister of 
Culture Angeles González­Sinde,” 2010, para. 1).  During the meeting, the politicians 
discussed how to implement the law and what strategies could be used to make sure that 
it passed in full.  The U.S. Ambassador told González­Sinde that the U.S. government 
wanted González­Sinde’s legislation to move into law with no weakening amendments 
(“Spain: Ambassador’s Meeting,” 2010, para. 5).  The Ambassador also noted that the 
RIAA did not approve of González­Sinde’s proposal, because it did not criminalize 
individual file sharers on p2p sites (“Spain: Ambassador’s Meeting,” 2010, para. 5).  Ley 
Sinde did not take the step of criminalizing individuals as the United Kingdom and 
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France were doing with IP industry­backed legislation including the Digital Economy 
Act and HADOPI during the same period, and so the United States was not satisfied 
with the law.  González­Sinde stressed to the U.S. Ambassador that Spain’s plans for an 
anti­piracy law were not as ambitious as the graduated response systems in France and 
the United Kingdom (“Spain: Ambassador’s Meeting,” 2010, para. 4).  She further noted 
that “attempts to regulate Internet activity are of intense interest to young people, the 
media, and companies like Google” (“Spain: Ambassador’s Meeting,” 2010, para. 4), so 
criminal copyright legislation for digital infringement would be difficult to push 
forward.  The Minister of Culture bemoaned the “free culture” movement in Spain and 
stated that most politicians were ignorant of the impact of digital piracy (“Spain: 
Ambassador’s Meeting,” 2010, para. 5).  However, she noted that the problem was 
“unsustainable” (“Spain: Ambassador’s Meeting,” 2010, para. 5 ) and that the 
government had to deal with it immediately.  She doubted that the Zapatero government 
was capable of handling the problem, though, and requested that the United States reach 
out to legislators in the opposition parties in case they were to take the 2011 election 
(“Spain: Ambassador’s Meeting,” 2010, para. 5).  The Embassy, however, was already 
meeting with the opposition, and had met with the right­wing Popular Party’s leader 
Mariano Rajoy and his Chief of Cabinet a month earlier to discuss, in order, 
“Afghanistan, Iran, IPR, the Spanish economy, and Latin America” (“Ambassador 
Solomont’s January 21, 2010, Meeting With Spanish Opposition Leader Mariano 
Rajoy,” 2010, para. 1).  The Ambassador told Rajoy that IPR in Spain is a major concern 
of the U.S. film and music industries, and emphasized that the head of the MPAA had 
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spoken with him just the day before over concerns of Spanish copyright infringement  
(“Ambassador Solomont’s January 21, 2010, Meeting,” 2010, para. 5).  He also noted 
that he was told by a group of Warner Brother’s executives that DVD sales in Spain 
were “down by 80 percent” (“Ambassador Solomont’s January 21, 2010, Meeting,” 
2010, para. 5).  Rajoy expressed concern over the problem but noted the vocal Internet 
activism in the country and stated that the Popular Party was seeking “appropriate 
judicial safeguards for shutting down websites” and the “the appropriate balance 
between IPR protection and freedom of expression” (“Ambassador Solomont’s January 
21, 2010, Meeting,” 2010, para. 5). 
WikiLeaks and mass protests. After the initial diplomatic meetings between the U.S. 
Ambassador and González­Sinde, the Sustainable Economy Bill moved forward 
throughout 2010.  In the midst of a volatile social and political atmosphere in Spain 
frequented by mass protests against the government, the European Union, and the 
broader specter of global capitalism, Ley Sinde continued to be a target for Spain’s 
digital rights movement (Hughes, 2011, p. 410).  The protests were still occurring on the 
streets, on social media, on the front pages of major newspapers and in the form of cyber 
attacks against the major political parties of Spain and politicians that supported Ley 
Sinde (Morell, 2012, p. 390).  The protests against Ley Sinde hit their stride in December 
2010 in the weeks before the final version of the bill was set to pass during the holiday 
season (Horten, 2011, p. 177).  It was during this period that WikiLeaks released its 
massive document dump of U.S. diplomatic cables.  The various meetings between the 
United States and Spanish political leaders was documented on the front page of Spain’s 
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largest newspaper, El Pais, with accusations that the entirety of Ley Sinde was the 
product of U.S. government in response to lobbying from the MPAA and RIAA 
(Hughes, 2011, p. 410).  Ley Sinde and its U.S. backing became an international news 
story appearing in the pages of The New York Times, Der Spiegel, and The Washington 
Post, and regional and activist media jumped on the story (Horten, 2011, p. 174).  The 
narrative of Ley Sinde was at once folded into a larger international A2K activism and 
anti­globalization movements.  In Spain, the WikiLeaks releases fueled the fires of 
protest against the government and all of its major political parties (Postill, 2013).  
Sustainable Net, the Internautas and Hacktavistas all launched extensive viral campaigns 
and street protests after the leaks were revealed (Horten, 2011, p. 174).  A group of 
technology lawyers launched an online mobilization against the bill under the banner 
“Ley Sinde­Biden,” named so as a joking reference to the United States’ vice president 
due to the U.S. involvement in its creation (Postill, 2014, p. 3). Anonymous also became 
involved after the WikiLeaks revelations, and were highly visible throughout Ley Sinde­
related protests and online campaigns during the protests (Postill, 2014, p. 5).  
Additionally, Sustainable Net announced that they were given only five days notice to 
review the final version of the Sustainable Economy Act in the government’s efforts to 
keep the public and social movement organizations out of the review process, which led 
to frustrations over the accountability of the legislation (Horten, 2011, p. 179). 
Due to the increase in protests, EC pressures on the Zapatero government to hurry 
and pass the SEA and an unwillingness of smaller political parties in Spain’s parliament 
to support the law for fear of electoral backlash, Ley Sinde annexes were removed 
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entirely from the Sustainable Economy Act (Horten, 2011, p. 179; “Government 
knocked back in bid to pass “’Sinde Law’ in Congress,” 2010).    The removal was 
hailed as a victory for digital rights in Spain by activists, but Ley Sinde was soon revived 
under a political compromise (Horten, 2011, p. 180).  The law passed the Spanish 
Congress in February with a minor change to the judicial process of blocking a website.  
The new process required a judicial ruling before ISPs could be ordered to block content 
(Horten, 2011, p. 180).  The law was approved by the European Commission, but it was 
never put into regulatory form by the Zapatero government (Horten, 2011, p. 180).  In 
effect, Ley Sinde was not enforced.  The stalemate displeased both rights holders and 
activists (Horten, 2011, p. 181).  A movement to boycott all the major political parties in 
Spain was created by activist groups, called No Les Votes (Gerbaudo, 2012, p. 78).  No 
Les Votes was supported by Anonymous activism and several regional grassroots online 
activist groups to continue protests on a larger scale (Postill, 2014, p. 5).  The movement 
included traditional journalism, online activism, street protests, and distributed denial of 
service attacks; the tactics used were diverse, wide ranging, and representative of the 
variety of traditional NGOs and activist groups and radical hacktivist collectives (Postill, 
2014, p. 5).  An early protest against the bill occurred at Spain’s motion picture awards, 
which included a speech by González­Sinde on the importance of protecting copyrights 
in Spain.  During this speech, hundreds of Anonymous protesters congregated outside of 
the ceremony and, wearing their signature Guy Fawkes’ masks, jeered at González­
Sinde (Williams, 2012, para. 13). Anonymous would later discover and reveal the home 
addresses and phone numbers of González­Sinde, her eventual replacement in the 
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Cabinet, and several prominent Spanish actors and directors that supported Ley Sinde 
(Belinchon, 2012).   
No Les Votes’ and Anonymous’ protests culminated in May 2011 when the groups 
orchestrated a demonstration against Ley Sinde in Madrid (Postill, 2014, p. 5).  The May 
protests were rooted in and based on A2K activism and anti­Ley Sinde sentiment in 
Spain, but soon grew much larger and encompassed discontent over Spain’s labor crisis 
(Morell, 2012, p. 390).  Gerbaudo (2012), in an analysis of the May 2010 movement, 
noted how the protests emerged from the systems of networked communication created 
by organizations and activists against Ley Sinde.  No Les Votes built an infrastructure of 
social media groups and blogs that united local, national, and international activist 
groups that were able to mobilize online and in public spaces (Gerbaudo, 2012, pp. 80­
81).  The infrastructure was easily shared with and appropriated by activists to protest 
Spain’s broader crisis (Gerbaudo, 2012, p. 81).  The May 15 protests soon grew to 
encompass other areas of political, economic, and social discontent, and 30,000 
protesters were marching in Madrid by the end of the month (Postill, 2014, p. 5).  The 
May protests marked the birth of the student­led Indignado movement in Spain.  The 
Indignado movement was rooted in economic and political discontent aimed at what its 
members perceived as corrupt, anti­democratic Spanish and E.U. institutions (Gerbaudo, 
2012, p. 77; Castells, 2012, pp. 136­137).  The Indignados were started through social 
networking and mobile services, but eventually coordinated and centralized on the 
ground.  Most importantly to the research conducted here, however, is that the 
Indignados were an outgrowth of Spain’s free culture movement that was mobilized by 
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A2K public interest groups against Ley Sinde (Castells, 2012; Gerbaudo, 2012; Morell, 
2012).   
15M movement. The Indignados, No Les Votes, Anonymous protesters, Internautas, 
and other social movement groups were united in questioning the sovereignty and 
legitimacy of governance in Spain and the actions of a Spanish political system heavily 
influenced by U.S. economic interests, E.U. mandates and international capitalism.  The 
protest movement became known as the 15M movement because the mass protests 
began on May 15 (Morell, 2012; Postill, 2014).  Ley Sinde was important in forming the 
15M movement because the social media infrastructure and communication tactics of 
A2K groups and activists protesting the copyright law laid the groundwork for digital 
communication throughout the larger protests.  Spain’s A2K movement was heavily 
involved with the protests on social networks, mobile applications, and on the ground 
(Hughes, 2011; Morell, 2012; Postill, 2014).  The 15M movement would end up a 
politically significant activist coalition in Spain and its influence would gain exposure 
from mainstream outlets including cable and newspapers (Gerbaudo, 2012, pp. 95­97).  
The movement and general discontent it represented were influential during the course 
of the 2011 elections, which saw the ouster of Zapatero’s Socialists (Martin & Urquizo­
Sancho, 2012, p. 352). 
In November 2011, the Zapatero government was defeated in the polls and the 
Popular Party’s Mariano Rajoy took over as prime minister (Martin & Urquizo­Sancho, 
2012, p. 359).  Zapatero refused to approve enforcement of Ley Sinde in his final 
Cabinet meeting on December 16, citing opposition from social networks that had 
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appeared prior to the meeting (Fraguas, 2012, para. 6).  El Pais, Spain’s largest 
newspaper, published a leaked letter from U.S. Ambassador Solomont to Zapatero that 
derided the former prime minister for not passing Ley Sinde (Fraguas, 2012).  The 
Ambassador accused Zapatero of failing to “[finish] the job out of political reasons, to 
the detriment of Spain’s reputation and economy” (Fraguas, 2012, para. 3).  The 
Ambassador then threatened that the United States may upgrade Spain’s status on the 
USTR’s 301 list, which would set off US sanctions against Spain (Fraguas, 2012, para. 
4).  The Popular Party had spoken out against Ley Sinde prior to the elections, but one of 
Prime Minister Rajoy’s first tasks in office was to heed the United States’ warning and 
begin the regulatory enforcement of Ley Sinde on December 30, 2011 (“Government 
knocked back in bid to pass “’Sinde Law’ in Congress,” 2010, para. 5).  Spain was 
removed from the 2011 Special 301 report in light of the decision (“US takes Spain off 
piracy blacklist,” 2012, para. 9).  The USTR’s goodwill toward Spain did not last long, 
however.  In 2013, the IIPA recommended that Spain be put back on the list and claimed 
that the Commission of Intellectual Property was slow and ineffectual (IIPA, 2013, p. 1).  
The IIPA also claimed that only two websites had been taken down by the Commission, 
and that 80 complaints were outstanding (IIPA, 2013, p. 1).  Additionally, the report also 
cited data that 87% of Internet users in Spain still downloaded copyrighted films, music, 
software, and video games (IIPA, 2013, pp. 236­238).  In response, the USTR’s 2013 
Special 301 announced that it was not yet putting Spain back on the list but needed to 
work with its government to strengthen digital copyright laws and regulations (USTR, 
2013, p. 7).  Facing a new round of U.S. threats, the Spanish government announced new 
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legislation that jails for up to six years anyone charged with making a profit from a 
website by linking to copyrighted material, larger fines for infringing content providers, 
and measures to speed up the process by which the Commission of Intellectual Property 
can take down websites (“Spain readies hefty jail terms over internet piracy,” 2014, para. 
1).  These new measures would finally criminalize linking sites and give Spanish 
enforcement agencies the authority to shut down sites like RojaDirecta and others that 
were previously protected under Spanish law.   
Discussion 
The discussion of the cases expands the conceptualization of the IPR GPR, draws on 
key findings, and cross­analyzes the cases, acting as a bridge into Chapter IV, which 
qualifies the historical importance of the case studies and expands on theoretical 
frameworks integrated throughout the dissertation.  I begin by revisiting the concept of 
global prohibition regimes, which Andreas and Nadelmann (2006) identify as occurring 
when unilateral and bilateral law enforcement measures are inadequate in the face of 
criminal activity that transcends borders (pp. 18­19).  The case analysis in this chapter, 
which demonstrates how stakeholders contest the governance of IPR, is consistent with 
Andreas and Nadelmann’s framework due to the prominence of the United States, 
national governments, and IP industries in establishing prohibitions.  In Chapter I, I also 
situated the IPR GPR as a smaller functional regime in the boundaries of a larger 
economic regime, and stated that the IP prohibition regime was parallel to what Braman 
(2004) identified as an information policy regime.  The case analysis in this chapter 
supports the notion, as discussed in Chapter 1, that the IPR GPR exists alongside the 
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information policy regime, which is built around policymaking initiatives that define 
information as commodities in order to control and manage digital networks of 
information and communication. The difference is important because In Braman’s 
(2007) analysis, information policy deprofessionalizes digital IP related activities by 
applying laws created for disputes between firms and publishers to individual behavior 
(p. 162).  The IPR prohibition regime is, in contrast, expanding the authority of police 
agencies to identify more actions as criminal.  Laws and legislation born from 
information policy—the regulatory mechanisms that control the flow of communication 
and social interaction—are often ignored by police agencies participating in the arena of 
cybercrime enforcement.  A prominent observation in the case analyses was the extent to 
which Leman­Langlois’ (2012) argument (detailed in Chapter I) that police authority to 
crack down on cybercrimes is wide, ill­defined and operates across borders with or 
without permission from national governments (p. 3­4) is applicable to digital copyright 
prohibitions. The OiNK case in particular demonstrates how an international police 
effort that included British Police, Interpol, and a Dutch anti­terrorism and organized 
crime task force can be deployed to crack down on digital copyright violations.  
Although the criminal charges against OiNK administrators were dismissed and 
subsequent U.K. legislation that would criminalize file sharing failed implementation, 
the police agencies involved continue to use seizures, raids, arrests, and extraditions to 
crack down on p2p networks.  The United Kingdom even created an IP task force in 
2012 to increase its criminal enforcement of file sharing, despite the U.K.’s inability to 
pass legislation legitimating criminal copyright enforcement (Solon, 2013, para. 1).  
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Similarly, the U.S. DOJ, Homeland Security, and Customs are willing to seize domains 
in European countries where the websites are legal and face no repercussions despite 
such seizures being rejected by U.S. courts.   
The application of the GPR theory to digital copyright enforcement is appropriate for 
this research because the prohibition regime concept creates an opportunity for the study 
of IP in which police agencies are centralized.  The application of the theory also 
emphasizes the extent to which the criminal enforcement of IPR continues Sell’s (2010) 
upward ratchet even as the DEA, ACTA, IPRED2, and other TRIPS­Plus proposals fail 
to gain ground at national and international levels.  The IPR GPR exists partially outside 
of E.U. efforts at Europeanization and harmonization of intellectual property because 
prohibition enforcement is dependent on the standardization of police procedures that, 
following Johns’ (2012) history of IP enforcement, cluster together criminal categories 
of digital piracy, money laundering, terrorism, and organized crime (p. 6).  
Internationally coordinated IP enforcement described in the case analysis from the 
United States, United Kingdom, Dutch, New Zealand, other nations’ police agencies, as 
well as international agencies such as Interpol and the WCO, demonstrates the presence 
and significance of an international prohibition regime in the governance of digital 
copyrights.   
GPRs are not only made of police agencies, however, and do depend on international 
legal institutions and trade agreements to be effective (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006).  
TRIPS is the starting point of the IPR GPR in that it expanded the commodification of 
information, communication, and culture through international enforcement mechanisms 
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(Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006; May & Sell, 2006), and information policy detailed 
throughout this dissertation continued the evolution of the prohibition regime.  In the 
European Union, the directives described in Chapter II formed a European baseline for 
digital copyright laws through expanding protections for software and databases, digital 
rights management, the right of information, and civil remedies for online copyright 
violations.  In terms of United States and European Commission demands for a 
solidified criminal enforcement regime for digital copyright prohibitions, though, the 
European Union’s information policy regime falls short of creating criminal prohibitions 
against peer­to­peer activity.  The reasons it is difficult to create criminal prohibitions, 
including protests from the telecommunication and technology sectors, A2K activism, 
incompatibility with existing laws, and standards of privacy and free speech, are detailed 
throughout the dissertation and in Chapter III’s cases in particular.  The IPR GPR’s most 
evident problem that can affect its democratic legitimacy found within the case studies, 
though, is that police organizations are expanding cybercrime enforcement into areas 
where criminal activity is not identified by the law.  The social movement and legal 
reactions to United Kingdom’s Operation Ark Royal to seize OiNK’s Pink Palace and 
the United States’ Operation InOurSites illustrate how police enforcement is out of sync 
with both the legal and social norms that govern digital copyright laws and online 
communication.  Both cases were rife with heavy­handed statements from police, 
government, and IP industry stakeholders that the arrests and seizures were in regard to 
criminals who profited from illegal activities that cost billions of dollars in damage to 
the global economy.  The pro­enforcement statements were countered by an array of 
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A2K groups, legal experts, and blogs that claimed that the enforcement was out of 
proportion and in some cases illegal.  In the case analysis, the courts sided with legal 
arguments that reflected those of the critics of police enforcement.  However, no 
measures were taken at the policy or judicial levels to moderate this enforcement.  The 
inconsistencies between police enforcement and legal and social norms were initially 
enumerated here in Chapter I’s discussion of cybercrime theory.  Lemieux (2010) noted 
that hybrid forms of police enforcement using digital surveillance and seizures as well as 
international raids and arrests often stem from broad prohibitions that are out of sync 
with social norms (p. 5).  Socially legitimated activities such as file sharing and 
streaming are difficult to address through police agencies designed to capture criminals 
and stop crime.  Indeed, the OiNK and Ley Sinde cases demonstrate that cybercrime 
theorists (Leman­Langlois, 2012; Lemieux, 2010; Yar, 2005) and information policy 
researchers (Larsson, 2011b; Andersson, 2014) are correct to argue that sharing and 
streaming entertainment media online are socially legitimated activities for many 
Internet users.  The legitimacy of sharing and streaming create a difficulty for the IP 
prohibition regime’s governance, which, following Andreas and Nadelmann (2006), is 
unlikely to find success using criminal enforcement tactics toward normatively accepted 
activities (pp. 20­21).  The OiNK case draws on the difficulties of enforcement by 
revealing the discrepancies in the perception of what OiNK’s Pink Palace meant to users 
and how its existence was interpreted by law enforcement.  For users, the site was an 
extensive, meticulously organized library of high­quality music, hard­to­find rarities, 
and early releases that was managed through the labor and donations of its members.  
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Ellis and other administrators claimed that all donations only went to maintaining the 
site, and the courts could find no evidence otherwise.  Yet for the music industry, 
prosecutors, and law enforcement, the site could only conceived through a lens that 
envisaged file sharing as the pure theft of cultural commodities and the practice of 
operating a file sharing site for the sake of sharpening programming skills and creating a 
digital commons for audiophiles to be in defiance of “common sense” (Lightfoot, 2010, 
para. 9).  With the disparity in the norms of OiNK users and the discourse of criminal 
enforcement, it is noteworthy that OiNK’s piglets, What.cd and Waffles.fm, still exist as 
of this writing and are larger than OiNK was in its prime.   
The OiNK case addresses the research question of how the legitimacy of IPR 
governance is affected by a prohibition regime by demonstrating how internationally 
coordinated police measures to shut down the Pink Palace and hold administrators 
criminally accountable led to accusations of police overreach from critics, led to no 
successful prosecutions, and inspired the creation of copycat sites.  In contrast, the Ley 
Sinde case addresses broader issues of democratic deficits and social unrest in Spain due 
to the mutual simultaneous shaping of the 2008 global financial collapse, a subsequent 
national labor collapse, and perceptions that the Spanish government’s decision making 
was dependent on the outside demands of the EC and United States.  As a stakeholder, 
the EC’s primary role in the Ley Sinde case was to pressure the Zapatero government to 
adopt economic reform.  The European Commission’s concerns with Spain were based 
on the dangers its economic situation posed to the European Union and not with its 
implementation of stronger IP laws.  Additionally, the ECJ in Promusicae v. Telefónica 
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showed no objection to Spain’s copyright system as it related to the E­Commerce and 
Copyright Directives.  The United States and the entertainment industry were the 
primary stakeholders pressuring Spanish leadership for changes to its copyright system, 
then, and the Zapatero government, after it failed to launder the Ley Sinde law into 
economic policy, was hesitant to upset the telecommunication sector, public interest 
groups, and the many activists protesting the law.  The Minister of Culture González­
Sinde was ardent in her support for Ley Sinde, but was upfront with the U.S. 
Ambassador about refusing to try and implement criminal enforcement measures that 
went beyond the civil stipulations of Ley Sinde due to protests from telecommunication 
and technology companies and A2K groups including Internatutas (“Spain: 
Ambassador’s Meeting,” 2010).  Ley Sinde’s guidelines of giving IP holders the right to 
demand Internet user information and the creation of the Spanish Commission of 
Intellectual Property were resisted by A2K stakeholders, but had been agreed to by the 
telecommunication industry in early talks between RedTel and the IP industry.  
However, complaints from lawyers and activists were enough to bring limited judicial 
review into the procedures of the Commission of Intellectual Property (Horten, 2011, p. 
174).   
WikiLeaks was a very significant stakeholder in the Ley Sinde case.  The value of the 
diplomatic leaks were stressed by Burkart and Andersson (2014) in their analysis of how 
the cables provided transparency to ACTA and the implementation of IPRED in 
Sweden, and the results of WikiLeaks’ whistleblowing was similarly impactful in the 
Spanish case.  The debate over Ley Sinde was possible only because WikiLeaks exposed 
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the government’s efforts at policy laundering.  The WikiLeaks revelations of González­
Sinde’s negotiations with the United States and the acquiescence of the Zapatero 
government in masking Ley Sinde within the Sustainable Economy Act was also 
symbolic of the broader perception among Spaniards that the Spanish government was 
taking orders from Brussels and Washington. The contents of the U.S. diplomatic cables 
were publicized and criticized in the pages of El Pais, across Spain, and in international 
news outlets (Hughes, 2011, p. 410), which sparked further discontent with Ley Sinde 
and the secretive manner in which it was fashioned.  The long­standing free culture 
movement in Spain was able to garner much support against the law, and pressures from 
protesters in addition to Zapatero’s unpopularity as elections neared and pressure from 
the EC to hurry and implement the SEA did manage to temporarily sideline the law.  The 
Ley Sinde protests were also engulfed by the larger protests in Spain, and the 
infrastructure of activism put in place by Internautas, No Les Votes, Sustainable Net and 
other A2K stakeholders assisted in the larger Indignado protests.  While Ley Sinde was 
far from the primary motivation behind Spain’s 15M movement, the case analysis 
displayed how the upward ratchet of IP law and the process of policy laundering can 
enhance democratic deficits and hurt the legitimacy of governance in a region such as 
Spain where there was already discontent toward the government and international 
institutions.  
The findings in the case analyses suggest that IP governance is poorly implemented 
within the framework of a global prohibition regime and the legitimacy of the regime is 
highly contested in Spain, which has a longstanding and active free culture movement 
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and a moderate approach to copyright.  Throughout the European Union, as identified in 
Chapter II’s analysis of IPRED2 and ACTA, historical and legal standards of privacy 
and free speech curtail the implementation of criminal IP enforcement standards that 
commodify digital sharing and communication through surveillance and censorship.  
Additionally, the process of policy laundering and secretive negotiations between the IP 
industry and governments was ineffective in not only Ley Sinde but also in the United 
Kingdom’s Digital Economy Act.  Without the framework for maximalist IP law to 
guide information policy, though, governments and IP industries turn to police agencies 
to use cybercrime enforcement standards to regulate the governance of digital 
copyrights.  The U.S. government is also still pushing for the international 
implementation of stronger IPR, as noted with the United States’ latest round of 301 
pressures on Spain.  The Spanish government appears to be working with the United 
States in developing stronger IPR, as well (“Spain readies hefty jail terms,” 2014, para. 
1).  Resistance from the telecommunication and technology sectors and from A2K 
activism does slow the international adoption of the IPR GPR, but the perceived 
economic imperative for the United States, European Union, and IP industries to bolster 
intellectual property rights is responsible for the continued growth of the prohibition 
regime.   
The next chapter concludes the research with an analysis of the historical importance 
of the adoption of the prohibition regime with an emphasis on the legitimacy of IP 
governance.  I revisit the concepts of regime theory, information policy and the 
international political economy of communication in order to emphasize the 
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contributions of this study to theoretical understandings of intellectual property.  
Something about the literature and critical analysis?  I also offer suggestions for further 
study and reflect on the historical significance of the cases. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
 
Overview 
 
The premise of this dissertation is that the international regulation of intellectual 
property is increasingly under the governance of a prohibition regime, and that the 
implementation of the regime has made it necessary to rethink questions of how 
legitimacy is negotiated in political conflicts.  The concept of the IPR GPR was 
presented in the first chapter as a theoretical framework for addressing the information 
policy’s regulation of information over digital networks and the expanding involvement 
of police agencies and criminal enforcement in information regulation. The digital 
copyright based raids, seizures, arrests and extraditions described throughout this 
dissertation demonstrate that information policy research should address the 
amplification of cybercrime initiatives among state and international police institutions.  
The cases in the third chapter suggest that the legitimacy IP governance, particularly the 
governance of digital copyrights, is dysfunctional when negotiated by political actors 
through a prohibition regime.  In this concluding chapter, I expand on the dysfunctions 
of the regime by engaging with the core concepts and theories presented throughout the 
dissertation in light of the findings.  I begin by returning to the concepts of governance, 
legitimacy and regimes before moving to a discussion of this study’s findings in regard 
to the political economy of IP enforcement.  I then contribute to debates in the literature 
regarding policy laundering and cybercrime.  I then expand on how the critical legal 
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methodology that guided the case analysis informed the findings, and discuss an 
alternative legal liberal approach.  The implications of prohibition enforcement for the 
A2K actors and policies are then discussed, and I close by describing limitations of the 
study and suggestions for future research.   
Governance and Legitimacy in the European Union IP Prohibitions 
The findings from this study demonstrate that the legitimacy of international 
prohibitions on digital copyrights was hindered by the European Union’s democratic 
deficits.  Legitimacy in liberal democracies is linked with democratic representation, and 
so the democratic deficits implicit in the framework of the European Union weaken 
perceptions of the legitimacy of E.U. governance (Mather, 1999, p. 277).  International 
governance is beyond the oversight of singular governments, and so it leads to the 
creation and regulation of supra­national bodies like the E.U., international institutions 
and regimes (Sarikakis, 2012, p. 148).  The IPR GPR is a functional regime based on the 
convergence of interests among core states and industries to control the commodification 
of knowledge by strengthening intellectual property rights.  The IP prohibition regime 
was constructed through processes of globalization, trade agreements and IGO formation 
and was solidified with TRIPS.  TRIPS set the floor for global IPR standards and was 
followed by United States’ laws and European Union directives that steadily increased 
the minimum requirements for IP protection.  The problems associated with the regime’s 
governance are related to normative resistance to its regulatory measures and the lack of 
democratic legitimacy of its international composition. In the European Union, the 
regulatory mechanisms governing IP are actualized through trade agreements, directives 
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and processes of Europeanization.  In the Ley Sinde case, I noted that processes of 
Europeanization were primarily operating in the background through previous IP 
directives, and that stakeholders most involved in pressuring Spain to increase its IP 
measures were the United States and IP industries.  Nonetheless, the difficulty of 
Europeanization is emphasized in the protest against Ley Sinde.  WikiLeaks’ Ley Sinde 
revelations were compound with pre­existing animosity in Spain toward the Zapatero 
government for succumbing EC and international pressures to implement austerity 
policies (Gerbaudo, 2012).  In effect, the leaks of United States diplomatic cables 
detailing pressures on Spain to insert industry­backed copyright policy into an economic 
reform bill demanded by the EC created outrage and enhanced the perception that the 
Spanish government had succumbed to outside interests and international institutions.  
The policy laundering of Ley Sinde into the Sustainable Economy Act also damaged 
perceptions of the legitimacy of the copyright law through the implication that Ley Sinde 
was being hidden from public view in order to ease its implementation into law with 
little debate over its policy procedures.    
Policy laundering is common feature in the emergence of digital copyright policy 
and occurred with Ley Sinde, the Digital Economy Act, France’s HADOPI and ACTA 
(Sarikakis & Rodriguez­Amat, 2014, sect. 4, para. 7).   The Ley Sinde case addressed the 
problem of policy laundering as a tool to pass copyright laws and enforcement measures 
where policymakers deem popular support too difficult or burdensome to achieve.  
Minister Gonzalez­Sinde warned the U.S. ambassador that copyright reform would be 
unpopular in Spain due to the nation’s history of moderate copyright laws, normative 
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support of digital downloads, past legal precedents, thriving free culture and consumer 
rights groups and powerful telecommunication sector and refused to support measures 
for graduated response or criminal enforcement (“New Culture Minister on Fight 
Against Internet Piracy, 2009, para. 4). The economic pressure for Spanish copyright 
reform from the U.S. and IP industries was still strong enough to pressure Spain into 
significant copyright reform, though, and Ley Sinde was integrated into Spain’s 
Sustainable Economy Act.  The Spanish government was convinced that Ley Sinde 
would assist in the protection of the 800,000 employees and the four percent of its GDP 
represented by its copyright sector (“Government knocked back in bid to pass “’Sinde 
Law’ in Congress,” 2010, para. 6), and used policy laundering in an attempt to bypass 
objections to the law.  The policy laundering process, possibly as much as the provisions 
of Ley Sinde, enhanced poor perceptions of legitimacy toward copyright laws and 
Spanish politicians.  To illustrate, the No Les Votes movement was not geared solely 
toward the removal of Ley Sinde from SEA; rather, its mission was to stop votes for 
major political parties because of Ley Sinde’s policy implications, the anti­democratic 
process in which Ley Sinde was inserted into SEA, and the corruption of the government 
in its inability to stand up to foreign and corporate interests (“Manifesto,” 2011).  The 
populist impulses of No Les Votes were seamlessly translated into the growing 
opposition against the Spanish government, and effectively inserted copyright reform 
into the agenda of protests opposing neoliberal economic initiatives and a labor crisis 
(Gerbaudo, 2012, p. 78).  The policy laundering common in the establishment of IP 
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prohibitions, then, damaged the legitimacy of IP reform in Spain by affiliating Ley Sinde 
with government failure and corruption.   
In addition to spurring the creation of No Les Votes, the controversy over 
WikiLeaks’ Ley Sinde revelations influenced protests from Internautas, created the 
group Sustainable Net to lobby for A2K principles in Spanish IP law, caused 
Anonymous protests and DDoS attacks, and gathered international criticism from the 
national and international press (Horten, 2011, p. 242), technology blogosphere 
(Doctorow, 2009; Anderson, 2010) and activist organizations (Hinze, 2011; Tasker, 
2012).  News outlets including The Guardian compared Ley Sinde to the United States’ 
SOPA (Rushe, 2012), which failed to be implemented due to protests from technology 
companies and activists.  The reaction to the Ley Sinde case was pieced into a narrative 
of international protests against an alphabet soup of IP reform proposals including 
ACTA, SOPA, HADOPI and the Digital Economy Act (Horten, 2011, p. 174).   
Importantly, the inclusion of Ley Sinde into the anti­IP reform narrative occurred despite 
the fact that Ley Sinde’s measures to facilitate website closure adopted no criminal 
measures or graduated response proposals at any stage during the policy’s development.  
The protests against Ley Sinde did focus on its measures to coordinate online enclosures 
through the commodification of digital spaces once protected by Spanish law, but the 
rejection of the copyright law by A2K organizations and activists was also due to the 
anti­democratic, secretive measures used to propose and implement the law.  A common 
criticism of Ley Sinde was that it was part of a model of IP governance that relies almost 
solely on industry lobbying, lateral pressures, international trade agreements and E.U. 
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directives to control and prohibit the distribution of information online (Doctorow, 2009; 
Anderson, 2011;  Hinze, 2011; “Manifesto,” 2011).  The protests, then, were in part a 
rejection of the legitimacy of the authority of institutions and norms that empower the 
international prohibition regime on intellectual property.  The spatialization of copyright 
norms and the European harmonization of copyright law were challenged through Ley 
Sinde’s activist criticism and protest.   
Although Ley Sinde was eventually implemented, it did not meet the standards 
demanded by the IIPA and USTR (IIPA, 2013, p. 1; USTR, 2014, p. 7).  The perception 
of the law’s weak standards led to a continuation of the cycle of United States pressure 
for IP reform that has lead to proposed law to give criminal enforcement authority to its 
Intellectual Property Commission (“Spain readies hefty jail terms over internet piracy,” 
2014, para. 1).  The effects of the new law are uncertain, but the announcement of the 
measures comes as protesters still fill Spanish streets (“Spain Spanish anti­austerity 
protests continue,” 2014).  The spatialization of global IP prohibitions as measures to 
enforce international digital copyrights is still an uneven process.   
The next section revisits the case of OiNK’s Pink Palace and discusses the 
spatialization of criminal copyright enforcement, the enclosure of digital spaces and the 
failures of commodified cultural mechanisms to offer services provided by file sharing 
and streaming services.     
OiNK and the Legitimacy of Norms and IP Prohibitions 
The focus on legitimacy within this study was in part due to the relationship between 
legitimacy and prohibitions.  Activities that are widely seen as legitimate are likely to 
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resist prohibition policy and enforcement (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006), and the peer­
to­peer activities of file sharing and streaming are consistent with social norms, 
particularly, as argued by Larsson (2011b) and evidenced within the case studies, 
throughout the European Union.  The problem of prohibitions that are not parallel to 
social norms was first discussed in Chapter I’s discussion of cybercrime theory.  I 
discussed Leman­Langlois’s (2012) discussion of cybercrime policy that criminalizes 
routine, habitual online activity.  The findings in the OiNK case advance cybercrime 
studies by demonstrating that administrators and users of the site widely considered their 
file sharing activities to be normal and the digital music library they were creating to be 
an asset for cataloging audio files that were often not available through legal channels 
(Day, 2007, p. 1).  Additionally, Leman­Langlois (2012) discussed how the security 
software association Symantec was distributing reports to police agencies that claimed, 
using questionable data, that nearly $400 billion lost per year globally due to cybercrime 
(pp. 5­6).  The essence of Leman­Langlois’ (2012) argument was that private companies 
use faulty and exaggerated data to create a hysteria among police organizations over all 
manner of cybercrime, from serious issues of fraud to mundane issues of borrowing a 
neighbor’s WiFi (p. 7).  The consequence of private sector educational outreach toward 
police in regard to cybercrime encourages, in terms of digital copyrights, an opposition 
understanding of Internet users and police organizations over the norms of file sharing.  
The police involved in the OiNK raid, for instance, involved British police, Interpol and 
the Dutch anti­terror and organized crime task force FIOD ECD, all of whom had been 
informed of the site’s illegal activities by the IFPI (O’Connell, 2007).  The result of the 
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raid was the closure of OiNK, but also a failed criminal trial in which none of the 
arrestees were convicted and confusion among the lawyers and judges in the case as to 
why criminal and not civil procedures were taking place (Wray, 2010; Curtis, 2010). The 
closure also led to immediate calls from The Pirate Bay to reopen the site, and the 
eventual establishment of two copycat websites (Jones, 2007).  Criminal enforcement in 
the OiNK case failed to result in any convictions and inspired even larger duplicates, but 
police enforcement was not scaled back after OiNK.  The U.K. created a new IP task 
force to crack down on file sharing and streaming (Solon, 2013, para. 1) and began its 
initiative for the Digital Economy Act.  The DEA was laundered into a larger economic 
bill and eventually sidelined, but the police force continues to operate (Solon, 2013).  
The resulting system for criminal enforcement of copyright, then, is that enforcement is 
transferred to police organizations that use seizures, raids, surveillance and arrests to 
aggressively prevent file sharing and streaming.   
The political economic implications of cybercrime enforcement to address digital 
copyrights are rooted in Strange’s (1994) observation that the social, political and 
economic interests of the most powerful actors in the international system are reflected 
in international governance (p. 84).  International trade agreements and standards for IP 
law have not yet supported the imperative of core states to implement criminal 
enforcement throughout the information policy regime, but police agencies are able to 
coordinate internationally to crack down on peer­to­peer websites and services.  Police 
agencies, then, are able to carry out the policy imperatives of the United States and 
intellectual property industries that demand the commodification of knowledge online.  
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Police coordination is also used to crackdown on outlaw websites like OiNK in efforts to 
enclose the digital commons.  One problem with the OiNK closure, though, was that 
many of its most salient features—high audio quality for music and expansive, precise 
database—has yet to be replicated through the market (Sockanathan, 2011, pp. 35­37).  
Criminal enforcement, then, did not address the central problem of OiNK, which was 
that there was no commercial alternative to its services.  The failure of criminal 
enforcement facilitated the replication of OiNK through the duplicate services.  The 
finding that the crackdown on OiNK did little to end the phenomenon of private, elite 
torrent trackers supports a central claim of GPR theory, which is that activities that 
require more extensive efforts than criminal enforcement to shut down are poorly 
addressed through prohibition regimes (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, p. 20).  Similarly 
to OiNK, the sports streaming sites including RojaDirecta described in Chapter II fill a 
social want—remote access to sports—that is often denied through legal means (Mellis, 
2008, p. 265).  As police agencies are increasingly able to enforce intellectual property 
under an expanding umbrella of cybercrime, the commodification of cultural goods and 
services fails to replace digital spaces for sharing culture and results in what Boyle 
(2008) referred to as the “underutilization of information” (p. 228).   
Comparing and Contrasting of Liberal Legal and Critical Legal Solutions 
I used a critical legal methodology in this study that situated the institutions and 
norms within the IP prohibition regime as guided by the actions of stakeholders.  The 
conclusions that I reach through the critical methodology are that the trajectory of IP 
prohibitions is governed through laws crafted and supported by multilateral 
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organizations, states, police institutions and industry stakeholders, and that stakeholders 
representing other interests have to engage in social movement processes in order to 
prevent stronger IPR legislation from passing at the international and national levels.  
Even after IP laws are slowed or halted through protest or legal obstacles such as judicial 
review or privacy standards, though, government and IP stakeholders still push for an 
upward ratchet to intellectual property law.  The continuation of the upward ratchet is 
important to note because its perpetuation demonstrates that even though the DEA was 
never fully implemented and Ley Sinde never adopted criminal measures, these policies 
are not demonstrative of a system of governance wherein democratic efforts to stop 
undesirable law consistently prevails.  The inability of criminal measures to be 
implemented at various instances described throughout the study constitutes a temporary 
setback for the IPR GPR.  There are continued efforts at policy laundering and policy 
transfer through new policies and trade agreements (USTR, 2014), continued lateral 
pressures for criminal copyright law (“Spain readies hefty jail terms over internet 
piracy,” 2014, para. 1), and continued expansion of police task forces that over capture 
lawful communications, personal information and creative works (Raymond, 2013).  The 
findings in the Spanish case support the critical legal argument that the continued push 
for criminal IP prohibitions is because the IP prohibition regime exists as a set of 
institutions and norms that functions to protect established market interests, commodify 
information and networks of communication, and protects those priorities through police 
enforcement.   When the prohibition regime fails to implement the IP policies that it 
supports, it continues proposing and expanding IPR because to do so is a core function 
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of the regime.  The problem, from a critical legal perspective, is that the IPR GPR uses 
regulatory mechanisms, information policy and the coercive power of police force to 
increase IP prohibitions.  A balance of interest created through legal and judicial 
instruments is difficult to achieve when the institutions and norms of the regime are 
committed to a regulatory system that uses law and policy as tools to protect private IP 
interests within the United States and for the European common market.    
Despite the difficulty of reforming the international IP agenda to stop supporting an 
end goal of criminal enforcement, it is useful to evaluate the liberal legal alternatives to 
the IPR GPR in order to analyze how a juridical balance of interests would operate as an 
alternative to the prohibition regime.  Benkler (2010) typifies the liberal legal approach 
to digital copyright reform through arguments that to increase individual freedom within 
a networked information economy, laws should cultivate the production of information, 
knowledge and culture by offering greater protections for a digital commons (p. 175).  
After all, in networked systems, individuals frequently communicate and create online, 
and individual reproduction of content is a normalized behavior (Benkler, 2006, p. 3).  In 
the European Union, Benkler’s (2010) preferred approach already existed in Spain prior 
to Ley Sinde. Spain was applying its own, legitimated interpretation of digital copyright 
laws as required by the minimum standards of European directives, and, as demonstrated 
by Promusicae v. Telefónica, was permitted to do so within the European Union 
(Leistner, 2009).  Copyright infringement was a problem for IP industries, though (IFPI, 
2010, p. 19), and attempts to alleviate Spanish digital piracy while acknowledging its 
digital culture could have been acknowledged through open, democratic fora.  Instead, 
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attempts to change Spanish law were made through discreet lateral coordination between 
industry coalitions, U.S. and Spanish officials, the latter of which were threatened with 
Special 301 measures if they failed to comply with U.S. demands.  The United States 
and Spain initially refused to negotiate with public interest groups like Internautas, who 
were labeled pro­piracy activists by the Minister of Culture (“New Culture Minister on 
Fight Against Internet Piracy,” 2009, para. 4).  The United States ignored the opinions of 
Spanish courts and even U.S. courts, in the case of Puerto 80 v. United States of 
America, and insisted that Spain strengthen its copyright laws under the threat of lateral 
pressures.  The U.S. attempts to alter Spanish law created the breakdown in perceptions 
of legitimacy in Spain, but could have possibly been avoided through open, transparent 
discourse between the U.S. and Spain over IP trade issues.   
A balance of juridical interests is easier to address in the OiNK case.  In terms of a 
liberal legal system of rights, Ellis and the other OiNK defendants should have been 
tried civilly for damages inflicted upon the music industry based on concentrated efforts 
to uncover to the true financial harms caused by digital copyright infringement.  The 
criminal trial led to accusations that corrupt British prosecutors were acting as proxies 
for the IFPI and BPI (Curtis, 2010, para. 4) and harmed perceptions of the legitimacy of 
the law.  The failure of the Digital Economy Act in the years after the OiNK raid suggest 
that the British legislative system is able to effectively balance the rights of individuals 
and market interests, but the establishment of an IP task force (Solon, 2013) 
demonstrates that the logic of institutions and norms in the United Kingdom still favors 
stakeholders that support digital copyright enforcement through elements of crime 
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control.  The legal solution to reign in police forces is to create more accountability for 
police agencies in enforcing digital IP law in order to reduce instances of over capture 
that stifle expression and communication.  It would also be useful to establish legal 
standards at the United Kingdom or international level that allow criminal enforcement 
of copyrights in situations where police can provide evidence to a judicial authority 
linking file sharing web sites directly to the terrorism, organized crime or money 
laundering that file sharing is often associated with in international trade agreements and 
U.S. and E.U. reports (Johns, 2012, p. 6).  Ending criminal enforcement in all but cases 
of links to greater crimes and recommending that the United Kingdom work to 
implement new laws and legislation that, unlike the DEA, offer greater protections to a 
digital commons while still giving the state the authority to shut down or perhaps offer a 
form of notice­and­takedown procedures that incorporate judicial review to file sharing 
sites like OiNK are reasonable goals for A2K advocates and policymakers seeking to 
promote legal standards for digital copyrights that support individual freedoms and 
protect market interests.   
The critical legal analysis to IPR prohibition enforcement also supports legal tactics 
that could strengthen a digital commons, support IP law that is more moderate than what 
the USTR or criminal enforcement legislation calls for, and reform the way that trade 
negotiations are conducted in regard to IP reform.  The critical interpretation of this 
study’s findings, however, focus more on the need to abandon governance through 
institutional norms that promote digital copyright criminalization, policy laundering and 
aggressive, standardized police tactics to establish an international prohibition regime.  
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The problems with the governance of IP through a prohibition regime cannot address the 
lack of legitimacy in the system solely through legal reforms, as the findings support the 
idea that the law supported by the regime is political in nature and manipulated by 
multilateral institutions, the United States, European Commission and IP industries to 
protect markets.  For the OiNK case, the problem was not the legal implications of 
OiNK’s services or the degree to which its users and owners were prosecuted and how 
users of the site responded.  The problem with the Pink Palace were the assumptions and 
arguments by police that it was a for­profit criminal enterprise, the lack of consideration 
by the courts of any alternative use for the website outside of theft, and the contradiction 
between the normative values of its users and the values of the legal system that shut it 
down.  The case represents an inability of IP prohibitions to regulate the social norms 
and values that create file sharing websites like OiNK and a divide between file sharers 
and policymakers in terms of what the function of file sharing and streaming sites are.  
The difference in understanding is not purely legal, but normative, and movements to 
reform or disassemble the international IP prohibition regime should account for the fact 
that IP law is intertwined with the normative and institutional preferences of powerful 
stakeholders.  The upward ratchet of IP is an institutional and normative mechanism 
more so than a purely legal instrument.   
The next section provides suggestions for how A2K advocates can frame arguments 
for IP reform in a manner that stresses the importance of both a juridical balance of 
interests and acknowledges the behavior and regulatory preferences of the stakeholders 
that create the law. 
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A2K Responses to the IP Prohibition Regime 
A2K is united by the metaphor of a cultural environmentalism that emphasizes the 
importance of an ecology encompassing the landscape of information, creative works, 
and knowledge (Boyle, 2008, pp. xi­xv).  International prohibitions on intellectual 
property threaten the information ecology not only through the practice of manufacturing 
laws that enclose the commons and support the commodification of culture, but also by 
disrupting the discussion regarding the balance of access to knowledge with market 
interests.  By transferring policy enforcement to police organizations, debate over the 
need for a more robust public domain or the preservation of the cultural ecology that 
A2K advocates were able to successfully initiate within WIPO (Netanel, 2009; Latiff, 
2010) is transferred to police organizations with broad agendas to prevent digital crimes 
and  little public accountability (Leman­Langlois, 2008, pp. 4­5).  It is important for 
A2K researchers and advocates, then, to stress the problem of the police enforcement of 
digital copyright law and the role of prohibition enforcement in the international 
governance of digital copyrights.  The OiNK and Megaupload examples, in addition to 
large Pirate Bay raid described by Andersson, (2014, p. 133), demonstrate an upward 
ratchet not only of copyright law but also of copyright enforcement.  If areas within the 
digital commons becomes not only enclosed and commodified but also criminalized, the 
goals of the A2K movement to establish spaces for creative practice and cultural 
participation may succeed in arenas such as WIPO (Latiff, 2010), and contribute to the 
prevention of legislation and trade agreements including ACTA and IPRED2 (Argawal, 
2010), but fail to prevent international police organizations that use aggressive measures 
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to prevent online flows of information.  A2K research should recognize the power of 
institutions in creating and enforcing the law and openly challenge the hierarchical 
norms of IP governance through concerted political efforts.  Legal reform should be 
sought after to the extent that it allows the A2K movement to enhance its political 
strategies for social reform.  
A2K research should also address the broad mandates of police organizations to 
tackle cybercrime and should emphasize that while it may be necessary to prevent the 
wholesale theft of cultural goods over file sharing networks, police strategies the 
surveillance procedures and paramilitary raids applied to terrorism and organized crime 
are perhaps extreme when applied to file sharing and streaming services such as OiNK.  
The tendency of police organizations to harmonize enforcement measures and 
standardize tactics for fighting crime (Lemieux, 2010, p. 5) create extreme IP 
enforcement measures that are contrary to the A2K movement’s commitment toward 
simple, transparent and carefully crafted information policy that encourages the growth 
of creativity and innovation (Cohen, 2012, p. 14).    
Further Implications, Suggestions for Future Research and Limitations 
The limitations to the study concern its spatial limitations within the European Union 
and temporal limitations regarding analysis of current events that are too recent to 
receive proper historical scrutiny.  The interdisciplinary approach also limited an ability 
to focus on the findings through one particular theoretical lens.  A study specific to 
social movements or cybercrime would have taken into account more thorough 
perspectives and detail.  The dissertation could have also benefited from cultural and 
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sociological perspectives that describe how criminal enforcement affects the individual 
and group propensity for innovation and creativity.  
The primary contribution that I offer to the study of communication and information 
policy is the identification and examination of the role of criminal enforcement in the 
international political economy of communication. The international IPR prohibition 
regime is a theoretical contribution information policy and media studies that opens 
opportunities for further research into how police organizations contribute to the 
decision­making processes that govern intellectual property.  The implications of both 
cases include the observation that enforcement and copyright reform alone is not enough 
to address the social norms and activities related to digital downloading and streaming.  
The critical legal analysis of the cases provides a framework for understanding 
intellectual property not simply as systems of laws, but as normative institutional 
frameworks that influence access to knowledge, information and culture.  The solution 
to digital copyright infringement involves more elaborate measures that cannot be 
offered within the confines of a prohibition regime, and those potential measures should 
be a focus of future study.   
The cases and the interdisciplinary approach also lead to several other avenues for 
future research beyond addressing normative behaviors online.  Most importantly, 
further research should extend the analysis of cybercrime discourse within the field of 
communication studies.  Police organizations, through IP prohibitions, have a large role 
in the governance of international communication and their influence and agendas 
should be analyzed in greater detail.  Additionally, current and future developments in IP 
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legislation that purports to create international frameworks for criminal enforcement of 
digital copyright infringement, such as the oncoming Trans­Pacific Partnership (USTR, 
2014), should be studied.  Research should also move outside of the European Union.  
One observation arising from this dissertation is that Spain, an E.U. member states and 
TRIPS signatory, has great difficulty in implementing the right to information measures 
required by Ley Sinde.  How, then, is digital copyright enforcement to be efficiently 
implemented in developing nations and, particularly, China?  Finally, future 
communication research should focus on the interests of the telecommunication and 
technology sectors in resisting IP prohibitions.  In this research, Telefónica was 
addressed as a major stakeholder against criminal copyright enforcement, but more study 
should be conducted in regard to how other members of the telecommunication sector 
and companies including Google manage enforcement.  The political economy of 
communication stresses that the private sector is the most powerful stakeholder in 
telecommunication policy (Mosco, 2009), and so further research is necessary to 
understand what a framework for the digital commons or an open Internet is under the 
influence of telecommunication and technology companies.   
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